At the moment, the presidential election in Taiwan features a very competitive race between incumbent Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT and Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP, with James Soong running a very distant third. The outcome of this election has the potential to affect U.S-Taiwan relations. If and how it will do so depend upon three distinct factors: 1) the policies of the winning candidate; 2) U.S. views about Taiwan; and 3) China’s reaction in cross-Strait relations which might create tensions between Washington and Taipei.
The United States has a long-standing policy of supporting peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait in what might be called the “Establishment” position, although two contending perspectives have been emerged. One believes that the U.S. should abandon its strong support of Taiwan because it creates an impediment to improving relations with China; and the other wants Taiwan to be more aggressive in confronting the PRC. In general, the supporters of the Establishment view favor Ma, while the advocates of the other two favor Tsai, obviously for very different reasons.
Over the course of the campaign, we can see a cycle of polarization on national identity and cross-Strait relations. The two major candidates started out with seemingly reasonable and moderate positions on cross-Strait relations, although their critics would dispute this conclusion. Ma’s “Three Nos” (No Unification, No Independence, and No War) represents the current status quo which seems acceptable to most parties; and Tsai’s proposal for developing a “Taiwan Consensus” for dealing with China is certainly an important policy goal.
By October and November, though, greater polarization erupted. For example, Ma’s proposal for concluding a “peace accord” with China within a decade raised fears that, if re-elected, he would try to push Taiwan toward Unification. Similarly, Tsai’s strong rejection of the “1992 Consensus” (that there is one China but that the ROC and PRC have different interpretations of what it is) raised fears that her election would destroy the basis for doing business with China.
The cycle continued in that by late November both candidates were moving toward the middle on cross-Strait relations. Tsai pledged not to provoke the PRC and even indicated that she was open-minded about visiting China. Ma continued to voice strong support for maintaining Taiwan’s sovereignty and even backtracked on his “peace accord” proposal after the negative public reaction that it produced. Thus, he quickly said that this would not be a Unification Treaty and indicated that it could only be signed if approved by a popular referendum.
Both candidates, therefore, are quite likely to want to have good relations with the United States and to try to pursue policies that are consistent with current American policy regarding the Taiwan Strait area. However, both could create problems or opportunities in cross-Strait relations that could affect the Washington-Beijing-Taipei triangle significantly. Ironically then, the PRC’s reaction may be the most important factor in determining how the election will affect Taiwan-U.S. relations.
In terms of challenges to the current rapprochement in cross-Strait relations, Tsai’s election would raise the most obvious problem given that her rejection of the 1992 Consensus is anathema to China. Ma’s election could raise problems as well, though, since his proposal for a “peace accord” could have raised unrealistic expectations in China.
There are also opportunities that either candidate could promote as President. The most obvious is that a Ma victory would lead to a continuation of the status quo of a “quiet” Strait. Yet, either Tsai or Ma could also promote a positive transformation in cross-Strait relations, albeit at a significant risk to the status quo. A Tsai victory would challenge the stability in Taipei’s dealings with Beijing. Yet, if China and the DPP could work out a modus vivendi, this would remove a major threat to peace and stability in the area. Certainly, Tsai appears to be one of the few DPP leaders who could make progress here. Similarly, if Ma were to pursue a “peace accord,” short-term problems would probably erupt, but a formal “live-and-let-live” agreement could ease tensions dramatically.
Cal Clark is Professor of Political Science at Auburn University, USA.
What’s that you say? Oh, there’s a campaign going on…
The second TV debate went off on Saturday; I will post some analysis soon. In the meantime Ben Goren gives his impressions. How did the candidates handle the TaiMed scandal in Saturday’s debate? (more here.) China limits the broadcasting of Saturday’s exercise in democratic performance. A short overview of the debate from Reuters. Want China Times discusses how the debate tested Tsai’s morality. Taipei Times has a detailed overview of the third round debate in which the candidates were grilled by civic groups, although some consider that the candidates avoided tackling the tougher issues. Tsai discussed the need for new leadership and set out her vision for the future of Taiwan; Ma played the father figure, defending women (while attacking Tsai’s integrity!), children and youth; James Soong emphasised the concept of security at all levels of society: “a state leader’s most important task is to keep the country safe.”
Tsai describes the continuing saga over Taimed as an attempt at “character assassination” while Ma claims he had nothing to do with it. Indeed, Ma says he will give up his re-election bid if it can be proven that he ordered special investigation probe. Do you remember the KMT ad in 2000 attacking Soong for making just such an empty promise? China Times editorial discusses the lack of integrity and responsibility shown in the TaiMed scandal and links it to Tsai’s inability to lead. Michael Turton has analysis of the scandal here and here and discusses the impact of the scandal on the latest polls.
Shelley Rigger predicts that Taiwan will stick with Ma as the safe choice. The polls say she could be right. The latest Asia-Pacific Market survey poll puts Ma up 7 points. Apple Daily says polls largely unaffected by recent mudslinging. Latest poll from United Daily News also puts Ma ahead by 7, and similarly this China Times poll, which also shows results from the VP debates. The latest Liberty Times poll puts just 1% between Ma and Tsai, narrowing from 2 points last week. Political scientists suggest that independent neutral voters and first time voters will determine the outcome of the election. Numerically its true, but we say this every election and then the turnout figures for these cohorts are too low to make that much difference. Here’s an overview of the recent Brookings event where “anxiety” appears to be the key word over the outcome of the election and the future of cross-Strait issues.
The DPP accuses the KMT of vote buying in Taichung county; now there’s a thing. In this Taipei Times interview with Lee Chin-lung, he discusses the need for better policies. The Financial Times blog looks at the support of prominent businessman for the Ma campaign; now’s there’s a thing. The Washington Post discusses how the eyes of the great powers are focused on the Taiwan election and its tight competition: yes, Taiwan’s four-yearly moment in the spotlight is upon us. To prove it, BBC News has a video providing an overview of the election and the issues that’ll affect its outcome. Meanwhile, Tsai slams Ma over the enormous financial assets the KMT has accumulated over the years (surely not?) and proposes creating 800,000 social housing units if elected. The DPP urges China to not interfere in the elections after recent comments from high ranking officials on cross-Strait issues. Asia Sentinel discusses the looming election and the role of external interference.
The three candidates fleshed out their cultural policies recently and agreed on not extending the life of the three original nuclear power stations, although the candidates have opposing views on the life of the fourth plant. At his cultural policy discussion Ma is confronted multiple times by protestors. The KMT allegedly turned down Jimmy Carter paying a visit to Taiwan for the January elections (they also turned down the EU delegation of observers). After having their issues ignored during both the presidential and vice presidential debates, aboriginal groups want their policy issues to be addressed – “No one talked about such serious issues; the only thing Aboriginal they do is to greet voters in Aboriginal languages.” Taipei Times has an editorial on how Ma has alienated aboriginal groups and pushed them towards voting for his rivals. Howevefr, United Daily News has an article on why the current First Lady is much more respectable than any potential DPP ones—what can you say to that?
Tsai says the reason the KMT has been promoting such scandals is to draw attention away from the fact that it has nothing to offer. This editorial on how the KMT’s smear campaigns show how it is increasingly desperate agrees. Meanwhile, James Soong stands aloof. But not forgotten: Here’s Soong’s opinion of the Taimed scandal. Asia News Network discusses how the striptease scandal has turned the campaign into a circus without credibility; Haha, they must not have witnessed many campaigns then. And finally, a calendar of a KMT legislative candidate shows an incorrect timeline regarding the history of China; tsk tsk.
The idea that incumbent President Ma Ying-jeou could fail in his re-election bid was unthinkable half-way through his term, and unlikely until as recently as a couple of months ago. Ma entered office with a landslide victory and an unequivocal mandate to steady the ship with regards to cross-Strait relations and reinvigorate the economy. All but the most partisan DPP supporters were disillusioned with the Chen adminstration’s governance problems (not all of its own making), over-emphasis on ideological issues and, ultimately, high level corruption scandals. With a correspondingly large majority in the legislature, an untainted personal lustre, and facing an opposition in utter disarray, the KMT looked all set to resume the position it unexpectedly (and begrudgingly) gave up when Chen won the presidency in 2000. That election was lost as a direct result of infighting within the party, and scholars have observed how the KMT never gave up thinking of itself or behaving as if it was still in power. Thus the conditions in which Ma took the presidency in 2008 appeared to have re-established order ‘under heaven’ and the KMT would again reign for a long time.
So, what happened? We should first acknowledge that Ma has successfully pursued détente with China, warming relations to historically high levels. And, despite a global recession eating in to economies the world over, Taiwan has escaped relatively unscathed. However, despite his parliamentary majority, Ma’s administration is seen as having been ineffective and Ma personally weak. His major election pledges and policies (6-3-3, ECFA) have failed to deliver generalized benefits. Both the middle classes and blue and green collar workers have suffered, economic inequalities have increased, creating a potent fusion of social justice and quality of life issues. The speed and unchecked nature of Ma’s entente policies has alarmed the median voter (i.e. the one who has unequivocally supported the status quo through three decades).
Yet, still, Ma possessed an array of incumbency advantages, some common to incumbents everywhere, others exacerbated by formal and informal political structures that, despite democratization, are essentially unchanged since the KMT was last in power (indeed since it was the only party around). Furthermore, he should have benefited from the aversion to change that characterizes many electorates: Voters are generally wont to avoid change after a single term unless there is a compelling reason to do so. This is particularly so in Taiwan where voters consistently aver a preference for stability and where the KMT has long owned the ‘stability frame’ (that said, stability is also beloved of the CCP and other change-resistant regimes). These factors contributed to my long held belief, coincidentally expressed on this blog recently by Gunter Schubert, that Ma has not been sufficiently awful to make a substantial enough number of voters want to exchange him for his unproven rival and the uncertainties that a DPP government could bring.
I have changed my thinking, partly due to Ma’s utterly inept and incompetent campaign (sorry Blue readers), and partly due to Tsai’s transformation from the unsure lightweight we witnessed in the ECFA debate, to a candidate of genuine presidential bearing. Her deft (indeed Reagan-esque) response to Ma’s insinuations about Chen Shui-bian was characteristic of a candidate who has grown in confidence and stature through a level headed but effective campaign. In my opinion, the only weaknesses in her campaign are a fuzzy economic program and the nebulous notion of a ‘Taiwan Consensus’, which I cannot imagine is practicable either in its means (bipartisan political consensus) or its end (as a platform from which to engage China). Then again, on the policy front Ma isn’t doing so well either, with his Big Idea of a peace accord totally out of touch with public opinion and hastily removed from sight.
Such are the suicidal shenanigans going on in Ma’s campaign, Tsai should probably cancel all her campaign events and let Ma deliver the victory for her (more seriously, the only thing that looks like stopping Tsai’s momentum is over-confidence and a failure of the confirmed green vote to turnout). What started as a series of marginal missteps has degenerated into a full blown catastrophe. The latest instalment, an obviously instrumental, and possibly fraudulent, attempt to tie Tsai to the corruption of the Chen administration, by digging up an old consulting issue. Despite the blue friendly media that predominate in Taiwan’s mediascape, and a vast array of surrogates lining up to do the KMT’s dirty business, the Yu Chang case has backfired spectacularly. Employing such tactics has been a staple of KMT campaigns since before democratization (in local and supplementary elections), but what surprises me is the clumsiness of the execution, more reminiscent of a township or village chief than someone running for president, indeed the incumbent president.
At this point (brought up in a western democracy I was taught to revere the horse race) I should like to quote a reliable opinion poll to show just what a pickle Ma has got himself into. Alas, readers of this blog will know the difficulties associated with that. Instead, let me leave you with this thought. At this moment in time the National Chengchi University/XFuture election market has Ma trading at 28, with Tsai in the high 60s. Ultimately, it predicts a 12 point Tsai win. Lest you quickly dismiss this as a quirk of the Chengchi computers, recall that the prediction market has an exceptional track record of accurately predicting Taiwanese election outcomes (my thanks to @TimMaddog). Take all the pinches of salt you need to swallow this extraordinary bit of data, but believe that Ma is in trouble.
