Taiwan has just had a set of good elections. President Ma Ying-jeou and his Kuomintang (KMT) have won a second term with a convincing majority. But the elections had been tightly fought and the result of the presidential contest uncertain right until the end. A genuinely competitive election confirms that the democratic process is healthy and strong.

The presidential candidate who lost, Ms Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), proved herself a totally credible standard bearer for the DPP and gave Ma a real run for his money. This was no mean achievement as the DPP suffered a resounding defeat in both the presidential and legislative elections last time round, in 2008. It appeared so crippled then that many speculated that it would be a very long time, at least a decade, before the DPP could make a return. Under Tsai’s leadership, the DPP made itself a credible choice for the electorate this time. By making such a strong show she has done democracy in Taiwan a great service.

In line with the DPP’s long standing convention, Tsai resigned from the Chair of the Party. But let’s hope that she will return to mainstream politics in the not too distant future. Taiwan’s democratic politics will be poorer without her.

The strong showing of the DPP, which also significantly reduced the KMT’s huge majority in the legislature, is good for Taiwan, as no democracy can be strong if the party in opposition is ineffective and ineffectual.

What we now have in Taiwan is a clear mandate for another four years for Ma and the KMT – with a reminder that they should not take the electorate for granted. Exactly how it should be in a healthy democracy.

Why did Ma win so convincingly (with a 6% majority) even though polls before the elections suggested the race would be too close to call? It was probably due in a large measure to tactical voting. A key source of uncertainty for the presidential election was the impact of a third candidate, James Soong, on the floating voters. He commanded over 12% support at one stage, which fell back to about 6% in the week before polling day. In the end he garnered only 2.8% of the vote. Since Soong is a charismatic politician who broke away from the KMT, most of those who indicated support for him in the earlier stage of the electoral campaign were disgruntled KMT supporters. Once it became clear that Ma could really lose to Tsai, these voters would have to decide if they should act on their dissatisfaction of Ma and let Tsai win or vote tactically. The calculated risk Ma and the KMT took paid off in the end. Most of them must have voted for Ma.

The tightness of the presidential race also galvanized a large number of Taiwanese business people who work and live in China to return to vote. The number who did so is estimated at 200,000. This group did not previously make such an effort to return to vote in anything like such a large number. Most of them have investments in China or their careers are dependent on Taiwan maintaining good relations with China. It means a significantly larger percentage of them would vote for Ma as their business interests required them to vote for a candidate committed to keep relations with China on an even keel. With the prospect that Ma might lose becoming menacingly real, an exceptionally high number of them returned to vote for Ma. This did not figure in the pre-election polls.

The mandate Ma and the KMT has received is not one to move closer to unification with China. It is one to maintain a good and mutually beneficial working relationship with China and to steer Taiwan through the economic turbulence expected for 2012. Beijing will be well advised to see it for what it is, and not put too much pressure on Ma in the next four years to strike political deals over relations between Taiwan and China. Ma does not have a mandate to open political talks, just to keep cross-Strait relations on an even keel.

As for Taiwan, Saturday was a good day for its democratic consolidation.

Steve Tsang is Professor of Contemporary Chinese Studies, Director of the China Policy Institute and Director of its Taiwan Studies Programme at the University of Nottingham.

Last night, Friday 13th January, the candidates rallied their respective supporters – President Ma Ying-jeou of the Kuomintang (KMT) in front of his office in Taipei, Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Banciao at New Taipei City Hall, and James Soong of the People First Party (PFP) in Taichung.

For the rally with candidate Tsai, former President Lee Teng-hui (b. 15th January 1923) joined her on stage giving an endorsement worthy of a legendary politician. He was the heir of the KMT Chiang Ching-kuo presidency in 1988 and the first president elected by the Taiwan public in 1996. Lee’s appearance with Tsai and her running mate, Su Chia-chuan, was heart warming. He said, “I am standing here for Taiwan, the land I love so much.”

Leading up to the election in the past week – the candidates did the best they could to reach out to their potential voters. Tens of thousands of Taiwan citizens arrived from China to cast their ballot (it was reported 385 additional flights were scheduled from China). Young people becoming newly eligible for this election were able to participate. For the candidates, these ‘arriving’ voters were making the difference.

It was last weekend, Saturday 7th January, a unique event happened. Former president Chen Shui-bian was permitted to give his last respects to his mother-in-law, Wu Wang-hsia, who passed away a week earlier, 31st December. Six hundred police and officers escorted Chen to the Tainan funeral home. As the minivan arrived at 8:50 am, Chen immediately emerged and threw himself down on the red carpet and crawled to show his humble respect. Then given a microphone, and televised, in soliloquy he said, “When we met last, I told my mother-in-law that I did not shame my country. During my administration, three great achievements took place 1. the ‘Snow Mountain Tunnel’, connecting Taipei to Ilan, 2. Taipei 101 [world’s highest building at the time], and 3. the high speed rail service – all contributing to making Taiwan a modern efficient country.” Chen referred to himself as unfilial for not attending to her before she passed away. He gave his appreciation to his mother-in-law for supporting his marriage to her daughter, Wu Shu-jen, who provided him with a sense of “Taiwanese consciousness.” Continuing, he said, “His wife requested him to accept only half his presidential salary. She was not greedy for money as people said.” The former president seemed healthy, and his political will unabated.

For most Taiwanese the conviction and imprisonment in 2009 of the former president and his wife seemed harsh. Some opposition leaders called his treatment by the KMT, “a new white terror” referring to the way people were treated under martial law from 1949 to 1987. Yet, Chen entrapped himself by enacting stringent laws to be used again his perception of a corrupt KMT party that abused its power against the people. And in turn the KMT used the new laws to ensnare Chen.

During 2011 the KMT government utilized national funds to celebrate a hundred years since the founding of the Republic of China (ROC) by Dr Sun Yat-sen. On government buildings slogans read “100 Republic of China (Taiwan).” President Ma instituted academic seminars, trade and security conferences, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to discuss the accomplishments of the ROC as the continuum of the 1911 revolution and its hope of liberty for the Chinese nation. Much pride echoed at these events.

An in-office president has the dual advantage of holding the reins of government, and its national legacy of pride. The opposition has the out-of-office disadvantage of finding fault with its own governmental institutions. As the KMT and ROC are so closely tied together, it is difficult to separate the two entities. And, the people of Taiwan have been educated to feel proud of their country associated with greater China. President Chen tried his best to replace the Chinese legacy with a Taiwan-centric policy, with some success, and then was ultimately blocked by the KMT ruled legislature.

For Tsai, her party attempted to localize nationalism for the Taiwanese. Yet, how can you ignore China, and the overlapping claim the ruling KMT has with China?

This evening Saturday 14th January, the election outcome showed Ma at 51.6%, Tsai at 45.6%, and Soong 2.8%. A jubilant Ma arrived on stage to declare he would continue to keep Taiwan safe. He further said that during the election he listened to the opposition parties, DPP and PFP, about their grievances and learned from them, such as the widening disparity between the rich and the poor, and the other issues raised concerning the public. For these questions, he would be vigilant and gather the leaders of the opposition parties to attend a meeting every six months “to find out what is best to do for the country.” Ma said, “I will use my life to guard the identity of Taiwan.”

Tsai addressed her people who were weeping in the Taipei rain to say she took responsibility for the election outcome, and she would resign from her DPP chairmanship. Yet, she said the party has come a long way since its ineffectiveness and near collapse four years ago. Tsai stated, “Our opposition has a powerful role to play in keeping the ruling party attending to our people’s needs.”

David Blundell is Professor of Taiwan and Asia-Pacific Studies at National Chengchi University

No, I’m not seeking a prize for originality here.

1. Presidential votes. Because the winner is decided by popular vote, we need to pay attention to how many votes each candidate receives in each district. Although the electoral geography is quite distinct in the north and south, no candidate can afford to disregard a district of any size. I will provide data on Saturday comparing district level returns for the last four presidential elections. As soon as the returns come in, we should get a pretty good indication of how competitive its going to be. In 2008 Ma won with 58.45% of the vote. A repeat is improbable. Depending on what happens to the Soong vote (see below), expect this election to be much closer, probably not approaching the 2004 race, which was decided by 0.2%, but close. The crucial battleground will be in central Taiwan.