Having just come back from Taiwan after a busy week there, I cannot help but express a feeling that the prospects for the DPP in the upcoming presidential elections are low. It’s a feeling partly nurtured by my experience back in 2008 when I closely observed the election campaign and joined the EU delegation visiting Taiwan. This was a sad time for the then ruling party. My friends in the DPP were depressed and had long accepted defeat. Outgoing president Chen Shui-bian was a disastrous liability for the DPP and its candidate Hsieh Chang-ting who fought a losing battle. DPP rallies were as hot and loud as ever, but the median voter stood by unimpressed. Talking to a number of leading DPP figures at the time was odd as they anticipated the result – and some of them were guessing quite correctly how big the gap was going to be between the two contenders. These were the winds of change, and whatever the DPP did to denounce the KMT’s obvious objective to jumpstart a new unification policy after retaking power, most Taiwanese didn’t want to listen.
Four years later, the DPP has regained strength. The new leader, Tsai Ing-wen, has proven to be a blessing for the party, uniting it by striking a deal with the old leadership and dimming down party ideology to pave the way for a proper response to the KMT’s integration course. From the beginning, the opposition was doomed to react and could hardly influence the government’s agenda. There was much to criticize when it came to speed and context of cross-Strait negotiations pushed forward by Ma, but Tsai Ing-wen had to accept that full blown opposition to the KMT’s proactive China policy would be political suicide in the long run; hence the focus on technical details and parliamentary oversight. That is certainly important, but it never could shake the government’s course.
The DPP’s 10 year policy platform, promulgated in late August, was hotly debated by the media until its finalization. After that, it became just another document and has not impacted meaningfully on the public discourse so far. In fact, the DPP’s China policy has been spelled out in rather cryptical terms: “harmony without uniformity, seeking similarity in peace” (he er bu tong, he er qiu tong) corresponds nicely to the Chinese way of breaking complex issues down to catchy slogans, but it explains little in terms of how the DPP could do better than the KMT. My DPP friends have told me that Tsai would be willing to talk to China, that she would be more cautious, more realistic and more successful in protecting Taiwan’s sovereignty and dignity than Ma Ying-jeou. But it is far from clear for many Taiwanese, including those supporting the DPP, how Tsai will find a way around the ‘one China principle’ and the ‘1992 consensus’, both of which she rejects, and still be able to talk to the Chinese authorities if she becomes Taiwan’s next president. Tsai may still be given a chance to try, but only if the alternative – another four years of KMT-led dialogue across the Taiwan Strait, is considered worse. It seems to me that most Taiwanese do not think that way.
Tsai and her DPP thus focus on other issues related to domestic policy in order to win over the median voter: social justice, judicial and educational reform, new policies to protect labour and the environment. These issues matter, but they do not decide an election in Taiwan. Recent surveys promise a close race between the two major contenders and one may think back to 2004 when Chen Shui-bian caught up during the last weeks before the presidential election. It may have been a bullet that ensured him eventual victory, but this veils the fact that the winds of change were also weak at the time. Tight races suggest an advantage for the incumbent in Taiwan, not for the challenger.
Today, Ma Ying-jeou stands firmly enough after four years as president. For a majority of Taiwan’s voters, he is not really a corrupt leader or a maverick whose policies undermine Taiwan’s sovereignty and freedom. He made a silly mistake by advocating a peace agreement agenda for his second administration, but the damage to his campaign seems to be limited. The way for the DPP back to the presidential office is long – too long for now. The median voter is simply not alienated enough from the current government, and the DPP has too little to offer to convince them to switch camps. For a change of government in Taiwan, you need a corrupt incumbent (at least one who is successfully labeled so) or a sentiment of crisis with respect to cross-strait relations. The best prospects for change would be a combination of both, like in 2008. In present-day Taiwan, none of these factors count. Since there are no winds of change, I expect four more years of KMT rule – until I am proven wrong?
One of the things that comes out time and again about Tsai Ing-wen is that she is a clean candidate. This is an important characteristic for all election candidates, but is particularly salient in an election where the incumbent prides himself on his own clean image and the challenger party has to deal with the baggage of a former party chairman and president jailed for corruption. With exquisite timing then, the KMT has launched a concentrated attack on Tsai’s image.
It started during the first presidential debate, where Ma made a concerted effort to tie Tsai to the Chen Shui-bian administration. Guilt by association is a common tactic, and though derided for his continual references to CSB, it is a vulnerability for the DPP. Of course, the KMT’s own history is, euphemistically, not blemish free either, and has been the subject of opposition attacks since the Tangwai era. It strikes me that voters may already be somewhat inured to revelations about the KMT. In any case, consistent revelations about the party (its connections to big business, media, civil service, military, China, the mafia etc. etc.) have not prevented it from maintaining its control of the legislature and being competitive in every executive election throughout the democratic period. Clearly, scandals and nefarious dealings have not devastated KMT support levels.
After ‘priming’ voters during the TV debate, the KMT reinvigorated an old issue (Tsai’s consulting role for a biotech company) in a legislative hearing that was clearly stage-managed. I am not a lawyer and have no detailed knowledge of the case. But an issue from 2007, which has not had any new developments, suddenly appearing on the public agenda at the sharp end of a campaign in which Tsai’s clean image is one factor in her strong poll performance, is obviously instrumental. And of course, it is the same tactic the KMT used in 2000, when friendly media broke the Soong Hsingpiao scandal. The difference is in the timing: this time round they waited until the final month of the campaign, no doubt hoping that it will dominate the rest of the campaign agenda.
Will it work, i.e. will it reduce Tsai’s support levels sufficiently that Ma will win regardless of the Soong-effect on election day? Let’s see. First, three decades of research on negative campaigning suggests that ‘there is no consistent evidence in the research literature that negative political campaigning ‘works’ in achieving the electoral results that attackers desire’ (Lau et al. 2007: 1185, italics in the original). Second, the majority of voters have already made up their minds who they are going to vote for. Confirmed DPP supporters will not be swayed by this. But, if the opinion polls are to be believed (Haha), a substantial segment of the electorate (10-20%) is still undecided, and we know that these voters tend to be influenced by what happens during the final part of the campaign. Furthermore, the KMT may be trying to create sufficient fear of a DPP comeback among (currently, self-declared) Soong supporters, that come election day, they do not dare register their dissatisfaction with Ma by making him vulnerable by voting Soong.
Could Ma risk a backlash? Research in the US suggests that voters (specifically weak partisans and independents) can withhold or withdraw their support for a candidate whom they perceive to be engaging in unfair, unwarranted or otherwise dastardly behaviour. If voters perceive these attacks on Tsai to be instrumental, could they hurt Ma (to whom the image of the gentleman-statesman is very important) more than Tsai? They could, which is why it is such a clever move to delegate the attack role to the party.
In a paper I have coming out in the Asian Journal of Communication using advertising as a proxy for campaigning, ad sponsorship was a robust predictor of all operationalizations of negativity, i.e. there is systematic evidence that presidential candidates get their parties to do the dirty work. In the paper I surmise that this is to avoid the backlash effect, to maintain ‘plausible deniability’ should voters react badly. Thus, while expecting attacks on Tsai to continue, I wouldn’t be surprised if the Yu Chang case itself is made by Ma’s surrogates in the party and media.
What should Tsai do? A far-away leading candidate would be best off ignoring the bait and staying above the fray. Responding can only keep the issue on the agenda. But Tsai is not in that position and cannot risk doing a John Kerry, i.e. letting the scandal grow in the vacuum of a non-response. The allegations have met with a forceful rebuttal, and the DPP has framed the attack as a dirty tactic. Unless the scandal continues to grow and eats in to her poll numbers (in which case a party-led counter attack would be appropriate), she should move on and get back on message.
At the request of the author, this is an extended version of the post that appeared here last week.
Donald Tsang, Hong Kong’s Chief Executive, desperately tried to retain his composure. He looked at the massive speaker’s desk in front of him. There were only a few metres were between him and the angry man in the red shirt. It should have been a routine visit to the legislature. Now ‘Mad Dog’ Raymond Wong kept shouting at him. Wong was visibly outraged by the governments’ indifference towards the elderly and a few moments later he should throw bananas towards Donald Tsang. This historic Wednesday in October 2008 saw a significant change in Hong Kong’s politics. It was the beginning of ‘radical’ politics, ‘Taiwanstyle’.
Three years later, in November 2011, the pan-democratic camp suffered a major defeat in the in the Hong Kong District Council (DC) Elections. Particularly hard hit were Raymond Wong and other so-called ‘radical’ democrats. The mainstream media was quick to conclude that this would be the end to their ‘radical and confrontational’ tactics (SCMP). But is this really the case?
Although the myth of Hong Kong people’s political apathy (DeGolyer and Scott 1996) has long been refuted, remnants of the ‘stability narrative’ (Ku 2002, Lam 2004) have contributed to the conception that Hong Kong people have to voice their political opinions in a ‘rational, peaceful and legal way’ (Hong Kong’s Information Service Department 2011). Although Hong Kong could best be described as a semi-democratic system without universal suffrage, the rule of law, civil liberties and freedoms are still guaranteed. This might have led to the consensus, among the administration, the media and the academic establishment that mass protests and Legislative Council (LegCo) debates are the ‘right’ way to articulate political options and any other forms are labeled as ‘radical’.
Indeed with the formation of the pro-democratic, grassroots oriented and left-wing League of Social Democrats社會民主連線 (LSD) in 2006 and the subsequent election of ‘Big Guy’ Albert Chan陳偉業, ‘Mad Dog’ Raymond Wong 黃毓民and ‘Long Hair’ Leung Kwok-hung 梁國雄 to the 2008 LegCo, a more innovative, energetic and confrontational style of politics and campaigning entered the political scene. All three legislators are veteran politicians and social and political activists. Radio host Wong has strong personal and educational links toTaiwan. Government representatives, pro-establishment and pro-Beijing figures were quick to condemn the actions of the trio in the LegCo as rowdy behaviour imported fromTaiwan(Wen Wei Pao 2010). This value judgement has been readily picked up by the mainstream media and not challenged by the academic establishment, avoiding any critical discourse of ‘Taiwanisation’. The following analysis is based on several years of continual and on the ground fieldwork, and extensive interviews with politicians from all political backgrounds.
It is important to point out that Taiwanpolitics is generally negatively framed by the mainstream media and the administration, particularly during the Chen Shui-bian era. Therefore connections of politicians and parties to Taiwanare frequently used to imply creating chaos and advocating separatism (footnote 1). Yet for observers of both Hong Kong and Taiwan politics and campaigns, the influence of Taiwan election campaigns and strategies is a long-standing phenomenon (footnote 2). The colourful style of campaigning with flags and banners is reminiscent of Taiwan and pan-democratic parties have also employed similar voter allocation strategies (Ma and Choy 2003). Hong Kong political parties and researchers have sent delegations to observe Taiwan politics and elections on a regular basis. The effects were obvious in the 2008 LegCo election campaign. Candidates from all backgrounds employed gestures directly copied from Ma Ying-jeou’s 2008 campaign literature.
Indeed the Democratic Party (DP) produced a short Youtube clip which was inspired by the iconic KMT clip ‘The power to change’.
The LSD fully embraced the entire spectrum of ‘Taiwanstyle’ campaigning. Taiwaninspired campaign elements included a large rally before the voting day, in fact the first of its kind in Hong Kong (footnote 3), the frequent use of gimmicks as well as the branding of its star candidates including comics, posters, and small toy figures. LSD candidates speeches were down to earth, spontaneous filled with foul language and particular in televised debates, very aggressive towards the pro-establishment camp.