2. Legislative seats. In 2008, the KMT won 71 seats (86 with their allies) to the DPP’s 27. The KMT has many advantages at this level, marshaling its vast financial resources and patronage networks. But the DPP will perform much better this time. It won’t get a majority, but it could approach parity, increasing the importance of the PFP’s performance. Soong’s motivation for standing for president appears to have been to increase momentum for his PFP legislative candidates and if they win a handful of seats, he could put himself in position to demand a Cabinet post in return for support in the legislature. The DPP was late to emphasize the legislature as a mechanism for checking KMT power; but after its experience of divided government during the Chen Shui-bian era, the number of seats in the legislature has increased in importance for the party. Depending on the final distribution of seats, a second term for Ma is likely to be much more constrained with regard to China policy. A Tsai presidency facing a KMT parliamentary majority of any notable size will likely be hamstrung from the start. The close distribution of legislative seats that many are predicting, could force the two blocs to deal with each other to a greater extent than in the past.

3. What happens to Soong’s support? In the opinion polls prior to the blackout, Soong was polling between 5 and 10%. I would be surprised if this ‘protest vote’ registered similar numbers in the actual poll. How much of Soong’s support will vote for him? I’d guess 3-4%. If he gets much more than that, Ma could be in jeopardy. Of those who previously registered support for Soong but “change their minds” at the last minute, I expect that the majority will vote for Ma; but a proportion will abstain, which benefits Tsai. The more votes Soong gets, all the better to leverage whatever he can from the number of seats PFP legislative candidates win. Personally, I’m surprised that Soong has come this far. I imagined that he would have done a deal with the KMT already. However, there is also personal animosity between Soong and Ma from way back. And, despite being cast as a “deep blue”, Soong is highly “pragmatic” and would have no qualms working with the DPP.

4. Idiosyncrasies. There is a range of things that could effect the election. There is likely to be rumblings about vote buying and fraud. Gambling rackets will no doubt be uncovered. There will be finger pointing and threats of lawsuits. Legislative candidates can face financial ruin, and incumbents with immunity go to jail,  if they lose, so its gloves off. There will be excuses for poor performance. The weather or proximity to Chinese New Year and exams will be blamed. Some voters won’t get to the polls because of traffic and this will become a conspiracy theory. Parties will blame the concurrent holding of the two elections and old arguments will be invoked. There will doubtless be some confusion in vote counting (voters have to make three choices-local and at-large legislators and the president), and demand for recounts. Hopefully there won’t be anything like the shooting of candidates (Chen Shui-bian, Shaun Lien) or fighting at the polling station.

5. How will the losers react? During the three presidential campaigns I witnessed in Taiwan, I was frequently informed that if the DPP lost, their supporters would respond with violence. In the event, the violent losers were the KMT-protesting against their own party in 2000, and against Chen following defeat in the 2004 election. Tsai Ing-wen has already outperformed expectations. That she is competitive against an incumbent with all of Ma’s advantages, and in light of the disarray the DPP was in after 2008, is nothing short of miraculous. I don’t say that DPP supporters will not be devastated if she doesn’t win the presidency, but from the greens that I have talked to, they know they are over-performing underdogs, and over-performing underdogs seldom react badly to defeat. The KMT on the other hand has history of reacting badly to defeat. As close as the race is, if Ma loses it will be a surprise; to KMT supporters it will be a desperate shock. I am pretty sure, no certain, that if Tsai wins, the KMT will demand a recount or launch a legal challenge or something. Sad to say that I wouldn’t be shocked to see a repeat of the disgraceful reaction to defeat in 2004.

Mail me at jonathan.sullivan@nottingham.ac.uk, follow me on Twitter @jonlsullivan, or access my papers at http://jonlsullivan.com. If you are in Taiwan or an armchair analyst, please email or Tweet me your observations or thoughts when I live blog election day. Will be live from 6am GMT (2pm Taiwan time) on Jan 14th until the final results are known.

 

For the benefit of readers with little or no experience of Taiwanese elections, this is a very brief summary of how the election will proceed on Saturday.

For the first time the presidential and legislative elections will be held concurrently. This was essentially a cost-cutting measure, although I discuss other possibilities and potential implications here. For the president, voters cast a single vote for a candidate nominated by a party. The winner is decided simply by the number of votes (the ‘popular vote’), and there is no equivalent of the electoral colleges or calculation of the number of electoral districts won. A simple plurality decides the winner outright-i.e. whoever gets the most votes wins. There is no requirement to gain more than 50% of the votes and there is no run-off. In 2000, Chen Shui-bian won the presidency with just 39% in a three horse race. The president serves a 4 year term and can serve for a maximum of two terms. On the ballot the DPP challenger Tsai Ing-wen is number 1, incumbent president Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT number 2 and the PFP’s “spoiler” James Soong number 3 (numbers assigned by drawing lots).

The Republic of China (Taiwan is the common shorthand) has a unicameral legislature (i.e. a single House) with 113 seats. These seats are distributed as follows: 73 are constituency based legislators (i.e. a local representative), while 34 are at-large representatives chosen from party lists. 6 seats are reserved for Aborigines. Voters cast one vote for a local representative in single seat districts and one for the party.

Voting takes place in the district of household registration, which for many people means having to travel back to home towns from places of residence and work. The polls open at 8am and close at 4pm. In my experience, the first results start coming in about an hour after the polls shut, although because this election combines a vote for the presidency and legislature, I imagine the count will take longer than usual. I also expect that there will be more recounts required than usual, and more scope for parties and candidates to point fingers. The elections are overseen by the Central Election Commission, who have produced this basic English language video.

Mail me at jonathan.sullivan@nottingham.ac.uk, follow me on Twitter @jonlsullivan, or access my papers at http://jonlsullivan.com

The China Quarterly recently asked me to review Mikael Mattlin’s book Politicized Society: The long shadow of Taiwan’s one-party legacy (2011, Copenhagen: NIAS). I’m glad they did, because it is terrific. I have excerpted the more relevant bits of the review below. If you’re reading this blog, chances are you’ll want to get hold of this book. It is highly recommended (and available as a relatively inexpensive paperback).

As I write this review, Taiwan is in the throes of a typically vibrant campaign, the first combined election for the presidency and parliament. Candidates have put forward their platforms, and attacked and defended their opponents’ and their own policies in election ads, at rallies and in televised debates. The opposition candidate, Tsai Ing-wen has mobilized dissatisfaction with incumbent President Ma Ying-jeou’s performance and put forward an alternative vision for Taiwan’s economic development and relationship with China. That she and her DPP party have become viable challengers to the current regime is a sure sign of the competitiveness and health of Taiwan’s democracy. Given this scenario, it may seem an incongruous moment to note that all is not well with democracy in Taiwan.

In this carefully reasoned and strongly argued book (which avoids regressing into polemics despite the major thrust and substantive implications of its theories), Mikael Mattlin provides the most cogent argument yet that many aspects of Taiwan’s democratic consolidation remain incomplete. Despite voting for the fifth time for their president, and the genuine prospect of a third change of party-in-power, this book explicitly articulates what many Taiwan scholars have long intimated. Namely, Taiwan possesses the veneer of democracy, but many formal and informal political structures (including those that fall under the rubric of political culture) are essentially unchanged since the one party era.

Breaking with the conventional wisdom that invokes national identity cleavages as an explanation for political polarization, Mattlin argues that incremental liberalization led by an authoritarian party state allowed it to maintain its power, by carefully choosing what would change (and what would not) and modifying its behaviour accordingly. In the absence of a complete break from the ancien regime, the KMT was able to shape the form that post-democratic political and social structures would take, and ensured that it would continue to benefit from them. At the same time, because it allowed ostensibly free and fair elections and other trappings of democracy, it was able to satisfy the majority of citizens’ desire for “democracy,” while stealthily ensuring its grip on power.