The rise of the LSD can be largely explained by the frustration of a significant sector of society which feels alienated by the political establishment. The rapidly growing wealth gap inHong Kong, steady rising living costs and astronomical housing fees have met by no effective, coherent and long-term strategy of the administration. In fact the Hong Kong government is perceived as increasingly unresponsive to the demands of the people without real public consultations and accountability as well as democratic progress (DeGolyer et al. 2010). These issues, its charismatic leaders and a sophisticated new media and social network strategy of the party contributed to the great support from particularly young voters and followers.
Taiwanese theatre politics (Fell 2007) was subsequently introduced into the LegCo. LSD legislators would frequently throw symbol laden items in the chamber at government members and verbally attack Donald Tsang for the administrations’ inadequate financial support of the grassroots.
The LSD split in early 2011, with Chan and Wong forming the de facto mirror organisation People Power人民力量 (PP). Yet the tactics of both parties remained the same with the PP further increasing the pressure on the government through street blockages following mass demonstrations and a siege to the LegCo building in July 2011.
The LSD’s Long Hair remarked that in fact these forms of resistance and theatre politics are not unique to Taiwan politics during the early years of democratisation. Indeed these are common ways of questioning the legitimacy of existing institutions (footnote 4). Yet the success of Taiwan’s democracy movement, its advanced and sophisticated campaign culture provide an ample resource that due to spatial proximity, language and cultural similarities as well as personal links can be easily accessed.
The recent DC election saw again frequent elements of Taiwanstyle campaigning, for example in the design of campaign leaflets as well as activities. Here again the PP was a front-runner with its appeal to young voters. An interesting observation was the clear reference to the popular Taiwanmovie那些年，我們一起追的女孩 [Once upon a time, the girl we chased together] (footnote 5). The film’s poster was used as the basis for a campaign leaflet by a young candidate targeting voters in his age group changing the film’s title into那些年，我們一起追的民主 [Once upon a time, we chased democracy together] (footnote 6).
The Legislative Council Elections in 2012 will employ a different voting system, favouring smaller parties and ‘star candidates’. Hong Kong’s deep rooted social problems are also far from being solved or even addressed. Adding the rising political awareness and participation of youngsters, the verdict on the fate of so-called ‘radical’ tactics is premature. It looks more like ‘Taiwanstyle’ campaigning is here to stay.
Footnote 1: In 2003 veteran pan-democratic lawmaker Emily Lau stated that Taiwan’s future should be determined by the Taiwanese people. This caused furious reactions by the pro-Beijing camp, asking for her removal from the LegCo and demanding an apology before ‘it is too late to regret’ (Chan 2003; Dao 2003). In late 2011 donations to the pan-democrats made by Hong Kong media tycoon Jimmy Lai, residing inTaiwan, were used to suggest foreign interference in Chinese affairs (Chan 2011).
Footnote 2: Election campaigning inHong Kongis highly regulated. Campaign commercials in broadcast media are not allowed and expenses are capped at a very low level. Therefore newspaper advertisements are rare and appear only in the last 2-3 days before voting day.
Footnote 3: Personal interview with Albert Chan. October 2008
Footnote 4: Personal interview with Leung Kwok-hung. May 2011
Footnote 5: The official translation of the film’s Chinese title is ‘You are the Apple of my Eye’.
Footnote 6: The subtitle on the leaflet is directed at the Democratic Party and reads: ‘Where has the 2012 universal suffrage in the previous party platform gone? We had agreed upon a timetable and a road map, but where are they now?’
Chan, Kam-lam (2003) “Censure Emily Lau for Taiwanremarks” China Daily HK Edition 5 September 2003 Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.china.org.cn/english/MATERIAL/74412.htm> (accessed 27 November 2011).
DeGolyer, Michael E., and Scott, Janet Lee (1996) “The myth of political apathy in Hong Kong,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political Science, 547
DeGolyer, Michael E. et al. (2010) “Protest and post-80 youth: a special report on the post-80s generation in Hong Kong,” Hong Kong Transition Project, Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.hktp.org> (accessed 27 November 2011).
Fell, Dafydd (2007) “Putting on a show and electoral fortunes in Taiwan’s multi-party elections,” in Strauss, Julia C., and Cruise O’Brien, Donal B. (eds.) Staging politics: Power and performance in Asia and Africa.
Ku, Agnes S. (2002) “Postcolonial Cultural trends in Hong Kong: imagining the local, the national, and the global“ in Chan, Ming K. and So, Alvin Y. (eds.) Crisis and transformation in China’s Hong Kong.
Lam Wai-man (2004) Understanding the political culture of Hong Kong: the paradox of activism and depoliticization.
Ma, Ngok 馬嶽Ivan Choy蔡子強 (2003) 選舉制度的政治效果: 港式比例代表制的經驗 [Political consequences of electoral systems: The Hong Kong proportional representation system].
South ChinaMorning Post (2011) “Grassroots lesson for pan-democrats” South China Morning Post 8 November 2011 Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.scmp.com> (accessed 8 November 2011)
Malte Philipp Kaeding is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Surrey. He is an Associate Fellow at the European Research Centre on Contemporary Taiwan (ERCCT) and a member of the Hong Kong Transition Project.
I reached out to several China-based scholars who do work about Taiwan with a mind to having a ‘view from China’-type post. Unfortunately these attempts have not produced any results. I can’t tell whether this is because Taiwan’s elections are too ‘sensitive’, or whether there is simply not a lot to say about them. So, changing track, I asked a couple of former students from China to give me a ground level view, maybe talk about what they’ve heard or their own opinions. What follows here was written by a former grad student, who wishes to remain anonymous. This student has done research on cross-Strait relations and is currently pursuing doctoral studies in China. I found this personal view very interesting; I hope you do to. Jon
“In 2008 after Ma Ying-Jeou won the election, my American friend Bob, Taiwanese friend Neil, and I were chatting happily in Bob’s living room. “So, how do you think about relations between China and Taiwan?” Bob asked Neil and I. “Oh, we are like a family” I answered. “No, we are enemies” Neil retorted. Bob burst into laughter. “You were diplomatic”, said Bob to me, “but you were telling the truth”, he said to Neil.
I can still recall how shocked I felt at that moment. First of all, I was not trying to be diplomatic. Instead, I sincerely meant what I said. I had been grown up in that belief, because everybody told me that Taiwan is part of China, including my Taiwanese friends who were doing business on the Chinese Mainland. I did often read from the media that there were a group of people in Taiwan who had been actively pushing Taiwan towards de jure independence, and that they had a lot of supporters who were called the “pan-greens”. However, I genuinely thought that there were at least half of Taiwanese, if not the majority, who believed that Taiwan and the Mainland should be a family, and did not want Taiwan to be separated from China permanently. Secondly, despite the fact that Neil was a “deep-green”, we were very good friends. Both of us agreed that political differences could be put aside and that people from both sides of the Strait should be able to be friends if they harbor good will towards each other. Thus, I did not expect that Neil, as an ordinary Taiwanese, was in fact so hostile towards China.
That incident four years ago made me start to really look at the history of Taiwan as well as cross-Strait relations. Also thanks to my Taiwanese friends from different political backgrounds and with different political views, I have developed a better understanding on the mentality of Taiwan people. To a certain extent, I even have sympathy towards the pan-greens because I can understand the historical trauma behind such a mindset. Thus, I share the expectations of those color-blind voters inTaiwanwho care more about which party can provide Taiwan people with a better life rather than the simple ideological division between the blue camp and green camp. By the same token, I believe that there should be a more conciliatory solution between China’s takeover of Taiwan—the handover of a democracy to an authoritarian state as some scholars suggest (personally I think scholars who suggest such possibility are doing so out of sarcasm or ignorance), and formal declaration of independence of Taiwan as Taiwan Republic or whatever, because the biggest concern for people of the both sides is peace and prosperity.
I might prefer Ma as most of the mainlanders do, because I think it would be easier for KMT and the CPC government to reach mutual understanding which would better facilitate a peaceful and prosper co-existence between both sides of the Strait (some of my fellows might even prefer Soong, because according to the mass media on the Mainland, the PFP is more prone to unification, though not all of them understand that Taiwan’s concept of unification is entirely different from that of the Mainland). Yet it would also be interesting to observe whether and how the Mainland and Taiwan could learn to better cope with each other in a more flexible and pragmatic way if Tsai got elected—a lesson CCP and DPP will have to learn sooner or later.
As a Mainlander I also believe that there is such thing as the Chinese nation, because the ethnical, lingual and cultural linkage between people from the Mainland and Taiwan is simply undeniable. Taiwan exceeds the Mainland in terms of economic and social development. Thus,Taiwan’s toady could be China’s tomorrow. And there are always things to learn and reflect on from each other’s experience.
Furthermore, though PRC claims the “sole representative of China”, it is Taiwan which has best inherited Chinese culture and tradition, and even the tinder for the rejuvenation of Chinese nation. During the late 19th and early 20th century, China was witnessing one of the most abysmal situations in the history, with its territory occupied or colonized, people slaughtered and humiliated, endless anti-invasion and civil wars, and political oppressions (Taiwan was separated from the Mainland under such a background). During that period, the pioneer of modern Chinese thinkers has identified two essential elements–science and democracy for China to grow out of this pathetic situation. After almost 100 years, while the merit of science has been widely recognized, democracy remains ill-defined, under-nurtured and frequently questioned on the Mainland.
To me, democracy does not simply equal vote, though the latter is a necessary part of the former. The ideal of democracy is a more grandeur institution that can liberate each individual from the fetish of collectivism that has made an authoritarian political system possible, so that everybody has the opportunity to live his fullest potential. When democracy on the Mainland has only been “uninstitutionalized” at its best, it has been taking roots and bearing fruit in Taiwan. It is far from perfect, of course. Yet as Lung Ying-Tai, one of the most famous writers on Taiwan has said, Taiwan proves that democracy is workable in the Chinese community. If it is workable in Taiwan, it is bound to be workable elsewhere among Chinese people. It might take time for a breaking point. It might sound too idealistic to say that Taiwan is a beacon of democracy, but Taiwan definitely would be a model that people on the Mainland keenly observe and draw the best lesson from.”
In a China Quarterly paper published last year (with the title “Chen Shui-bian: On independence”, which was supposed to be a play on Mao’s ‘On’ series), Will Lowe and I analysed all of CSB’s speeches in the first 6 1/2 years of his tenure (~2500). Our findings strongly suggested that CSB was not a serial independence monger. His discourse, especially after re-election, was dominated by Taiwan identity, but these expressions (by our definition) did not relate to sovereignty or constitute independence markers. Furthermore, we argued that the ‘fluidity’ of his rhetoric could largely be explained by the identity of the primary audience he was addressing, e.g. independence groups overseas were exposed to a lot of sovereignty language, while economists heard only about the economy.
With Eliyahu Sapir I am currently writing up a similar analysis of Ma Ying-jeou’s presidential discourse for a special issue of the Journal of Current Chinese Affairs. I can’t give away too much at this point, but I can share a couple of visual representations of Ma’s speeches (~2000). The first graph shows the proportion of Ma’s speeches that contained indicators in each of four categories, Chinese identity, Taiwan identity, the economy and pro-democracy. This graph doesn’t control for external events as the CSB paper does and its not spectacularly informative. But it does show that around two thirds of Ma’s speeches between May 2008 and August 2011 were ‘on the economy’, which was the most popular topic. At the start of his tenure, around 40% of speeches contained markers of both Chinese and Taiwan identity, but quickly diverged thereafter. By mid-2011 around half of Ma’s speeches contained references to Chinese identity, but less than a third Taiwan identity markers. Also declining in prominence is language associated with democracy. A little less than one third of speeches at the beginning of his tenure made reference to democracy, falling by half by summer 2011. Data for the paper will present a more detailed and nuanced picture, but the birds eye view is that Ma consistently emphasizes the economy, began with an equal emphasis on Chinese and Taiwan identity (which quickly and consistently diverged thereafter), and democracy is progressively less emphasized over time.