This is not a polemical text, but it doesn’t shirk from laying blame at the KMT’s door for refusing to embrace the deep seated democratic reforms that Taiwan needed to make a full transition from the one party era. This refusal is most seriously manifest in its continuing cultivation of patronage networks at all levels of society. And more obviously in the party’s essential refusal to cede power following presidential elections in 2000 and 2004. Never fully accepting that it was no longer the “in-party”, the KMT obstructed Chen Shui-bian at every turn, responding to his appointment of a KMT Premier by trying to impeach him. Pan-blue obstructionism in the Legislative Yuan brought it to a virtual standstill. And then, despite losing again in 2004, a result that the party tried its best to annul, Lien Chan visited the PRC in 2005 as if he was an elected head of state.

Clearly there is no quick fix to the serious problems that Mattlin carefully documents, and the book will not convince you that a Ma or Tsai victory in 2012 will facilitate the requisite reforms. Indeed, there is evidence in these pages that elections only serve to exacerbate politicization and ensure the continuation of a long held winner-takes-all mentality. Because Taiwan’s political culture has not developed beyond a zero sum conception of democratic competition, parties are essentially engaged in permanent mobilization efforts, hindering both governance and further democratic reform. Because underlying structural conditions that have not changed since the one party era, the procedural aspects of democracy are a thin veneer under which non-democratic behaviours persist.

Mail me at jonathan.sullivan@nottingham.ac.uk, follow me on Twitter @jonlsullivan, or access my papers at http://jonlsullivan.com. 

Lee Teng-hui is reviled in China as a traitor to the Chinese nation. His “crime” was to recognize that the myth of “one China” was increasingly anachronistic and to move political discourse in Taiwan towards the “two states” position that has characterized Taipei’s stance since the early-mid1990s.

In Taiwan, Lee is also reviled by some in the KMT, the party he led and represented as president. Many cannot forget or forgive what they see as his role in splitting the party ahead of the presidential election in 2000, which allowed Chen Shui-bian to win. Some say Lee’s personal enmity against James Soong led him to endorse a candidate who couldn’t win (Lien Chan), prompting the more promising Soong to stand as an independent. For a party that seems to find it hard to accept that is no longer the only party in town, the memories of this defeat are bitter; particularly as Lee subsequently shifted to the left, setting up a party that would ally itself with the DPP.

For many others though, Lee Teng-hui is revered as Taiwan’s ‘father of democracy’, the man who oversaw, and personally pushed through many moves towards liberalization and democratization. Although his post-2000 contribution to Taiwanese nationalism splits citizens along partisan lines, the gravitas he commands as Taiwan’s most influential living politician is unmatched by anyone else in Taiwan. And the sense of Lee’s grand status (he is nearly 90) has increased as his health has deteriorated.

Lee is currently recovering from cancer surgery, so it was a mild surprise, and strategic masterstroke, that he turned up at the DPP’s final campaign rally this evening. And boy, did he deliver.

Tsai Ing-wen is not the typical DPP firebrand who can rev up a crowd with affective appeals to Taiwanese identity. She is cool and smart, qualities that have served her extremely well as she has developed into a candidate of real presidential bearing as the campaign has progressed. After the constant ideological mobilization of the Chen Shui-bian era, Tsai’s rational approach has been spot on. But at this moment in time, the DPP campaign needed a shot of emotion, a reminder of everything that has gone on in Taiwan’s political history. Lee Teng-hui did exactly that, with a stirring speech that had the crowd enthralled. Standing next to him on stage, Tsai Ing-wen was visibly moved and holding back the tears. For DPP supporters this was the equivalent of an address from Muhammed Ali. The text is available here.

Here is Lee in his pomp, starring in campaign ads from 1996. Lee was non-elected incumbent president standing in the first direct election for the presidency. Enjoying a large lead from the outset, Lee’s campaign set out to show him as a statesman, cool under pressure and determined. These were highly salient characteristics as China attempted to effect the outcome of the election by firing missiles just off the coast of Taiwan. In these ads, the avuncular Lee, holds forth on courting his wife, quitting smoking and the meaning of freedom.

Mail me at jonathan.sullivan@nottingham.ac.uk, follow me on Twitter @jonlsullivan, or access my papers at http://jonlsullivan.com. I will live blogging from 6am GMT (2pm Taiwan) until the last results are in (yeah, could be a long day). I want to hear from people in Taiwan or armchair analysts anywhere else. Please send your impressions, thoughts, observations etc. to me via email or Twitter on Saturday.

Taiwanese people will vote in a few hours for their president and legislature. Much has been written on these elections, and no doubt that, considering what is at stake, much literature will follow. One word that is coming back constantly in the debate is precisely the opposite of what we expect in democracy: consensus.

Even a distant look at the elections, however, will reveal quite quickly that there are two different consensuses debated in Taiwan these days. One, the so-called “1992 consensus”, the other, the “Taiwan Consensus”. Neither of them is a new idea at all, however they’ve found a new actuality in this campaign.

Two major camps are still opposed in Taiwan today, the blues and the greens. If this division might perhaps, in the future, represent less accurately the opinions than now, it seems that this division is still operative. Before discussing each other’s version of the consensus, and propose a third one, let’s briefly remind the reader what those colored camps represent.

The blues are a nebula of forces revolving around the Kuomintang, while the greens are the sum of forces around the Democratic Progressive party. Neither group is homogeneous, but in this 2012 election the green camp appears more united than the blue one, which is divided among two candidates, Ma Ying-jeou and James Soong. The question that I want to address in this post is where is the boundary between the greens and the blues? The question is, in fact, more complex than it may appear.

A general perception is that the division line is between pro-unification and pro-independence. That is a very inaccurate perception. Most of the blues are in fact against independence, which is not equivalent to being pro-unification; and how surprising it might be for the non-specialist, most of the blues who vote for Ma are definitely not in favour of unification. It appears that only the top, Mainlander elite strata of the KMT still favors an option that runs directly against a massive support in Taiwan for the preservation of the status quo – 88.2% in September 2011 if we add up support for all variations of the status quo. In Taiwan, unification has no electoral market at all – only 1.4 % of the electorate favors unification immediately.

On the other side, the greens most often dream of independence – or, we should say, as the ROC is considered in Taiwan as a sovereign and independent regime that is not controlled by PRC – of the formal change of the nation’s name from Republic of China to Republic of Taiwan, which is the technicality behind the so-called, and misleading expression of, “Taiwan independence”. And clearly, we can say that probably the vast majority of greens oppose unification in any form.

In sum, I’d say that, instead of a unification-independence divide, the line of demarcation is rather anti-independence against anti-unification forces. Which, all in all, leads the majority to support the status quo.

What is sure too is that the immense majority of Taiwanese are against unification with the mainland. When the 2008 election of Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT – whose platform favors unification – was interpreted by many outside Taiwan as a vote for a rapprochement with China, it was largely a mistake. In 2008 the middle classes voted for better economic ties with China, and not for a pro-unification platform, which was clearly toned down by Ma during the 2008 campaign, as well as in the last year of his mandate, in 2011. He did so for fear of antagonizing an electorate that, according to official statistics, increasingly considered that the pace of negotiations across the straits was going too fast.

However, characterizing the opposition between the blues and the greens along those lines is not sufficient either. There is another variable, the so-called “consciousness”. Certainly, the line is not an ethnic one here: if roughly 80% of Taiwan’s Mainlanders are considered voting for the blues and other Mainlander candidates (including among young generations), the ethnic Taiwanese vote either for the KMT or the DPP. In other words, Mainlanders have a tendency, due to a complex psychology of fear (as refugees of the civil war) to vote along ethnic lines, but the ethnic Taiwanese do not. This fact enables the KMT to survive electorally in Taiwan – and pretty well if we think that the KMT (in concert with blue allies) has never lost its majority in Parliament. Otherwise, with just 12% of Taiwan’s population being Mainlanders, the KMT would long ago have become a minority party.

“Consciousness”, whether “Chinese” or “Taiwanese”, however, subsumes these ethnic differences, encompassing them. Yet, together with other factors, among which relations of interest, whether personal or economic, political or administrative, play a central role in Taiwanese politics. People whose Chinese consciousness prevails (they may be Mainlanders or ethnically Taiwanese or Aborigines) do identify with Taiwan and most of them consider Taiwan as their “home”, within the wider Chinese “nation”. The identification with the later is mostly cultural and not political – except in extreme cases – and they tend to oppose unification in large numbers. People whose Taiwanese consciousness prevails do not always reject a sense of proximity with the cultural China, but radically oppose the idea of unification, or sharing blood ties that necessarily lead to unification in the future, either as a historical necessity or a return to a normal situation. This latter group includes not only ethnic Taiwanese, but also a growing number of Mainlanders. In sum, we do find Mainlanders whose Taiwanese consciousness is growing, and many Taiwanese whose Chinese consciousness prevails.

Upon these factors we also have to add relations of interests, and the notion more generally understood by the term “guanxi”. Many Taiwanese who invest in China and wish to see Tsai Ying-wen of the DPP elected tomorrow keep close ties with China and with the KMT. In Taiwan’s politics, as well as in cross-Strait politics, the only certainty is that nothing is definitely defined and opposed. Everything is, rather, on a continuum.

Continuum, consensus… As I noted above, two consensuses are constantly invoked. On the surface, they are clearly incompatible. The blue camp is insisting that Taiwan and China reached a consensus on “One China, Two interpretations” in 1992, clearly meaning that each side considers to be the only one China, either the PRC on the Mainland or the ROC on Taiwan. The opposition in Taiwan replies that this consensus, if it ever existed, was reached secretly between two parties, the CCP and the KMT, and not between the two states. As such, they argue that it is a secret, partisan agreement, and thus unacceptable. In response, the DPP launched the idea of a “Taiwan consensus”, insisting that the future of Taiwan must be defined democratically and ratified by the nation’s representative bodies.

To a great extent, these two ideas are not exactly new: the “1992 Consensus” has been the object of heated debates since the early 2000s – its inventor even acknowledged inventing the notion, while the then President denied it ever existed. On its side, the “Taiwan consensus” is a new expression that designates the necessity for Taiwan to present a unified response to Chinese pressure and to decide its future by itself – but it is an idea already defended by the Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian administrations, and by all supporters of the Taiwanese national movement.

These two consensuses are certainly different and since democracy requires the construction of electoral competitors as enemies, each camp dramatizes the differences and exaggerates the traits of the other camp. This tends to obliviate, for analysts, the fact that moderate parties are situated on a central consensus, just across the boundary line from one another. Sure, the blues and the greens are in opposition on one important thing: they look in opposite directions in terms of the ultimate future of Taiwan – independence or unification. However, in practical terms, they in fact agree on several important issues: developing the economy, benefitting from closer economic ties with China, and protecting the nation’s sovereignty.

Analysts must learn not to forget differences, but not to exaggerate them either. In fact, the moderate blues and moderate greens are closely situated on the continuum. By understanding this, we not only see differently the real differences between Ma and Tsai, but also the remarkable continuities between the administrations of Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou. All three tried, in their own way, to protect Taiwan’s and the ROC’s sovereignty, while actually developing greater ties with China. Between the three successive administrations, and between the two current candidates, there is an obvious consensus, which is the real consensus we should focus on.

Substantial differences exist, however, between the greens and the blues: on how negotiations with China are led and interpreted through the filter of their respective political cultures. Both camps are making a bet. The blues in power bet that the sovereignty of the ROC, at least for the years to come, will survive negotiations and rapprochement with China. The greens bet that, if they come back to power, they’ll be able to benefit from China’s economic rise (and thus, not be sidelined) without having to cede too much to China in the process.

The truth is that no one knows which of these two bets is the less unrealistic, or if either of them is realistic at all. And here lies the true, deep difference between the two camps: the blues do know that there are risks to seeing the regime’s sovereignty eroded. But, at least among the supporters of the greater China ideology who lead the KMT today, this embarrassing risk is, in a way, acceptable in the sense that, after all, the benefactor is the Chinese nation. After all, they think, “China is changing”, and “we want to be united again”. In face of this, the greens are upset to see what they consider a lack of commitment to protecting the ROC’s sovereignty. The Greens are now fully conscious that relations with China must be developed. The DPP has transformed itself into a staunch defender of the ROC, the regime that they have considered for so long as having colonized Taiwan after 1945. And a DPP committed to developing ties with China insists on reaching agreements that are validated by a consensus at home, and ratified in parliament.

As we can see, the KMT and the DPP, or the blues’ and the green’s positions are different, but are nevertheless situated on a continuum. Democracy can only be peacefully governed at the center; and Taiwan is one more good example of this.

Stephane Corcuff is Associate Professor of Chinese politics at Sciences-Po Lyon and a researcher at the Institute of East Asia (Lyon) and CEFC-Taipei. His latest book in Chinese was published in Nov. 2011 (中華鄰國－臺灣閾境性, Neighbour of China. The liminality of Taiwan) and is recommended reading.

Earlier this week, we travelled with an international election observation group to Kaohsiung and Tainan to observe local electoral activities. After briefly visiting the newly built Kaohsiung Arena, the group proceeded directly to the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Kaohsiung Ma Ying-jeou Campaign Headquarters. The deputy director of the headquarters provided the group with a short briefing and then answered questions put forth by observers. First, in response to a query regarding fears of vote buying, he asserted that these rumors in Kaohsiung were all false and concocted by both the media and the opposition. He also believed that the political campaign environment was fair to all parties.

Second, he was asked whether the KMT was concerned that college students would find themselves unwilling or unable to return home to vote because of the proximity of the elections to their final examinations. The deputy directly expressed his full confidence that Taiwanese youth loved their country and would put their electoral responsibilities first.

Third, an observer noted that because the presidential election date was moved from late March to mid-January, there would be an approximately four month gap between the election date and the presidential inauguration. Therefore, he wondered whether this might present a problem. The deputy explained that the gap existed because the legislature needs to be inaugurated by February 10th, and so the presidential election must be held before that time. He expressed his complete faith in the democratic process, and promised that even if his party lost the elections, the transfer of power would be peaceful.

Fourth, when asked how much money the KMT had spent on its campaign activities, the deputy director claimed that he did not know because he was not in charge of financial affairs.

A number of the observers picked up on the way in which he characterized not only the identity of the Taiwanese people, but also the country’s relationship with China. At one point, he stated that both sides were all Chinese and that China and Taiwan were indivisible.

Following this visit, the delegation traveled to the election campaign headquarters for Democratic Progressive Party legislative candidate Chao Tian-ling. An aide greeted the group and answered a number of initial questions before the candidate himself appeared.

First, when asked how much money the campaign office had spent on the election, the aide responded that they estimated that the entire campaign would cost approximately US $500,000.

Second, the aide drew a sharp comparison between their opponent, Chiu Yi, a KMT legislator infamous for his negative campaigning and mudslinging, and their own candidate. While Chiu Yi engaged in partisan bickering and smear attacks, their candidate was focused on city development, children, art and culture, policies, interacting with constituents.

Third, the aide mentioned that there are thirteen local support groups on call twenty-four hours a day to help prevent vote buying and block the spread of anonymous letters attacking the candidate.

The candidate was introduced by his old professor Dr. Wu, now the president of a local university in Kaohsiung. He related the story of how Chao told him that he was determined to run his campaign according to his Christian faith and steadfastly refuse to engage in dirty tricks or negative campaigning. He said that if he was to win the election, he wanted to do so fairly.

Chao Tian-ling expressed strong confidence that he would not only win the election, but win by a comfortable margin. He also noted that he had successfully blocked two attempts by supporters of his opponent to smear him via anonymous letters within the past week alone.

Former Deputy Minister of Education Fan Hsun-lu also greeted the observation group before their departure and welcomed them on behalf of Mayor Chen Chu.

In Tainan, the election observation tour began by visiting the Democratic Progressive Party Tsai Ing-wen local campaign headquarters. DPP stalwart Huang Kun-hu joined the event. The director of the election headquarters, Tsai Wang-chuan, was the host.

The Democratic Progressive Party expressed its concern that the administration was using government resources to support its presidential and legislative candidates. It also felt that the election environment remained unfair to the DPP, because of the KMT’s financial advantage as well as their proclivity toward vote buying. Although they asserted that the vote buying problem was alleviated under the DPP administration, they said that vote buying had reappeared during the past 3 or so years.