One of the other main findings of the CSB paper was that a lot of the variation in Chen’s speeches could be attributed to the identity of the audience to whom he was delivering the talk. In colloquial terms its known as playing to the crowd, it is also consistent with spatial politics models. The upshot is that political actors, be they CSB or Ma Ying-jeou, have different constituencies to engage, different stakeholders with varying preferences to win over etc, and one of the ways they can do so is by telling ’em what they want to hear. The chart below shows the proportion of speeches dedicated to each category, for 10 different audiences (for the curious, details are in the CQ paper). Again this is rough and ready, but we can see that Ma has substantially different emphases in speeches to different audiences. For instance, when talking to foreign media (fmed) Chinese identity is by far the most salient message. By contrast, when talking with business people and organizations (econ) the vast majority of what they get to hear is about economics. Sovereignty is only salient in New Year’s and National Day speeches (ndny), and to a lesser extent when Ma addressed foreign allies (alli).
There’s lot’s of fun stuff in this paper, I’ll try and post something more substantial once I’ve done some more work on it. But remember this is the analysis of speeches (not campaign ads etc.), and the timeframe doesn’t go up to the recent campaign period. Ma’s presidential discourse has been dominated by the economy and Chinese identity; it doesn’t surprise me that he would feel the need to do a bit of remedial work on Taiwan identity during the last part of the campaign.
The Hong Kong District Council (DC) Elections of early November 2011 have been considered as a major defeat for the pan-democratic camp in the territory and particular for the ‘radical’ democrats. Leaders of the League of Social Democrats (LSD) and People’s Power (PP) admitted that their strategies did not work and the mainstream media was quick to conclude that this would be the end to their ‘radical and confrontational’ tactics.
Although the myth of the Hong Kong people’s political apathy has long been refuted, remnants of the ‘stability narrative’ have contributed to the conception that Hong Kong people have to voice their political opinions in a ‘peaceful, rational and orderly manner’. Although Hong Kong could best be described as a semi-democratic system without universal suffrage, the rule of law, civil liberties and freedoms are still guaranteed. This might have led to the consensus, among the administration, the media and the academic establishment that mass protests and Legislative Council (LegCo) debates are the ‘right’ way to articulate political options and any other forms of political activism are labeled as ‘radical’.
Indeed, with the formation of the pro-democratic, grassroots oriented and left-wing LSD in 2006 and the subsequent election of ‘Big Guy’ Albert Chan, ‘Mad Dog’ Raymond Wong and ‘Long Hair’ Leung Kwok-hung to the 2008 LegCo, a more innovative, energetic and confrontational style of politics and campaigning entered the political scene. All three legislators are veteran politicians and social and political activists. Radio host Wong has strong personal and educational links to Taiwan. Government representatives, pro-establishment and pro-Beijing figures were quick to condemn the actions of the trio in the LegCo as rowdy behaviour imported from Taiwan. This value judgement has been readily picked up by the mainstream media and not challenged by the academic establishment, who wish to avoid any critical discourse of ‘Taiwanisation’. The following analysis is based on several years of continual and on the ground fieldwork, and extensive interviews with politicians from all political backgrounds.
It is important to point out that Taiwanese politics is generally negatively framed by the mainstream media and the administration, particularly during the Chen Shui-bian era. Therefore connections of politicians and parties to Taiwan are frequently used to imply the creation of chaos and advocating separatism. In 2003 veteran pan-democratic lawmaker Emily Lau stated that Taiwan’s future should be determined by the Taiwanese people. This caused furious reactions by the pro-Beijing camp, asking for her removal from the LegCo and demanding an apology before ‘it is too late to regret’.
Yet for observers of both Hong Kong politics and campaigns, the influence of Taiwanese election campaigns and strategies is increasingly evident. Election campaigning in Hong Kong is highly regulated. Campaign commercials in broadcast media are not allowed and expenses are capped at a very low level. Therefore newspaper advertisements are rare and appear only in the last 2-3 days before voting day. However, the colourful style of campaigning with flags and banners is reminiscent of Taiwan and pan-democratic parties have employed similar voter allocation strategies. Hong Kong’s political parties and researchers have sent delegations to observe Taiwanese politics and elections on a regular basis. The effects were obvious in the 2008 LegCo election campaign. Candidates from all backgrounds employed gestures directly copied from Ma Ying-jeou’s 2008 campaign literature. Indeed the Democratic Party (DP) produced a short Youtube clip which was inspired by the iconic KMT clip ‘The power to change’.
The LSD fully embraced the entire spectrum of ‘Taiwan style’ campaigning. Taiwan inspired campaign elements included a large rally before the voting day, in fact the first of its kind in Hong Kong, the frequent use of gimmicks as well as the branding of its star candidates including comics, posters, and small toy figures. LSD candidates’ speeches were down to earth, spontaneous, filled with foul language and particular in televised debates, very aggressive towards the pro-establishment camp.
The rise of the LSD can be largely explained by the frustration of a significant sector of society which feels alienated by the political establishment. The rapidly growing wealth gap in Hong Kong, steadily rising living costs and astronomical housing fees have been met by no effective, coherent and long-term strategy by the administration. In fact the Hong Kong government is perceived as increasingly unresponsive to the demands of the people without real public consultations and accountability as well as democratic progress (HKTP). These issues, its charismatic leaders and a sophisticated new media and social network strategy of the party contributed to the great support, particularly from young voters and followers.
Taiwanese ‘theatre politics’ was subsequently introduced into the LegCo with Wong famously throwing bananas towards the Chief Executive, slamming the governments inadequate financial support of the elderly. The LSD split in early 2011, with Chan and Wong forming the de facto mirror organization the PP. Yet the tactics of both parties remained the same with the PP further increasing the pressure on the government through street blockages following mass demonstrations and a siege to the LegCo building in July 2011.
The LSD’s Long Hair remarked that in fact these forms of resistance and theatre politics are not unique to Taiwanese politics during the early years of democratisation. Indeed these are common ways of questioning the legitimacy of existing institutions. Yet the success of Taiwan’s democratic movement, its advanced and sophisticated campaign culture provide an ample resource that can be easily accessed.
The recent DC election saw again frequent elements of Taiwanese style campaigning, for example in the design of campaign leaflets as well as activities. Here again the PP was a front-runner with its appeal to young voters. An interesting observation was the clear reference to the popular Taiwan movie ‘You are the Apple of my Eye’. The film’s poster was used as the basis for a campaign leaflet by a young candidate targeting voters in his age group.
The Legislative Council Elections in 2012 will employ a different voting system, favouring smaller parties and ‘star candidates’. Hong Kong’s deep rooted social problems are also far from being solved or even addressed. Adding to the rising political awareness and participation of youngsters, the verdict on the fate of so-called ‘radical’ tactics is premature. It looks more like ‘Taiwan style’ campaigning is here to stay.
Dr Malte Kaeding is Lecturer in International Politics at the School of Politics, University of Surrey.
A blog I haven’t read before has the extraordinary tail (sic) of the politicization of a senior citizen’s nightly congress with Man’s Best Friend. Is nothing sacred anymore? Chun-yi Lee posted here recently on the Taishang issue, Asia Times has a story on the same issue, with the added value of how China is trying to leverage its influence over Taiwanese business people in China: “if you can mobilize more votes for Ma, you will find doing business in China far easier in the future”. This is not at all surprising. More worrying is the Next report about attempts to “influence” local vote brokers. This is a very depressing development to go alongside the other means of CCP interference described here by Muyi Chou. This Taipei Times editorial concludes that ‘the CCP has apparently decided that its support for Ma no longer needs to be kept secret’.
If you’re in the DC area, Brookings will convene an election panel made up of Richard Bush III, Shelley Rigger and Hsu Szu-chien on December 14th. On the same day in London, SOAS will hold its own election panel, with Chris Hughes, Dafydd Fell, Malte Kaeding and me. I’ll post a report of any interesting goings on next week. SOAS will also have a post-election panel on Feb 8th.
I also want to draw your attention to the recently established Association Francophone d’Études Taïwanaises. It is currently being run by Jérôme Soldani (who posted here on Ma’s adoption of baseball) and Youan Goudin, who will also post here soon. It also has input from Stéphane Corcuff, who’s new book is highly recommended. This also seems an opportune moment to give a shout out to my friends at the North American Taiwan Studies Association (really looking forward to working with Murray Rubinstein and Shelley Rigger on a panel about the ‘decline of Taiwan studies’ at NATSA next year). And to remind you that proposals are now being accepted for the European Association of Taiwan Studies conference in Denmark, which will have at least one panel dedicated to the Taiwan 2012 elections.
Global Voices Online has extracts from Chinese bloggers discussing the first televised debate. There is more on Chinese netizens’ love for the debates here and here. “Only when state leaders are elected via a democratic process can China become a democracy. Leaders produced via other methods are only dictators under a fake skin of democracy.” I shall refrain from saying that this can also be true of elected leaders. Even more love for the debate here, but including the damning conclusion that “Ma was too weak, Tsai was too feminine, and Soong was too fake.” Its a pity that we’re no longer in Movember, because a strong moustache could be the answer for all three.
Stung by the criticism from an anonymous Chinese blogger that he is fake, and cavalierly eschewing my moustache idea, James Soong instead attempts to set a new world record for use of the word extraordinary in the same sentence. “In this extraordinary time, we need an extraordinary man to lead an extraordinary team to use an extraordinary approach to break away from Taiwan’s extraordinary plight.” A good effort, Sir. He also has some advice for Tsai Ing-wen’s campaign sloganeers: “Taiwan can’t be ‘Next,’ Taiwan has to be first.” Wasn’t “Taiwan First” one of CSB’s slogans in 2004?
Tsai says that she wants “to restore Taipei to the city I remember from my childhood.” A noble intention, but it made me wince when I checked when Tsai moved to Taipei from Pingtung: 1967. Now, I think Taipei is one of the most liveable cities in the world, but that 60’s architecture was brutal. I couldn’t find an appropriate image I could use, so here’s some video from 1959 instead.
If you weren’t already getting sufficient value out of James Soong’s campaign, his running mate just came up with a doozy. He accused the National Security Bureau of launching an electronmagnetic wave attack on his house. He said “If I hadn’t quickly moved out of my home, I would have lost my mind.” …Guys its no fun when you make it this easy.
Finally, Ma has solicited the help of the First Lady on the campaign trail. A campaign staffer gushed “the first lady is very charismatic and is always great with the public.” Can she sub for Ma in the next debate?
As anyone who knows a bit about Taiwanese politics will tell you, media polls should be taken with a pinch of salt. Such is the wild variation from one polling organization to another, you could be forgiven for thinking that something smells fishy. I don’t want to go down that route, but will simply note what most people already know: media organizations in Taiwan are (and have always been) pervaded by partisan interests. Although actual ownership of news organizations by political parties was outlawed several years ago (one of CSB’s achievements), various forms of influence continue as strongly as ever. Media are generally not independent from partisan interests, and this is reflected in opinion polls. For as long as I can remember, the variation between polls across the blue-green divide suggests something systematic rather than random. Namely, blue-friendly media consistently over estimate blue candidates’ support, and under-estimate green candidate support. The opposite is probably also true, just that the number of green-friendly media outlets is much smaller.
These ruminations were prompted by Michael Turton’s post on the current poll confusion. In the latest polls, Apple has Ma ahead by 10 points, Now News by 7, TVBS by 6 and China Times also by 7. These outlets lean towards blue to a greater or lesser extent. By contrast, the strongly green-leaning Liberty Times has Tsai ahead by 2 points. In each of these polls, the percentage of self-reported undecided voters and don’t knows is rather high, on average 20%. Looks like grim news for Tsai, but the Chengchi University/ XFuture election market (which doesn’t have a measure of undecideds) has her trading 10 points higher than Ma and predicts a Tsai win. Being confronted with such a big spread is one reason many Taiwan observers (and voters) put little stall in pre-election polls.
Individual polls are actually fairly consistent; but whether they are consistently right or wrong is open for debate. See for instance the poll numbers published by the blue-leaning TVBS over the last four months.