A campaign worker remarked to one of us afterwards that he was extremely worried about vote buying in rural Tainan. DPP heavyweight Mark Chen, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs and National Security Council head, had been asked to run in Tainan and is heavily favored to win. However, the worker said that the KMT has already swept rural areas twice in an attempt to buy votes. Each time, Mark Chen immediately dropped approximately five percentage points in the polls. If Mark Chen loses what is viewed as an extremely “safe” legislative contest, it may well raise strong suspicious of vote buying in southern Taiwan.

The election group also visited James Soong’s campaign election headquarters in Tainan. The small office was located in the bottom floor of a building owned by a supporter. Due to a lack of funds, they have relied heavily on volunteer support. Volunteers have designed and printed the campaign literature to keep costs down. A highlight of the visit was a fake movie poster that placed James Soong’s head on the body of the star of Seediq Bale. The effect was to portray Soong as a protector of the Taiwanese people as well as demonstrate his resolute nature. They revealed that they have spent only NT $200,000 (under USD $7,000) on their campaign efforts in Tainan.

There were small packets of rice sitting on a front table of the campaign headquarters. Donated by a local farmer, they carried the label 平安米, or Peace Rice. The small packets symbolized Soong’s ability to bring peace and prosperity to Taiwan.

The Soong camp argued that as a small political party, the KMT and the DPP possess an unfair electoral advantage. Despite the fact that they would admit that they are a “deep blue” party, they characterize themselves as presenting a third way for voters. They highlighted James Soong’s vast administrative experience, including his positions as personal secretary to former President Chiang Ching-kuo, Secretary-General of the KMT, and the Republic of China Provincial Governor, during which time he strongly established himself as an effective leader. They also rejected allegations of any financial misconduct during his tenure. In fact, they argued that such KMT accusations and smear tactics cost Soong the 2000 election. They added that as was the case during that time, the KMT is once again using fake or manipulated polling data to create the impression that Soong possesses low levels of support in Taiwan.

Finally, the group witnessed a quintessentially Taiwanese campaigning activity, namely 掃街 or street sweeping. Candidates, their aides, and their volunteers travel by either foot or by jeep (particularly in rural areas) to engage in grassroots campaigning and interact directly with the people. Supporters brings signs, pamphlets, flags, and occasionally even simple musical instruments. Despite the fact that he is already 76 years old, DPP legislative candidate Mark Chen insisted on walking the 7km parade route to demonstrate his excellent health. He was joined by DPP Tainan City Councilor Wang Ding-yu, who is running for re-election. The supporters walking with the candidates were both extremely friendly and boisterous. Their signs highlighted issues such as the candidates’ dedication to protecting Taiwanese sovereignty, unsurprising in staunchly nationalistic Tainan.

Strangely (although surely not a coincidence), the KMT legislative candidate followed closely behind Mark Chen, choosing to 掃街 along the exact same route at the same time. His slogan was “I’ll be standing right beside you.”

Julia M. Famularo is a Research Affiliate at the Project 2049 Institute and a fourth-year doctoral student in Modern East Asian Political History at Georgetown University. She was assisted in writing this report by Michael Chen, a political science student at Stanford. 

As voting day draws near, the candidates are making their most desperate push to mobilize voters. Inundated by campaign ads as we are in Taiwan, it’s important to examine the almost outlandish creativity and energy being dedicated by both the Kuomintang [KMT] and the Democratic Progressive Party [DPP] to persuade voters.

Let us begin by taking a chronological look at Ma Ying-jeou’s campaign. The fact that Ma was born in Hong Kong makes him an immediate target of criticism. At the outset of the campaign, his opponents even challenged him on whether he was an authentic Taiwanese. His daughters, his opponents charged, all hold American citizenship and work and live in the United States. Being the father of American citizens is an issue for his opponents, as he’s running to president of Taiwan – not the United States.

Ma’s response to such charges has been a series of KMT campaign ads that stress his Taiwanese background. Entitled “I am a Taiwanese” （我是台灣人） and “Ethnic tolerance for people is part of the Taiwan character” （多元包容台灣情）, the ads emphasize that he is the son of mainland parents. “He is a new immigrant to Taiwan”, and “He is running to be president of the Republic of China [not the People’s Republic of China]”.

As for the party of Tsai Ing-wen, the DPP has sought to sharpen and build upon its well-known image of being linked to the “local spirit”. Her ads repeatedly hammer home this traditionally DPP appeal, stressing that for people who are “real Taiwanese”, the only party is the DPP.

One of Tsai’s early ads states explicitly that she is Taiwan’s future. The ad demonstrates how, even while attending the London School of Economics, she has maintained a strong and deep Taiwan identity. That ad was followed by another call boosting the party’s identification with Taiwan: “Our country is great because of you” and emphasizing to voters that, “Our country lies under your feet. It needs you to love it and change it.”

Apart from emphasizing the DPP’s traditional “Taiwan-focus”, the party began unleashing attacks right at the outset of the campaign. Given the DPP’s strong support among farmers, the party has raised the issue that “0.6 kilos of persimmons is only worth 2 NT dollars” （一斤柿子只要兩元） to attack the Ma camp for failing to give farmers a good return on their labors during his four-year term.

Ma’s camp responded dexterously, creating ads to refute Tsai’s accusations.

Ma’s ads center on the inaccuracy of the statistics used by Tsai to tarnish him. The ads called: “Where can we go to find 0.6 kilos of persimmons for 2 NT dollars?” and “One can hurt others without a weapon [referring to Tsai and the DPP]” effectively challenged the DPP accusations. And the KMT’s response to these attacks has been very personal, using clips of Tsai to demonstrate that it is she that is responsible for these false accusations, and calling the DPP a “retrograde” party（退步黨）.

With ballot casting fast approaching, the Ma campaign has redoubled its efforts. In a series that might be called “Re-introducing Ma Ying-jeou”（重新認識馬英九）, we are shown Ma being endorsed by average people surrounding him and discussing his frugality. However, pan-blue people we spoke to appear to consider his frugality to be a problem. Because in Taiwan, frugality is not considered the virtue it once was and may in fact be off-putting to the masses of society today.

The DPP also lays into the Kuomintang for being a wealthy party, to counter the image of frugality the KMT is seeking to implant in the minds of voters.

Meanwhile, the Ma campaign hasn’t been shy about playing the “lady card”, using Taiwan’s first lady to appeal to voters. The DPP – not necessarily in a direct response – broadcasts to voters that there is already a “lady” in the campaign – and she should be the next president.

Time will tell whether these ads really succeed in mobilizing voters, but no one can doubt the Herculean efforts being put into making them.

In this ad, the DPP emphasizes that every vote counts

Julie Yu-Wen Chen is an Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica in Taiwan. Joey Ying Lee is a graduate student at the Department of Transportation and Communication Management Science at National Cheng Kung University in Taiwan.

Taiwan’s presidential election is around the corner. Europe on the other hand, is suffering a terrible debt crisis. In my opinion, the European debt crisis has important implications for the increasing warmth of the cross-strait relations following Ma Ying-jeou’s election to power in 2008.

The biggest difference between the two main presidential candidates in Taiwan is an entirely different policy on cross-Strait relations. President Ma Ying-jeou of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) acclaims the “1992 consensus”, which refers to only “one China” with different interpretations. Having created a sort of gray area based on the doctrines of the “new three Noes” — no unification, no independence and no use of force — Ma strives diligently to a pledge maintaining the “status quo” in the Taiwan Strait. With the denial of the“1992 consensus”, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen, instead, advocates a “Taiwan consensus” to build a society based on a democratic procedure and to prioritize the opinions of the Taiwanese people.