In fact the blue-friendly media polls over the last four months all say pretty much the same thing. The figures below are the mean levels of support for each candidate (and the proportion of don’t knows) over all the polls by each organization taken since August. All three blue-leaning media have Ma at around 40%, Tsai around 34%, Soong around 11% and don’t knows around 15%. Mean levels of support in the green Liberty Times polls have Soong at a similar level, and Tsai around the same but in fact a bit lower on average. The difference between Liberty and the other polls is in the number of undecideds, which is seven or eight points higher than in the blue media polls. And that seven or eight points is exactly the difference between the level of support found for Ma in the blue polls and the green poll (40% vs. 32%).
TVBS
UDN
China Times
Liberty
Ma
39.9
40.3
39.9
32.4
Tsai
34.5
33.0
34.8
31.8
Soong
12.3
11.3
10.5
12.0
DK
13.4
15.3
15.0
21.8
Isn’t it unusual to find so many undecided voters? Why should the blue and green media samples find such different proportions of don’t knows? Back in the day there was a theory that green support was systematically under-estimated in polls because people were worried about revealing their preferences for fear of reprisals. That is no longer a factor. A more prosaic answer is that there are non-random sampling errors. The bottom line is that we can’t read too much into the polls and an educated guess is probably as accurate. Either way, these numbers, which are widely publicized in Taiwan, can be spun by each side. Ma can say that he isn’t so unpopular after all, and Tsai can demonstrate her competitiveness while still urging the mobilization of every last green supporter (something the DPP is good at). And, if ~20% of the electorate really is undecided, there are still enough votes out there for each camps’ campaign to make a difference.
After numerous false starts, and the largely unwarranted salience of marginalia like piggybanks and persimmons, the issues that will determine the presidential campaign are finally coming to the fore. There are three main arenas; the economy, a range of (related) social justice issues, and relations with China. Thus far, the campaign has been rather subdued, as the candidates focused to a great extent on themselves. Ma struggled with his low approval ratings, broader economic woes and articulating his programs for the next four years. Tsai Ing-wen quietly and effectively sought to establish her presidential bona fides. There is little doubt that she has succeeded in establishing herself as a legitimate candidate, with the requisite personality and policies; to such an extent that gender is no longer an issue. Now, to use the obligatory war metaphor, the battle has commenced, and relations with China are emerging as a battleground.
Tsai Ing-wen has run an effective campaign so far, but if relations with China become salient, her nebulous “Taiwan consensus” is vulnerable. The “Taiwan consensus” is a proposal for the establishment of bi-partisan consensus, as a pre-requisite of further agreements with China. It sounds innocuous enough, and the argument that the “1992 consensus” is an illegitimate foundation for conducting cross-Strait relations because it was essentially a deal between the CCP and a non-democratically elected KMT, resonates with a lot of Taiwanese voters. It is especially resonant with those voters who have not gained from ECFA and other agreements enacted by Ma, and those voters who are alarmed by the speed of Ma’s detente and the lack of checks (given the KMT’s legislative majority). Tsai’s challenge is to explicate how a Taiwan consensus can be achieved (given that opposing positions are enduringly intractable) and to assure voters that the presence (or absence) of a “Taiwan consensus” could be the basis of engagement with China.
President Ma has not run a good campaign so far, and is undoubtedly embattled. Numerous missteps, inconvenient economic data and the unanticipated blowback from the “peace accord” proposal, have seen Ma lose a 10 point poll lead in less than two months. The campaign has been casting around for a keystone campaign issue, but haven’t found it. At this point, trailing Tsai in most polls and fearful of the unpredictable Soong-effect, Ma’s best bet may be to go on the attack; a strategy that was evident in the first TV debate. While Ma has been widely derided for bringing up the Chen Shui-bian administration in the debate, concerns about the DPP’s ability to govern could resonate with voters (of course Ma doesn’t mention the structural conditions that hamstrung Chen).
But you would be hard pressed to find a DPP candidate less like CSB than Tsai, so there are limits to this strategy. Another strategy is to attack the Taiwan consensus idea–which I think is the way Ma will go. Interestingly, after having to step away from cross-Strait relations following the unpopular peace accord proposal, Ma’s best strategy right now might be to make China salient after all. Both of the “consensuses” are conceptual abstractions that many voters cannot properly engage with; but Ma can, with justification, argue that the 1992 consensus is a proven basis for engaging China, whereas the Taiwan consensus is, as yet, not.
Tsai Ing-wen has thus far espoused a moderate position on cross-Strait relations. She has experience as head of the Mainland Affairs Council under Lee Teng-hui and is, in general, proposing deceleration rather than negation of already enacted cross-Strait policies. But what cannot be adequately addressed is how Taiwan can engage China without accepting, or coming close, to the latter’s bottom line 1992 consensus. This is a legitimate point of attack for Ma. On the other hand, since back tracking from the peace accord proposal, Ma hasn’t said how far he plans to go if he wins another 4 years. I don’t expect him to either. Instead I expect him to ‘show some love’ for Taiwan (he has the latitude to say more things like ‘Taiwan is a country’ during the campaign), showing that love for Taiwan is compatible with the 1992 consensus. How many voters would buy into that I don’t know, but I expect China and associated identity issues to come out now that we’re reaching the sharp end of the campaign.
Commentators closely watch the coming presidential election in Taiwan, at times with anxiety. Many believe the electoral outcome will profoundly impact Taiwan’s security prospects, primarily through its effects on cross-strait relations. The premise of most concerns is that if the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) reclaims Taiwan’s presidential office, Beijing will harden its policies towards the island and at least suspend cross-strait exchanges for some period of time. However, such a view overlooks the bigger structural changes that are taking place in East Asia’s security environment. The Obama administration’s strategic move away from Iraq and Afghanistan and shifting America’s foreign policy focus to the Asia-Pacific region brings new, and uncertain, dynamics into Sino-U.S. power relations. The obscure future relations between Taiwan’s old archrival but new number one economic partner and Taiwan’s sole ally and security guarantor makes it more difficult for any government in Taipei to develop a shrewd foreign policy. Bluntly, for either a Kuomintang (KMT) or DPP government, to maintain trust with both Beijing and Washington in the backdrop of a potentially more confrontational Sino-U.S. relationship will not be an easy task.
Last week, President Obama made his initial moves that pivot Washington’s strategic focus towards Asia and supposedly usher in what Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has branded “America’s Pacific Century.” Though some argue the physical presence of the first American president in the East Asia Summit itself sufficiently symbolizes Washington’s new eastward strategic posture, President Obama went further to substantiate U.S. policy reorientation. On the economic side, Obama pushed for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an expansive free-trade agreement that aims at, eventually, covering the whole Asia-Pacific region. While China is not excluded from TPP, the requirement of truly embracing reciprocity and non-discrimination, i.e. forsaking currency manipulation, ceasing subsidies to state-own enterprises, and protecting intellectual property rights, means that in the short-term, China is not going to show interests in the pact. As a result, successful negotiations of the TPP give Washington the opportunity to outline the future economic order of the Asia-Pacific and offer China’s neighbors with, in Bernard Gordon’s words, an “alternative to a Pacific dominated by China”. On the security side, President Obama, together with Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard, announced the establishment of a permanent marine base in Australia’s Darwin area, giving American forces convenient access to the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. At the same time, Secretary Clinton visited the Philippines and reaffirmed the U.S. military relationship with Manila, on the deck of a U.S. warship in Manila Bay. Amid concerns over China’s assertiveness on regional territorial disputes and worries about the reliability of America’s security commitments, the Obama administration took actions to reassure regional allies and ensured the message was not missed by any interested parties.
China’s initial responses to America’s eastward pivoting, summarized by Elizabeth Economy, were two-fold. One was accusing the United States of interfering in regional affairs and claiming that East Asian countries were capable of solving their own disputes. The other was reminding regional countries that China was not to maintain its economic ties with regional trade partners at any price. Beijing’s message, in Economy’s witty words, was blunt: we have more money, so you should be friends with us instead (or, by the way, you’ll be sorry). Such implicit doubts over U.S. capabilities of sustaining its regional commitments are not uncommon to Beijing. After all, amid sluggish growth, heavily indebted economy, and scheduled defense budget cuts in a scale of hundred billion dollars, Washington’s ability to project power overseas is constrained in the coming years. The jury is out on whether Obama’s Pacific turn is the astute re-concentration of resources on critical national interests or a last ditch attempt at salvation before the American empire’s eventual downfall. But one thing is certain: with new military presence and an economic framework both anchored on the United States and its regional allies such as Australia and Japan, it is now harder for China to believe or for Washington to convince Beijing that these actions are not about containment. Chinese leaders’ suspicions of U.S. motives will grow; the mistrust between Beijing and Washington is likely to increase.
For Taiwan’s newly elected government next year, maintaining trust with both Beijing and Washington will be challenging. Though intensified Sino-U.S. competition has yet forbidden Taiwan from approaching either power, making both powers comfortable with Taiwan’s alignment position may prove to be demanding. Taipei wants to prevent Washington from regarding the island as being irresistibly absorbed into China’s orbit; meanwhile, Taiwan also wants to avoid a perception by Beijing that the island is a steadfast member of a U.S. encirclement attempt. This trying foreign policy task means different things for different parties in Taiwan.
A second Ma Ying-jeou administration will face two central challenges. If KMT’s Ma is re-elected, his rapprochement with China, which has greatly reduced unwanted Sino-U.S. irritations, is likely to be welcomed in Washington. Nevertheless, Ma has to manage U.S. perceptions. If his efforts of improving cross-strait relations are taken as an indication of accepting an ever closer embrace with China and disinterest in maintaining the status quo, his rapprochement policy might provide ammunition to the argument of “letting Taiwan go” in Washington. A scaled-back U.S. support will eventually reduce Taiwan’s space to maneuver when it deals with China and undermine the island’s interests. An equally thorny issue might come from relations with Beijing. Suspicious of U.S. containment, China is likely to become more eager to push for cross-strait political talks, in order to cement progress made in the current détente and draw Taiwan closer to Beijing. Given the Taiwanese society’s lack of consensus on its political relations with China, the Ma government is likely to court a domestic crisis should the administration proceed with cross-strait political talks. To avoid facing such a dilemma, the second Ma administration will face an uphill job of controlling Beijing’s expectations as Taipei carries on its reconciliation with Beijing.
A new DPP government will face similar, but different sorts of, challenges. If DPP’s Tsai Ing-wen sticks with her denial of the so-called “1992 consensus (i.e. both China and Taiwan recognize there is only one China, but each side is allowed to interpret this one China with its own definition),” cross-strait rapprochement is likely to stall and exchanges to be suspended at least in the short term. The Tsai administration needs to come up with its own discourse of cross-strait political relations. However, to build up an alternative DPP position that can satisfy the party’s Sinophobic constituencies and at the same time assure Beijing that Taipei is not the vanguard of Sinophobia is difficult. If the Tsai administration fails to stabilize cross-strait relations, it is hard to see how Taipei can persuade Washington the island is a strategic asset, not a liability, in the Sino-U.S. relationship. After all, the current Sino-U.S. relations remain dominated by a mix of cooperation with competition, and Washington still looks to Beijing for collaboration despite their heightened mutual suspicion. Taiwan’s security environment could be worse if cross-strait relations reverse to confrontations seen during the previous DPP Chen Shui-bian administration. Beijing will put a stop to its programme of benefits for Taipei. Equally damaging is that some in Washington will reduce their support for Taiwan because it is costly, and also, Taipei has little leverage to attract America’s scarce political and diplomatic capital.