Pan-blue supporters worry that Tsai Ing-wen will give up the “1992 consensus” if she is elected. They worry that this decision will be followed by an instant downturn in cross-Strait trade and deterioration in the rapprochement that has been operating quite smoothly on the base of “1992 consensus” and regress to a zero-sum scenario. Cross-Strait trade has elevated the historical apex since Ma’s took over the presidential office. The Chinese market has occupied 40% of the Taiwanese export market according to the ministry of Economics of Taiwan government. With high dependence on China’s market, Taiwan seems to have entered the road of no return, similar to the economic integration of EU states. Whenever one member runs into a financial problem, all members suffer. As the situation appears to be coming to a head, there are two issues which we should keep an eye on:

Who will be on a knife’s edge-Taiwan or China?

Weaker European countries submit their sovereignty to the stronger ones, as Italy did due to its domestic financial turmoil, by accepting the bailout package from EU. Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconio was forced to resign by the pressure of European debit crisis and was replaced by Mario Monti, a former member of the European Commission. Greece’s Prime Minister George Panandreou resigned due to the same turmoil. It leaves no doubt which nation-states cede their sovereignty to supranational organizations. On the same page, once Taiwan has become weaker impacted by the tide of economic recession, it could degenerate into a situation where Taiwan’s sovereignty will be easily trampled upon by China.

Lack of identity

In addition to the threat of losses on sovereignty, Taiwan will likely face the risk of losing its autonomy, as happened in the process of European integration. However, Taiwan and China have different political regimes and social systems. If Ma wins the election, the Chinese might want to raise the pressure to promote the level of cross-strait discussions and agreements into the political sphere. Without a mutual collective identity, Taiwan’s government may be cautiously aware of not jeopardizing its economic developments.

The European debt crisis has brought problems that many analysts say will require a fundamental change in the way the European Union operates. While Ma touted the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with China, there has been less attention paid to trade with the US and EU markets. Don’t put all your eggs in one basket, as the old proverb goes.

In the final stage of the election, voters need to focus not solely on the vain debates of “1992 consensus” or “Taiwan consensus”, but to consider who can build a solid foundation for a better economy and democratic regime. That is the first priority.

Lan-shu Tseng is a doctoral student in the School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham

With only few days to go, the election campaign is becoming very visible in the streets of Taipei. When wrote on this blog before Christmas that there was no election feeling on the ground in Taipei, things have by now changed quite drastically. Well, it was high time, for sure.

On my way to work this morning, 15 election campaign sound trucks passed me (I counted!), inflicting varying degrees of noise pollution upon me. The number of campaign flags introducing candidates for both the presidential and the legislative elections has exploded. Meeting new Taiwanese friends, their first question these days is invariably, “Do you know that there are elections going on in Taiwan?” – how could I not know with this media coverage? And the parties are bringing out their most fancy campaign props: my favourite item has so far been a glittery, blue blinking LED-lighted flag sporting the faces of Ma and his running mate.

Also, the foreign academic world is getting ready for the elections. Numerous conferences, workshops and presentations are going on in Taiwan to discuss what has been – or has not been – achieved during the past 3.9 years under Ma Ying-jeou, and what the potential impact of either election outcome will be. Also, a steady stream of academics from Europe, the United States, Australia and many other places is flocking into Taiwan with the aim of gathering a first-hand experience of these elections, which could leave a tremendous mark on Taiwan’s future.

What is these academics’ assessment of the presidential elections? Despite polls still suggesting last week that Ma’s victory could be within the margin of statistical error, there appears to be a consensus that Ma Ying-jeou has the better chance of bringing home the election victory. Even rather green-leaning academics have started bracing themselves for a defeat for Tsai Ing-wen.

The reasons for this assessment do not lie in the fact that Ma Ying-jeou has managed to shine as the better candidate during the campaigns. Rather, to the Taiwanese voter, so the observation, he is the known evil and his policies will come as no surprise. Tsai Ing-wen’s weak points are not only the threat her election would pose to stability across the Taiwan Strait – foreigners seem anyway to be more worried about such a development than the Taiwanese. A bigger issue for the Taiwanese is that Tsai is perceived as lacking charisma, although admittedly also Ma does not score highly in this ranking. And finally, the question worrying the Taiwanese is whether Tsai really has the backing of her party, which, of course, could decisively limit her room for action if elected president.

James Soong is the clear loser of all polls, which often leads to the question what he actually expected from running in this race. Again, foreign observers have reached a consensus there. The main motivation for Soong was to improve his People First Party’s turnout for the simultaneous legislative elections by campaigning on this national platform. However, stealing a few votes from Ma Ying-jeou is seen as an intended side effect. This being said, polls show that Soong not only manages to draw votes from the KMT, but also potential protest votes from the DPP. This indicates that Soong has become the choice for those Taiwanese disappointed by Ma Ying-jeou, but who still prefer not to give their vote to Tsai Ing-wen, as Shelley Rigger observed today during her recent talk at the National Taiwan University.

While academics are looking into their crystal balls to foretell the potential outcome of this election, one thing is for sure – watching this election can beat a Hollywood blockbuster in terms of suspense. I will have my popcorn ready in front of the TV on 14 January.

Sigrid Winkler received her PhD from the Free University of Brussels, and is currently conducting postdoctoral research in Taiwan

The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) long-term aims have remained constant in its desire for eventual absorption of Taiwan. It has replaced its previous more aggressive stance with a concentration on reducing Taiwan’s de facto independence by making Taiwanese increasingly dependent on the Chinese economy. The Chinese government’s preferential policies are outlined in the law of 1988 “The Regulations for Encouraging Investment by Taiwan Compatriots”, the law of 1994 “the Law on the Protection of Investment by Taiwan Compatriots”.

However, whether the Chinese local officials’ preferential policies towards Taishang (overseas Taiwanese business people) matches the Chinese central government’s political motivation should be analysed by referring to the views of four different groups involved: the first one is from the Taiwanese government’s stance and reaction to the Chinese preferential policies for Taishang; the second one is from the attitude of Taishang; the third is from the perspective of Taiwanese people in general living in Taiwan; and the fourth relates to Chinese local government’s motivation in implementing preferential policies.

Cross-strait economic integration is predominantly achieved through inter-governmental agreement, negotiation and treaty as well as through sustained links between state and non-state actors (mainly taishang) within or across national borders. However, the bottom-up process of Taiwanese residents’ voice will to some degree affect the government’s policies.  According to the changes of the cross-Strait relationship during different periods in the past 25 years or so, as well as the political attitude of the President toward China and cross-Strait macro-economic policy, the Taiwanese government in general has responded positively to the Chinese central government’s preferential policies toward Taishang. Under domestic pressure from the opposition party and Taishang and the worry of being over-dependent on the Chinese economy out of concerns over security, the Taiwanese government has however not fundamentally changed its position on unification with its Chinese counterpart. From which one can conclude that the Taiwanese government has not been seduced by Chinese government’s preferential policies in favour of Taishang to surrender its identity or made any radical concession to China.

As for the Taishang, all of my interviewees from Taiwanese companies (conducted as part of my PhD fieldwork) were careful not to let their domestic political views or support for any of the Taiwanese parties affect the way they conduct their business in China. Such action, they explained, is simply to avoid unnecessary problems from the central government or conservative local officials. It has not affected Taishang’s Taiwanese political affiliation or sympathy. Some of the interviewees mentioned that, in some cities, Taishang with strong political views of ‘Taiwanese independence’ will be blacklisted. New Taiwanese investors have learned from their predecessors’ experiences to ‘do in Rome as the Romans do’ and try not to take sides.

This should be set against the situation as seen by the general Taiwanese population. At the same time as not necessarily sharing the political views of the Taishang and remembering that Taiwanese people in general have minimal interaction with Chinese central or local governments, one notes that data from surveys conducted by the Election Study Centre of Taiwan’s National Cheng-Chi University regarding Taiwanese people’s political attitude on independence versus unification and Taiwanese identity, shows a gradual shift in the population’s attitude. Data for 1994-2010 and 1992-2010 indicate that the percentage of the population favouring unification has decreased and that of those wanting to keep the status quo or more assertion of independence has increased. In other words, the movement of popular opinion is not necessarily progressively in one direction only. Surveys show a remarkable shift in Taiwanese self-perception over the past 18 years. The number of those identifying themselves as Taiwanese has risen from 17% to 52.6%, whereas those who see themselves purely as Chinese has dropped from 26% to 3.7%.

The number of people with a feeling of being both Taiwanese and Chinese has not dramatically changed, from 46% to 40%. It can be argued that many factors contribute to this trend, one of the main factors being a result of Chinese government’s propaganda and ‘Taiwan policy’ (DuiTai Zhengce). The Beijing government not unreasonably suspects Taiwan’s leaders of possibly pursuing a deliberate policy to “de-sinify” the island, counter to the Chinese government’s “friendly” policies (such as preferential treatment).  Nevertheless, some officials in Beijing still hope that economic interaction with Taiwan will make people in the island feel more Chinese again.

One can conclude that cross-Strait economic integration between Taiwan and China does not work completely in the Chinese mainland government’s favour and does not fully reflect its political motive for offering preferential treatment to Taiwanese investors. One way of reaching China’s political goal has been through making the Taiwanese economy become heavily reliant on the Chinese market, which may help or expedite  future political integration of the two countries. But another fundamental issue will not easily be reconciled – Taiwanese abandoning a wish for a distinct identity in terms of nationality and political sovereignty which most of Taiwanese presently feel, and being sympathetic to unification and finally giving up their resistance to the idea of one nation.

Jen-Ping Myron Chiu is a Doctoral Candidate at the University of Wales, Swansea.

Joint presidential and legislative elections are coming in just few days which means that besides culminating election campaign different groups of observers started to pour in Taiwan. It would be difficult to estimate how many of them will be in Taiwan because there is no central coordination and therefore some observers were invited by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), some by local NGOs and some come on their own.

A Conservative estimate would be several hundred. MOFA claims that in 2008 altogether 290 observers from 38 countries came during presidential elections, although it is not clear to what extent it takes various groups that were not invited by MOFA. Yet, election observation missions in Taiwan are far from those conducted by organizations such as OSCE and due to serious limitations they have very restricted if zero ability to actually asses regularity of elections.

The first burden is a legal one. The Taiwanese legal system does not recognize election observations and thus all observers have no rights to access polling stations in order to be able to monitor the election process. Moreover, foreigners as such are forbidden to come closer to election ballot than 30 meters. However, on the ground it depends much on the police officer whether observers are given access to premises. Considering that polling stations are often in schools, the 30m limit can be in reality much bigger. If lucky, observers can get to windows and observe the voting procedure from outside. That surely is not exactly what could be considered as serious election monitoring.

The second burden concerns capacities to observe election process both domestic and international. On the basic level, observers lack of sufficient training and orientation in peculiarities of Taiwan’s election rules. That significantly decreases already limited ability to observe irregularities or serious violations of the election process. From a domestic perspective, there is no institution or NGO that would provide observation training, organizations such as Citizen Congress Watch (CCW) or Taiwan Front for Human Rights in Election (TFHRE) deal with pre- and post-election period (raising level of policy debate, conducting performance assessment of legislators etc.). As far as international observers are concerned, Taiwanese organizations prefer to invite well-known experts and current or former politicians in order to attract the attention of local and international media. Yet, academic expertise does not automatically imply good observation skills. At the end of the day, it depends on the observers’ individual experiences with election monitoring whether particular mission has sufficient expertise in election monitoring or not.

This is indeed a set of serious limitations. But for MOFA it was apparently not enough when it decided first that this time it will not provide funding for some international observers (as it was the case between 2000 and 2008) only to announce in early January that observers would be invited. Better late than never, that was most likely the Ministry’s thought, nevertheless, a last minute invitation was rather embarrassing in this case. Another issue is to what extent can be group organized by MOFA regarded as truly impartial. However, the same applies to groups that are invited by local NGOs since many of them have their own political bias.

Last but not least, most of the missions operate in Taipei City or other urban areas. Thus, the impact of observation missions is also limited in geographic terms. Besides observation on the election day, missions conduct field trips to other areas of Taiwan where they visit local governments and party HQs. Useful as it is for getting familiar with the environment, it can be considered at best an associated activity with questionalbe meaning considering that information from field trip are not supplemented by monitoring on the election day. There are missions that are exceptions from the general rule. One of them is mission of Bangkok-based Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) that has election observation as one of the core activities. ANFREL has skilled personnel and therefore it represent type of mission that is particularly needed. However, due to lack of funding this year’s mission will consist of only 4-5 observers with planned deployment in Chiayi. The report from 2008 mission is available here and serves as a positive example of election observation, considering legal constraints in Taiwan.

Democracy in Taiwan is by all means very positive example of democratic transition which is always difficult process with uncertain end. Yet, it is also still young democracy and professionally conducted election observations with a favorable legal framework can cause no harm, but can help to strengthen Taiwan’s democracy. A particularly painful issue in Taiwanese conditions is vote buying. During this legislative term, 15 by-elections had to be called (more than 10% of seats) and in 4 cases the reason was vote buying. None case was recorded in Taipei where most of the observers stay.

There is certainly a lot of space for improvement but nothing can change substantially until the Legislative Yuan passes a law that will define election observation, including rights and responsibilities of observers. It is role for the civic sector, including organizations like CCW, TFHRE or newly established International Committee for Fair Elections in Taiwan to lobby the Government and Legislative Yuan to remove unfavourable conditions. Until then, most of the missions will be rather engaged in “election tourism” than election monitoring.

Michal Thim is currently enrolled in the International Master‘s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies (IMAS) at National Chengchi University in Taipei and research fellow at the Prague-based foreign policy think tank, Association for International Affairs.

One of the fundamental questions worth asking about this election is:  Why isn’t Ma Ying-jeou winning by a comfortable margin?  He may yet emerge the victor on Saturday, but most of the credible polls reported in the days and weeks prior to the black-out period suggested a race too close to call.  Yet just four years ago, Ma defeated Frank Hsieh by 17 percentage points.  Today, he runs with all the advantages of KMT incumbency and yet his lieutenants seem anxious and concerned.  Ma’s policy record as president has not diverged substantially from what he promised in 2007-2008.  His record by objective standards seems solid and defensible.  Why, then, has he evidently lost so much support?

A conventional answer to this question would stress Ma’s perceived mismanagement of the response to Typhoon Morakot, vindictive investigations of DPP figures during Ma’s presidency, egregious campaign errors such as suggesting the possibility of political negotiations with China, and the like.  Surely all of this is important, but there may be a deeper reason for Ma’s failure to maintain political traction:  Taiwan may be becoming a polity similar to Japan in that voters are unusually well-educated by comparative standards, highly-informed, wealthy, and well-traveled, but for all of these reasons also increasingly critical of their political leaders and cynical about democratic politics.  This would be more problematic for Taiwan than for Japan because of Taiwan’s unusually challenging national security situation.  If Taiwan people are becoming disenchanted with democratic politics and unwilling or unable to give steady support to political leaders of either major party, then the task of generating a consensus on how to deal with China will be substantially more difficult.  Ma would be the second president in a row either rejected outright by the Taiwan public or endorsed with reluctance and half-heartedness.

If this is the deeper reason for Taiwan’s political ennui, a key causal factor could be globalization.  Simply put, under globalization political leaders of any country quickly lose the ability to shape the living circumstances of the people who voted them into office.  Decisions affecting the welfare of citizens are made in faraway places and combine with other decisions made in other places to produce highly complex patterns difficult even to comprehend, let alone to control.  A small and extremely open country like Taiwan would be far more affected by these phenomena than most.  Add in the factor of China determined to dictate the parameters of Taiwan’s political future and it would hardly be surprising if ROC voters were to come increasingly to perceive their presidents as incapable of leading effectively.

And yet particularly among DPP supporters in this election there still seems to be substantial enthusiasm, rooted in an apparent conviction that changing the leader can make a genuine difference.  This spirit was on display Tuesday in Taichung at a rally of Tsai Ing-wen and DPP legislative candidates.  On a sunny, warm day, streets in the center of the city were thronged with cheering supporters.  Smaller groups continued the raucous festivities well into the night.  It was not quite like the gargantuan and cacophonous rallies of 2004, but did suggest that political disenchantment may still not be institutionalized in this country and that a change in leadership could rekindle political passion.  But if Tsai is elected, would she, too, be doomed to serving only one term, unable to satisfy Taiwan’s demanding voters?  If Ma wins, can he govern effectively given what will have been a very near miss?  These questions seem critical for understanding what kind of polity Taiwan is becoming and whether it can respond effectively to the existential challenge posed by rising China.