In sum, the East Asian strategic landscape is in a state of flux. President Obama pivots the focus of U.S. foreign policy towards Asia; and America’s Pacific turn has heightened Beijing’s suspicion of Washington’s motives. Recent U.S. actions have increased uncertainties in Sino-U.S. relations and made it more difficult for Taiwan to position itself between the two powers, no matter which government takes office in Taipei next year. Nevertheless, in the short-term, the general atmosphere in Sino-U.S. relations remains a mixture of cooperation and competition. As a result, Taiwan has space to maneuver, and maintaining access to both Beijing and Washington is still the most beneficial foreign policy position that Taiwan should strive to take. Because China remains the biggest security threat to Taiwan, Taipei’s new government should aim at cementing U.S. commitments to Taiwan while at least maintaining a working relationship with China. Specifically, Taiwan needs to reduce Washington’s costs of supporting the island, and this first and foremost means preventing the cross-strait relations from reverting to outright confrontation. Last but not the least, Taipei should build up as effective as possible communication channels with Beijing and Washington. Effective communication channels help Taipei preempt or deal with mistrust with either power and will prove to be instrumental in steering a prudent foreign policy.
The first televised presidential debate for Taiwan 2012 was held on Saturday. The format for the debate allowed scripted openings for each of the candidates, followed by questions from the media, questions from the candidates to their rivals followed by scripted summations. It was, like the rest of the campaign, rather low-key, and all three candidates played it safe. But, as James Soong and Tsai Ing-wen both emphasized in their wrap-ups, the fact that Taiwan has this kind of democratic institution is a point of pride. Electoral competition in Taiwan is fierce, but the debate was carried out in a manner becoming of presidential candidates.
The Central Election Commission began organizing ‘discussion fora’ in 1983, as platforms on which opposing candidates could, in theory, present their own views. Televised debates are the evolved version of those fora, and have been used for candidates in national and sub-national executive elections, and also ad hoc special events such as ECFA. TV Debates have become an institutionalized component of the presidential campaign, and have a substantive and symbolic role to play in Taiwan’s electoral competition. Research in the US suggests that debates have a small impact on voters’ evaluations of the candidates and small increases in voter knowledge; but generally have a non-decisive impact on vote choice.
Thus, as common and fun as it is to grade candidate debate performance, outside of Perry-style meltdowns, Quayle-style put-downs, Ford-style Poland-flubs, or unless you’re Bill Clinton, debate performance doesn’t have a substantial effect. I am skeptical therefore when I see in AP’s (via WaPo) overview that the debate “could go a long way in determining the future of the incumbent’s efforts to bring the democratic island closer to China.” There were no major flubs and both major candidates generally stayed on message. Tsai attacked Ma’s record on the job and explicated her China position deliberately and carefully. Ma challenged her to accept the “1992 consensus” and promoted his job performance. Both appeared nervous to me (as did the moderator, who is taking some heat for addressing the candidates in an inappropriate fashion), but performed well enough–no Nixon sweats on either side. Given low expectations and nothing to lose, James Soong may have been the best performer. The obligatory TVBS poll favours Ma’s performance. This is not surprising, but it is also not an outrageous result, particularly when debates are largely about personality and looks, on which Ma scores well (although I thought he looked unusually ruffled yesterday).
A couple of interesting strategy observations from the debate. Ma appears, for the moment, to be ignoring Soong and concentrating his attacks on Tsai. He wants to create doubts about the DPP’s suitability to govern (witness the attempt, well deflected by Tsai, to bring CSB into the debate) and attacking the DPP may satisfy some of the blue voters who (currently say they) have defected to Soong. Tsai has shown that she is a viable, presidential ‘character’, but doubts remain about the specifics of her economic programs and ‘Taiwan consensus’ as the basis of cross-Strait relations. While voters don’t want to read hundred page policy documents, the KMT could leverage these doubts simply by emphasizing this over and again.
With the battle heating up ahead of the presidential election, recent polls show that it will be a close contest, with either the KMT or DPP potentially to gain presidential office in January 2012. Within Taiwan, the division of votes has more or less been settled. The general impression of blue voters is that they are more passive compared with passionate green voters. But no matter how passive they are, blue voters hardly would have voted for the green party. If there will not be any unexpected event (for instance gun-shooting episode) happening before the election, there are two uncertainties to resolve that will point towards which party would have the better chance of winning next year.
One uncertainty is James Soong, as it is difficult to say how many votes Soong will steal from the deep-blue voters on Ma’s side. The other uncertainty is the crucial group of Taishang and their relatives in China. The date of the presidential election is 14 January, only a week ahead of Chinese New Year. Local Taiwanese Business Associations (TBAs) started to negotiate with airlines which run direct flights from China to Taiwan in order to sell package tickets: purchasing a return flight for voting plus a return flight for the Chinese New Year means a discount of 75% off a return ticket price rather than two return tickets’ price. Considering the direct flight at Chinese New Year is always difficult in terms of price and availability, this package is attractive to many Taishangs, and in a way, has boosted their motivation to vote in the presidential election.
However, can we be sure those Taishang in China will vote for the KMT? The stereotype is that most Taishangs vote favourably for the KMT, but my new book, Taiwanese Business or Chinese Security Asset indicates that Taishang have slightly changed their position after witnessing four direct presidential elections. This is not to say that Taishang have changed completely to support the green party, however, it would be prudent not to align Taishangs automatically with the KMT. Most Taishang expressed that their desire is to maintain peace across the Strait, and to see the Taipei government having more decisive strength in negotiating with the Chinese government. Taishang are disappointed with the slow pace of signing the MOU because this has hampered the possibility of getting loans from local Chinese banks. Taishang do appreciate Ma’s policies of opening three direct links and keeping a steady and friendly relationship with China.
However, the most sticky finding in my book is that some Taishang feel that they were better off under the DPP’s government because local Chinese officials have treated them as the VIP investors in order to win their votes for the KMT. When the KMT came to power in 2008, the Taishang lost their privileged role because their ‘strategic value’ of ‘overthrowing’ the DPP government had disappeared, and Taipei and Beijing interacted smoothly without any help from the Taishang bridging effect. Package flights indeed shall boost the number of Taishang and their relatives’ turnout, but whether all of the Taishang and their families’ votes go to the blue party, remains a question.
Chun-Yi Lee is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Nottingham, where she focuses on Chinese labour practices and the role of Taishang.
I am delighted to be able to host the November edition of Michael Turton’s regular smorgasbord of campaign promotion materials. If you’re not on the ground in Taiwan at the moment, feast your eyes…
Each month on my blog I post a small collection of election poster photos taken on my sojourns around Taiwan that month. This one is for a colourful candidate taken in the town of Wufeng in southern Taichung county.
DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen and her running mate Su Chia-chyuan. The white empty circle is the space where her number is going to go once the candidate’s respective numbers on the election ballot are chosen. The text next to her says that only Tsai Ing-wen will realize a fair and just society.
Local DPP candidate posters above a marketplace in Tanzi, a small town in Taichung. Like many candidates, the fellow advertises his educational qualifications, in his case a double PHD.
This Taitung candidate says he doesn’t divide people into Blue or Green, but promises to work for Taitung.
Taiwan Next! on Tsai-Su poster.
Another DPP candidate lists in her chronology her local birth, her university background, including a masters from abroad and a BA from NCKU, one of Taiwan’s best universities, as well as her service in various elected legislative positions.
This candidate, whose sign lacks a party affiliation, says “I get it done” and crows her success at getting a huge sum of money for her district.
President Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT and his running mate Wu Den-yih share a Taitung sign with a local candidate. Word I’ve had from several vectors is that local KMT candidates consider having Ma on a sign as a kiss of death, but tolerate him because they need the support from the party center.
A KMT candidate’s office peeks from behind some buildings in Fuli town in the east coast rift valley.
This DPP candidate in eastern Taichung city offers a striking pose as well as taking credit for the new No.4 highway through the area and for bringing in the big bucks for his district.
Here the same candidate promises subsidies of varying sums to various citizen cohorts. Unfortunately “pudgy balding bloggers” is not among them.
Cars with election gear are uncommon; the thinking is that it invites vandalism.
This large, beautiful sign is in Tainan. The list below Tsai and Su gives the name and district of all the DPP legislative candidates in Tainan.
President Ma with a KMT candidate in Tainan.
This candidate’s sign says “Rebuilding the spirit of the Taiwanese” and similar sayings on it. The large red characters say something like “the world is resplendent because it has you”. I don’t know whether the saying refers to herself or the voter.
A KMT candidate’s local HQ right in a market in Taichung.
PFP Presidential candidate James Soong (in red), whose candidacy is widely thought to be hurting President Ma’s re-election chances, with a local PFP candidate in Dongshih. The sign calls for fairness and justice in big red letters.
Here’s the same candidate again. That tie is probably the reason he is so thin; can’t imagine how he can eat without getting it in his food all the time.
A small political rally in Dongshih strategically positioned at the end of a bike path.
A van advertises a DPP candidate.
DPP candidate Lin Chia-lung on a bus in downtown Taichung city.
Lin and his wife on another sign.
In downtown Taichung, KMT candidates peer around trees at a major intersection.
This sign proclaims the Facebook address of the candidates. Social networks may reach people, but do they get them out to vote?
Lin again on a sign near the train station in Taichung city. It says he listens with his heart. In the corner it also advertises his Yale PHD.
If you don’t know already, Michael Turton is a Taiwan resident, Doctoral student, and owner of the indispensable The View from Taiwan blog. My thanks to him for bringing this visual feast to the Taiwan 2012 blog.
Research has shown that Taiwanese opinion on cross-Strait policies is varied, depending on particular issues and social backgrounds. The majority of the population supports economic opening and cultural exchange, but a majority is also opposed to institutional acknowledgement and further social interactions. Individual demographic characteristics and social cleavages, namely, gender, partisanship, and socioeconomic status have played important roles in fostering differing positions and attitudes on cross-Strait policies in Taiwan.
Using data from telephone surveys conducted in 2010, I investigated Taiwanese attitudes towards various cross-Strait policies. The issues under study and the distribution of people supporting and opposing them were as follows:
(2) On allowing Chinese students to study inTaiwan: 50 percent supported and 45 percent opposed
(3) On recognizing Chinese diplomas and degrees: 44 percent supported and 50 percent opposed
(4) On allowing self-guided individual Chinese tourists: 43 percent supported and 48 percent opposed and
(5) On increasing the daily quota of Chinese tourists on group tours: 39 percent supported and 44 percent opposed
Overall, apart from the ECFA issue of economic opening, differences of opinion on other policy issues such as educational exchange, institutional acknowledgement and social interaction were around five percent, indicating that there was no common ground on these issues.
There are different social foundations for each cross-Strait policy, sometimes converging, and sometimes diverging. Research indicates that in general men, older people, pan-blue supporters, and people of higher social status were more likely to support the KMT government’s cross-Strait policies. One the other hand, women, younger people, non-pan-blue supporters, and people of a lower social status tended to oppose such policies.
More specifically, the percentages supporting various policies among men and women were:
(1) ECFA, 48 percent vs. 44 percent;
(2) Permitting Chinese students, 55 percent vs. 46 percent;
(3) Recognizing Chinese degrees, 49 percent vs. 40 percent;
(4) Opening to individual Chinese tourists, 50 percent vs. 30 percent; and
(5) Increasing the daily quota for Chinese group tourists, 47 percent vs. 33 percent.
Comparing people of higher and lower social status, the percentages that supported the abovementioned policies among the more educated (college and above) and less educated people (high school and below) were:
(1) ECFA, 58 percent vs. 35 percent;
(2) Permitting Chinese students, 61 percent vs. 42 percent;
(3) Recognizing Chinese degrees, 55 percent vs. 35 percent;
(4) Opening to individual Chinese tourists, 54 percent vs. 37 percent; and
(5) Increasing the daily quota for Chinese group tourists, 46 percent vs. 35 percent.
After controlling various variables, the factor residing in southern Taiwan does not, in fact, have any significant effect on the people’s position on cross-strait policies. On the surface, the influence of party identification on positions regarding cross-strait policies seems to be as expected. Green supporters have a strong tendency to oppose policies towards China. But greens and blues together only make up about 50 percent of the population (Blue 34 percent, Green 17 percent). What is the position towards cross-strait policies within the other half which does not have such a strong party identification? Research shows that, given controlling demographic factors (age, gender, socioeconomic status, and ethnicity), independent voters who were neither blue nor green significantly showed far less support for cross-Strait policies than did pan-blue supporters.
Finally, what merits closer scrutiny are gender differences on support for cross-Strait policies. It was found that, firstly, a higher percentage of Taiwanese women than men opposed increasing social exchanges between Taiwan and China. On the issue of economic opening, there was no gender imbalance. However, on social issues, taking into consideration personal backgrounds (education, marriage, income, and ethnicity), females tended to oppose these issues more than males did. This was much more noticeable among pan-blue supporters. For example, among pan-blue voters only 36 percent of males opposed allowing Chinese students to study in Taiwan, while 64 percent of females did. The same gender discrepancy among pan-blue voters was noted on the issue of institutional acknowledgement and social interaction. Among pan-blue voters 38 percent of males and 62 percent of females opposed recognizing Chinese diplomas. Similarly, 36 percent of pan-blue males and 64 percent of pan-blue females opposed increasing group tourist quotas.
Why were women more likely to take such opposing positions than men for further social exchanges with China? First, it is possibly about the concern over disturbances caused to their daily lives by increased cross-Strait social interactions. Furthermore, the impression of Chinese male chauvinism might well lead many Taiwanese women to mistrust further social interaction withChina. Second, it might reflect the want for stable homes and committed relationships. Many women do not see benefit accruing from further cross-strait social exchanges. In fact, they view closer ties with China in a disadvantageous light and see themselves as becoming potential victims from closer social relations.
These past twenty years have seen Taiwanese businessmen go off to China and send money back home to their wives, who feel alienated as they tend to value marriage, stability and secure homes. This kind of cross-Strait split affects the minority of Taiwanese families today, and the impression it has left on society is very influential. Taiwanese women see a potential threat from Chinese mistresses. The media has recently made a fuss about the “Chinese mistress” effect, which has created a further distrust among women on policies of cross-Strait interactions.
Finally, it may be related to concerns on the impact on the marriage market. Increasing social interactions with China will stimulate the marriage market leaving unmarried Taiwanese women feeling that they are now in competition with Chinese women, placing the fear in the minds of Taiwanese housewives that their children may find matching partners with Chinese youths on college campus. Perhaps as a result of these factors, given the effects of party identification, socioeconomic status, and age, gender on cross-strait social policies remains an independent and significant factor in today’s Taiwanese society.
As the presidential campaign got underway, the KMT government seemed to intentionally downplay cross-Strait social policies as an election campaign issue. Otherwise it would probably not be able to win the support of the majority of voters.
Chih-Jou Jay Chen is Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Sociology of Academia Sinica and Director of the Center for Contemporary China, National Tsing Hua University in Taiwan.
Ever since Taiwan held its first direct presidential election in 1996, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has tried to influence the outcome of elections on Taiwan through implicit and explicit means. Many of you will remember the missile threat authorized by the CCP in 1996. And perhaps too, the harsh warning made by former Premier Zhu Rongji (朱鎔基) during Taiwan’s 2000 presidential election, in which he told Taiwanese voters to “make a historical decision wisely,” otherwise war between Taiwan and China would become a “the logical necessity”.
However, Taiwanese voters seemed to disregard Zhu’s threats and elected the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) as the president. Since Chen’s rise to presidency, the CCP has modified its means of influencing Taiwan’s politics through subtler ways, mainly by providing incentives for particular politicians, Taiwanese businesspeople, and media, in order to affect and mold the public opinion to create an image in favor of the China. In this post, I will summarize some of the political intentions behind the scenes and discuss how the KMT and the DPP respond to China’s interference.
There is abundant evidence that the CPP attempts to influence Taiwan’s domestic political scene. The DPP recently provided some evidence to support their suspicion of the CCP’s interference in order to help President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) be re-elected. DPP spokesperson, Chen Chi-mai (陳其邁) outlined five tactics which China had adopted to ensure Taiwan’s elections would result in President Ma’s re-election. These include sending provincial-level purchasing delegations to boost economic performance, providing incentives to mobilize Taiwanese businesspeople in China to return to Taiwan to vote, allowing the assembly of Taiwanese businesspeople to campaign for President Ma, bribing some particular legislators to influence Taiwan’s policy-making, and hindering other presidential candidates from obtaining political donations from Taiwanese entrepreneurs who are active in China through direct or indirect threats.
Many more examples of such interference have been uncovered by the media. According to a report by Business Weekly magazine, DPP Legislator Tsai Huang-liang (蔡煌瑯) said China permitted Straits Exchange Foundation Chairman Chiang Pin-kung (江丙坤) to brief senior Chinese officials on Ma’s “golden decade” platform at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Oct. 28: an explicit signal that Beijing backs Ma. Furthermore, according to media reports, DPP spokesperson Liang Wen-jie (梁文傑) said that Lai Xiaohua (賴曉華), wife of Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits Chairman Chen Yunlin (陳雲林), was investigated by the Chinese government for allegedly embezzling USD$300 million, which was listed as “media purchasing in Taiwan.” This outlay was supposed to be spent on “influence” within Taiwan’s media.
Confronted with these accusations, President Ma defended himself in a BBC interview, arguing that these allegations were made up by his rivals and none of them would be able to present evidence reasonable enough to bolster their claims. President Ma further justified his position, proclaiming “is Beijing kind to me, when it has missiles targeting Taiwan?”
The DPP showed the evidence that the CCP aided the KMT and thereby doubting the KMT’s sincerity to put the Taiwan’s interests in priority. While the DPP usually emphasizes on the CPP’s political intention harmful to Taiwan’s sovereignty and security but failed to distinguish the practical matters from political manipulation. From the DPP’s perspective, it seems that anything related to China is dubious and perceived negative. This kind of self-constraint weakens the DPP’s ability to convince people that it can deal with China issues in a proper manner.
The KMT believes that Taiwan can rely on China, and avers publically that politics can be separated from economics. This view is at odds with the CCP’s views on Taiwan, which put politics ahead of everything else. The KMT intentionally downplays the controversy of Taiwan’s national sovereignty and status. It rarely mentions the potential risks inherent in such an asymmetric power struggle between China and Taiwan, as well as the CCP’s insistent denial of recognizing Taiwan as an autonomous political entity.
The gap between domestic political attitudes towards China provides room for the CCP to polarize and divide solidarity in Taiwan and leeway to manipulate Taiwan’s politics. As a result, there is continuing controversy in defining national sovereignty and cross-strait relations, and it seems very unlikely that a consensus will be reached in a short period of time.
The CCP’s interference inTaiwan’s politics is nothing new. While the means of achieving this end have become increasingly delicate, and both carrot and stick tactics are conducted. Although there are various ways of implementation, the logic behind these tactics is the same: to provide attractive incentives for sympathetic elites while threatening and sanctioning troublesome ones. Applying this logic to the context of Taiwan’s elections, the target elites for the CCP include politicians, businesspeople, and the media. The most general tactic is to provide economic or material incentives in exchange for their cooperation. In other words, the CCP intends to influence public opinion through money politics, which can easily affect the outcome of elections, especially when it is linked to gambling behavior common in some electoral districts at the local level.
The CCP’s maneuvers to influence Taiwan’s elections are consistently operating behind the scenes and we should be aware of their methods and resist this interference. The Taiwanese democratic system is a result of many people’s efforts. In order to maintain the Taiwanese democracy, we should not compromise with any force that seeks to harm it.
Ms. Bi-khim Hsiao 蕭美琴, spokeswoman and advisor for the Tsai Ing-wen Presidential Campaign, recently spoke at Columbia University. The event took place on 16 November 2011 and was organized by the Weatherhead East Asian Institute. Ms. Hsiao was invited to speak as a prominent alumna, who graduated with an M.A. in political science in 1995. Political Science Department Professor Andrew Nathan served as the moderator. The venue was filled to capacity with students, scholars, and members of the public. There was a question and answer session following her speech. A number of the questions came from Chinese students who were fascinated to learn more about Taiwan, their democratic neighbor.
Ms. Hsiao began by discussing her background, simultaneously weaving her own life story and interest in politics into her perspectives on the process of democratic transition and consolidation in Taiwan. Recalling the night when she emceed Chen Shui-bian’s presidential victory rally in 2000, she saw tears in the eyes of older generations of Taiwanese. They had waited their entire lives to change their government through the power of the ballot box. Ms. Hsiao poignantly remarked that following the historic victory, Democratic Progressive Party leaders had to deal with a bureaucracy that formerly saw them as enemies of the state, and had throw a number of them in jail. An opposition party that was born and raised on the streets had to learn how to put its ideals into practice by working within the political system and from the Presidential Palace.
When Tsai Ing-wen took over as chairwoman of the Democratic Progressive Party in May 2008, the party was five million dollars in debt. Many had quipped that the DPP was in the ICU, and Ms. Hsiao said that the process of recovery was difficult and divisive. However, Chairwoman Tsai took a number of steps that enabled the party to once again become a relevant force in Taiwan politics. Her leadership marked a generational change: Tsai was one of the first DPP leaders who was neither politically active during the martial law period nor a victim of political persecution. One of her goals was to encourage the younger generation to help play a leading role in the renewal and regeneration of the party.
Under Tsai Ing-wen’s stewardship the DPP has refocused its attention on socio-economic policy issues, not only cross-Strait issues. It has also sought to win back the public confidence it lost in 2008; Ms. Hsiao noted that in her own mild and moderate way, Tsai Ing-wen has managed to achieve a feat that many had thought impossible. During the November 2010 municipal elections, the DPP won more votes nationwide than the KMT, despite winning only two out of five mayoral seats. Ms. Hsiao believes that if the DPP wins this election, the party will win on a center-left socio-economic agenda.
Since becoming Chairwoman, Tsai has focused on seeking small individual donations (小募款) and refusing large donations. Ms. Hsiao described how some corporations would attempt to funnel 90 percent of their campaign donations to Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) candidates, and donate the remaining 10 percent to the DPP. Even such a relatively small amount of money would benefit the coffers of the DPP, which has always had to compete with a party believed to be one of the world’s wealthiest. However, given the political accusations flung at former President Chen when he accepted corporate donations, Chairwoman Tsai wanted to rebuild the party’s public image as devoted to clean, transparent politics.
In this spirit, the Democratic Progressive Party is currently in the midst of its “Three Little Pigs” fundraising campaign. Ms. Hsiao explained how young triplets attempted to donate money from their piggy banks to Tsai’s campaign, with their grandfather at their side. The KMT protested to the Control Yuan (a government watchdog and one of five equal branches of government in Taiwan), which subsequently ruled that the children’s donations violated the Act Concerning Political Donations because they had yet to reach voting age. Many indignant Taiwanese voters responded by presenting piggy banks full of coins and bills to the DPP. The party began ordering its own plastic piggy banks from the only factory in Taiwan that produces them (the others have moved to China), and tens of thousands of them have been snatched up by party supporters wishing to make donations.
Ms. Hsiao argues that Taiwan is currently standing at the crossroads of a number of policy issues. How will Taiwan deal with security issues, national sovereignty issues, and economic integration with China? She noted that as the debate over nuclear energy continues, the DPP has proposed to invest resources into new energy sectors. Taiwan current operates three nuclear power plans and is building one more. All four plants rest on earthquake fault lines. There is also a renewed interest in agricultural issues in Taiwan. Although production costs are high, the industry creates many jobs. Taiwanese are increasingly aware that as Taiwan moves toward greater economic integration with China, the subsequent economic growth has not benefited all sectors of society equally. Although the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement has already been signed with China, Ms. Hsiao remarked that if any adjustments need to be made in the future, under a DPP administration they would occur only with the democratic consent of the public via the legislative process. The DPP has previously argued that the ECFA negotiations were not transparent and that the Legislative Yuan was not properly informed during the negotiation process.
The Democratic Progressive Party believes in an activist-oriented approach toward its role in Asia. Ms. Hsiao noted the importance of connecting to the region through democracy. Democracy is not just a moral value, but also a strategic asset for Taiwan, a form of soft power that is critical to its survival. Taiwan needs to not only preserve its democratic achievements, but also consolidate and deepen its gains. Taiwan must continue to find creative solutions to find adequate international breathing room, such as working through NGOs and INGOs. Although Taiwan is already a de facto independent country, Ms. Hsiao asserts that Taiwan seeks recognition. At the same time, she emphasized that Taiwan and China have common interests and can work together without seeking to antagonize each other.
Julia M. Famularo is a Research Affiliate at the Project 2049 Institute and a fourth-year doctoral student in Modern East Asian Political History at Georgetown University.
Minimalist shorts today (not because Australian Masterchef beckons, but because the candidates are serving up some tasty quotes that work better without my insouciant waffling).
For starters, how about this zinger from Tsai Ing-wen talking about agriculture in the South: Ma “reads the data of his public opinion polls more carefully than economic data.”
Extracted from Time interview: Ma: “Many of my key programs require a long period to be implemented”. TIME: “Has Beijing given you any indication that it might reduce the number of missiles aimed at Taiwan given the improvement in cross-strait relations?” Ma: “No, they never have”.
The KMT website is promoting an editorial from the friendly China Times. “This is the first time in our nation’s history that a sitting President and current Presidential candidate has ever sued his challenger. This is unprecedented. A court battle will become part of the Presidential race”. Um, KMT if you’re thinking of hanging your hat on that, you’re in trouble.
From the same editorial: “Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP are seeking high office. A word to the wise. Voters will not tolerate a political party that fabricates lies to reacquire power”. Must…Resist…Australian…Masterchef…Starting soon…Must Resist…
Ma Ying-jeou spent fifteen minutes at Ai Weiwei’s ‘Absent‘ exhibit at Taipei’s Museum of Fine Art on Friday. Hours before Ma’s visit, I posted this piece by Harry Wu criticising the human rights situation in Taiwan during the Ma administration. In that post, Wu wrote of “the silence of government associated sectors on the persecution of Chinese dissidents, including the vague attitude held by Taipei Fine Arts Museum towards Ai Weiwei’s arrest”. So, does Ma’s visit to the Ai exhibit represent a change of heart or tool for an ailing campaign?
First of all we should recognize that, given the strategic context, this is one of those damned if you do, damned if you don’t moments for Ma. Having made détente with China the cornerstone of his successful campaign in 2008, Ma has had to tread a fine line when it comes to offering support to people and causes blacklisted by China. But this is also an ‘easy issue’ for domestic opponents to attack on, and it is a sphere in which the KMT has its own historical vulnerabilities, so he can’t be seen to be a total walkover either.
Thus the Dalai Lama came to Taiwan (after much oohing and aahing), but was assiduously avoided by officials in the Ma administration. Ma issued a press release after Liu Xiaobo won the Nobel Peace Prize, saying that it was “not only an individual honor but also has great historical significance for the development of human rights in China.” Since information about Liu’s Nobel was put on lockdown in China, Liu Xia has since disappeared and Liu remains in jail somewhere, we can wonder what ‘development of human rights in China’ actually means. Indeed, these sentiments are the same as expressed in Ma’s yearly thoughts on Tiananmen-a fairly safe time to criticize the PRC as it closes its ears to everything outside of China on that day. But lest we castigate Ma too strongly for toeing the line when it comes to China, think of how many other world leaders, CEOs, universities and many others are doing the same.
Ma has mentioned Ai Weiwei, publicly, twice in nearly four years; in his Tiananmen statement in June 2011 and when he visited the exhibit. Speaking to media at the gallery on Friday, Ma spent as much time referencing his Tiananmen statement as saying anything new. The line that 人權保障越接近，雙方距離就能更接近 (the closer the two sides are on protection of human rights the distance between them will decrease) is not new: its essentially the same old ‘when China becomes a democracy etc.’ wishful thinking. The ‘new’ was this: 艾未未是一位藝術家，藝術家應該有表達其藝術觀點的自由，這是臺灣重要的核心價值 (Ai is an artist and artists should have the freedom to express their artistic perspective; this is an important core value for Taiwan).
That is a very clever workaround. As I describe in this paper on Ai Weiwei’s precarious online communities, the cause of Ai’s problems with the Chinese government is not artistic freedom per se, but the fusion of his art with his activism. But Ma can spin his comments both ways; art as activism for domestic (Taiwanese) critics and “art as art” if China gets upset. It’s interesting that according to observers, Ma avoided “Studies in Perspective”.
Not on Ma's gallery tour
As if there is any other position for him at the moment, Ma was on the defensive at the museum. He first felt the need to explain/justify the reluctance/incompetence of Taipei Mayor Hau Long-bing in failing to invite Ai to Taiwan. He would soon thereafter have to defend criticism that this was simply a 选举秀 (lit. election show). One would like to think that Ma’s support for Ai Weiwei is genuine, and I have no reason to doubt that on a personal level it is. But several things point to instrumental motives.
As documented on this blog, Ma’s campaign is in trouble, and frankly, it needs all the positive distractions it can get at the moment. Taking up a cause celebre that could show Ma as a strong leader not willing to sell-out Taiwan’s core values, seems like a pretty good idea to me. Especially given how the disastrous ‘peace accord’ gambit failed utterly to resonate with voters (indeed, following National Chengchi University’s Center for Prediction Markets, it could be responsible for Ma’s big poll drop through October). And frankly, whatever Ma says during the campaign, China is not going to hold it against him and start wishing for Tsa Ing-wen to win.
Maybe a better test of Ma’s new taste for human rights is to see whether he mentions any of China’s detained rights defenders–who are also emblematic of Taiwan’s core values?
Yesterday I wrote that Ma’s campaign is a car wreck and suggested that to get it back on track, his team should get on message, and self-promote and attack on the economy. Instead, they have decided to fall back on a tactic that predates the first presidential election in 1996 and has been present ever since. Namely, invoking the “DPP smear campaign”.
In a troop-rallying speech in Tainan Ma Ying-jeou “urged party members to be cautious about smear campaigns, while pledging to run a positive election campaign”. Ma argued that “we are facing a tough battle in both the presidential and legislative elections, and our opponents will launch more smear campaigns against us. We should take more cautious measures and prevent such negative campaigning from affecting the party’s performance in the elections”.
I have a paper coming out in January in The China Journal (which I can’t link to yet) in which Eliyahu V. Sapir and I attempt to explain the campaign behaviour of KMT and DPP candidates. I will write a proper post on the findings (which are highly relevant as we move forward in the campaign), but I just wanted to quickly refute the notion of DPP candidates as persistent smear artists.
Using empirical data derived from seven presidential and subnational campaigns between 1996 and 2008, our models provide a robust picture of campaign behaviour in Taiwan. Our findings simply do not support Ma’s (or many of his predecessors’) concerns about DPP skulduggery. In fact, our models show that after controlling for a range of covariates (incumbency, closeness of the race, time to election etc), there are no statistically significant differences between the two main parties in terms of their proclivity to ‘go negative’ or to engage in a certain type of negative campaigning.
There is, however, a statistically significant difference between the parties in terms of what we (euphemistically) call in the paper ‘negative strategic appeals’. This includes the type of claim that Ma made yesterday, and our models suggest this is true to form. Indeed, it is so spot on that I will simply excerpt the relevent paragraph from the paper’s conclusion:
“…use of negative strategic appeals often contain unsubstantiated claims that voting for an opponent will lead to dire consequences (multiple variations of the ‘fear card’), contributing little to the information environment and potentially propagating political mistrust. One of our strongest findings for the KMT is that their candidates’ negative tactics rely heavily on strategic appeals.In many cases (indeed in most of the campaigns analysed in this article) KMT candidates attempted to harness longstanding stereotypes about the DPP by associating vote choice and turnout levels with the purported risks of the DPP coming into positions of power. In addition, KMT candidates frequently associated their DPP opponents with campaign tricks and misleading voters. In our view, this type of claim contributes more to the atmosphere of political mistrust than attacks on the issues or even personal traits, both of which often contain legitimate information about the candidates. We suggest further that legislation is needed to improve this situation, in the same way that Article 48 of the President and Vice President Recall Act forced parties and candidates to ‘stand by their ads’…”
Approaching the Universal Human Rights Month, both the Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen camps are endeavouring to build their own images by presenting their human rights manifestos. The current ruling party KMT announced that it would implement no more executions (literally) of the death penalty before the election: in contrast to the impression it had given the voters previously, concerning its determination to build a powerful judicial system preceded by the standing down of a minister of justice, who opposed the death penalty.
Between 2010 and 2011, nine people were executed, in contrast with the record of the former government. During the Chen Shui-bian years, only two people were executed in the first year of his administration, before the government closed the discussion on this controversial issue.
The human rights records kept by the Kuomintang party have been rarely seen in post-Second World War Taiwanese history. Most of the records show inappropriate arrests and confinements of innocent individuals during the Martial Law period. The rise of the DPP was closely associated with its concerns for the weak and marginalized. Under the DPP rules, nevertheless, the government did not reach any significant achievements in the area of transitional justice apart from restoring the reputation of former political prisoners. The steadfast structure of government administration remained untouched; the reformation of judicial and taxing systems was not complete. The rights of indigenous populations, gender minorities and new immigrants were not satisfactorily regulated.
Since the KMT came to power again in 2008, Taiwan’s human rights record deteriorated, due to the government’s honeymoon relationship with China. The clashes between police and activists protesting Chinese envoy Chen Yunlin’s visit in November 2008 and the consequent events were seen as an indicator of dwindling freedoms of speech, assembly, and the press freedom. In 2010, when Liu Xiaobo won the Nobel Peace Prize, Taiwan’s government failed to condemn China’s human right violations soon enough to meet the pressure of public opinion. The newly created Presidential Office Human Rights Consultative was seen as a delayed response to balance the criticism.
The honorary chairman of the KMT, Lien Chan, being awarded the inaugural China Confucius Peace Prize was another embarrassing moment (this year’s winner, Vladimir Putin). The silence of government associated sectors on the persecution of Chinese dissidents, including the vague attitude held by Taipei Fine Arts Museum towards Ai Weiwei’s arrest, all make the promise of the current ruling party to pursue principles of human rights unconvincing and doubtful.
The recent maid abuse case involving Liu Shan-shan, the representative of Taiwan’s Kansas Office, again challenged the extent to which the Taiwanese government respects human rights in comparison to diplomatic immunity. This puzzle, however, does not only confront the KMT government, but the entire Taiwanese society. There are too many topics that are seldom discussed and underplayed not only by the government, but also the general population, due to the exhausting political contest between blue and green. There is still a general acceptance of the death penalty. The discrimination of minorities persists. Capitalists’ exploitation of labourers still plagues the labour market.
One view as to why Taiwan’s progress towards a “normal society” remains unfulfilled, is the possible collective mentality resulting from the long authoritative regime. People do not see the subordination to authority as an evil but only banality. They think that one should envisage the future instead of looking at mistakes made in the past. Therefore, the general public are indifferent regarding most of the unfair treatments in their daily life. They are also ignorant in most aspects of legal life. For example, in the recent restored injustice case of Jiang Guo-qing, an innocent soldier tortured and eventually gunned down by the military, the state only reimbursed the bereaved family without paying indemnity. Most of the public, including the press, do not understand the different nature between these two forms of compensation.
In November, Human Rights We Care (台灣大選人權陣線), a league comprising thirteen NGOs, was formed to monitor the human rights manifestos of all presidential candidates. It has issued a questionnaire for all candidates to clarify the content of their human rights policy. Judging on the performance of two ruling parties in the past decade, the government’s actions were always sluggish and passive. The vast and unshakable system of government, which was left behind by the past regime, seems to be the main obstacle. If current KMT government cannot live up to its advantage in developing a small and powerful official procedure, but instead designs the structure of the public sector according to its obsessive desire to connect with China, which is already happening, then the reformation of human rights in Taiwan will be always hampered by its own bureaucracy, and will have to perpetually rely on the slow growth of civil society.
Dr Jonathan Sullivan Hompeage 