Daniel C. Lynch is Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California and is a member of USC’s US-China Institute Executive Committee. 

In less than a week, the citizens of Taiwan will vote for the next president and parliament of Taiwan. Incumbent President Ma Ying-jeou of the Nationalist Party (KMT) faces a growing challenge from his opponent Ms. Tsai Ing-wen of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).  Like other national elections before it, Taiwan’s relationship with China is the dominant issue in this race.  Most of the media and scholars  have focused on the differences between Ma’s and Tsai’s policy proposals towards China and little attention has been placed on what they share in common and what that implies for the future of cross-strait relations.

The debate centers on the so-called “1992 Consensus” or the “one China with respective interpretations” on which President Ma’s cross-Strait engagement policy is based. The Consensus is a tacit understanding reached by Beijing and Taipei in 1992 when former President Lee Teng-hui was in the office.  It allows both sides to accept that the concept of “one China” should serve as the basis for cross-Strait interactions, even though there are major differences as to what “one China” means in practice.  Following Ma’s endorsement of the three-no policy of “no unification, no independence, and no use of military force,” relations with the mainland have improved substantially. During the past three years, the Ma administration has deepened economic ties with China and has signed more than a dozen agreements with Beijing, including a landmark trade deal: the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA).  To the DPP’s way of thinking, the “1992 Consensus” merely sugar coats Beijing’s version of the “one China principle” to mask its intention to annex Taiwan.  Increased cross-Strait economic ties will worsen Taiwan’s dependence on China, undermine the island country’s independence, and lead to a political settlement on China’s terms.  Characterizing the “1992 Consensus” as a nebulous pact between Beijing and the KMT, Ms. Tsai has rejected it as the basis for cross-Strait interactions.  Instead, she has proposed a “Taiwan Consensus” as the basis for future cross-Strait interactions, with content to be decided via public discussions in the future.

Despite this apparent major difference, Ma and Tsai do share considerable common ground on this issue.  First, both candidates’ policy proposals aim to preserve and protect Taiwan’s sovereign and independent status in the international community.  Although Tsai and her followers portray KMT policies as eroding Taiwan’s sovereignty, Ma’s endorsement of the “1992 Consensus” is based on the premise that the Republic of China, the official name of Taiwan, is an independent and sovereign state.  Because the “1992 Consensus” allows both sides to provide their own interpretation of what “one China” is, Taipei leaders expect that Beijing will recognize Taiwan’s legitimate existence, or at least, would not deny its legitimate existence in the international community.  Second, both candidates show no intention of pursuing a plan for cross-Strait unification, especially under Beijing’s “one country, two systems” proposal.  Tsai is affiliated with the DPP which is the only major political party on the island that has a plank of pursuing Taiwan’s de jure independence.  She naturally rejects any prospect for Taiwan’s unification with China.  Ma’s endorsement of the “1992 Consensus” aims to shelve the issue of Taiwan’s sovereignty and his three-no policy of “no unification, no independence, and no use of military force” clearly states that his administration will not pursue cross-Strait unification but rather wants to stabilize the cross-Strait status quo.  Third, while Ma’s three-no policy aims to stabilize the status quo, for her part Tsai has dialed down the DPP’s stridency on pursuing Taiwan’s de jure independence.  Instead, she has argued that Ma’s proposal to negotiate a peace agreement with Beijing will change the status quo in China’s favor.  Both candidates thus see maintaining the status quo as the optimal choice for Taiwan.  Fourth, both candidates wish to break out of Beijing-imposed diplomatic isolation and expand Taiwan’s “international space.”  Voicing the island citizens’ frustration over Beijing-imposed diplomatic isolation, President Ma has called on Chinese leaders to stop isolating Taipei in the world community.  “Only when Taiwan is no longer being isolated in the international arena,” Ma stated in his 2008 inaugural speech, “can cross-Strait relations move forward with confidence.”

These commonalities between Ma’s and Tsai’s cross-Strait policies reflect the views of the majority of Taiwanese citizens.  A recent poll shows that 75% of the island citizens now view Taiwan as an independent and separate state from China.  Given this strong national identity, it is not surprising that Beijing’s “one country, two systems” unification plan has not been well received in Taiwan.  Polls conducted on the island have repeatedly showed that very few islanders consider Beijing’s plan acceptable even though more than half of Taiwanese citizens have a favorable view on the active cross-Strait exchanges.  However, the emergence of a Taiwanese national identity and the rejection of Beijing’s unification plan do not imply a strong commitment by the island residents to Taiwan’s de jure independence.  About 90% of the Taiwanese prefer maintaining the status quo now even though they differ in their views on the island’s long-term status.  They do not want to make an outright bid for de jure independence since they know that it would bring a violent response from China and would destroy both the economic prosperity and democratic way of life they now enjoy.  Therefore, both candidates’ policy proposals reflect strong voter preferences regarding Taiwan’s future relations with China: security, equality, autonomy, and sovereignty.

What does this mean for future cross-Strait relations after the 2012 presidential election?  It is no secret that Chinese leaders prefer Ma over Tsai as Taiwan’s next president.  During the past three years, Beijing has attempted to boost Ma’s popularity through various means such as “profit concessions” during the ECFA negotiations, hoping that a favorable political settlement could be reached between Beijing and Taipei during Ma’s second term.  Most observers believe that should Tsai win, cross-strait rapprochement is likely to stall and exchanges will be suspended.   If Ma wins his re-election bid, then Chinese leaders are likely to press for cross-Strait political talks, possibly even negotiating a peace agreement.  After all, Ma’s policies are considered the most responsive to Beijing’s position.  Given clear voter preferences and Ma’s expressed views, it will be unlikely for Ma in his second term to accept Chinese leaders’ terms.   If Beijing insists that Taiwan’s autonomy must be reduced to the status of Hong Kong or Macao, it would have serious adverse effects on the much improved cross-Strait relations.  The island citizens would interpret Beijing’s unyielding stand on its version of the “one China” principle as proof of its malice towards Taiwan.  The likely consequence is that the Taiwanese people would see no other alternatives but to pursue the island’s de jure independence whatever the cost.  Thus, Chinese leaders need to show their sensitivity to the island citizens’ political preferences and be creative in their negotiation with Taipei.

T.Y. Wang is Professor of Political Science, Illinois State University, Normal, Illinois, USA.  He is the Co-Editor of Journal of Asian and African Studies.  He can be reached at <tywang@ilstu.edu>.

As many as 1.8 million Taiwanese voters in the 20-24 age group, 10 percent of the about 18 million eligible voters, are expected to cast their ballot for the first time in Saturday’s elections, a number that could be a deciding factor in what has been a neck-and-neck presidential race.

As a young democracy that held its first presidential election in 1996 after nearly half a century of authoritarian rule, the impressive voter turnout in major elections — which this year will once again be above 80 percent — is commendable, and highlights the commitment of Taiwanese to a system that became theirs after years of democratic struggle by their forefathers.

Sadly, it now appears that not all voters are equal.

Last year the Taiwanese government announced that, for the first time in the nation’s history, the presidential and legislative elections would be merged. As a consequence, the presidential election, which historically had been held on March 20, was moved up by more than two months, to January 14.

Although the authorities claimed the measure was adopted to cut expenses on expensive electoral campaigns — and no doubt holding the elections concurrently will achieve this aim — it also leaves some voters at a disadvantage. And this includes young voters.

The principal reason why the move has been called unfair to young voters is the fact that the election will coincide with the final week of exams for many students. As a large number of students of voting age go to school away from home, many will not have time to return home to vote.

Conversely, the timing of the election benefits wealthier and more mobile Taiwanese who will be returning to Taiwan for the Lunar New Year holidays, which this year fall one week after the elections.

While the divide can only be delineated imperfectly, it is generally agreed that for generational reasons (young Taiwanese tend to identify more with Taiwan than older generations, many of whom have a stronger sense of attachment to China), first-time and young voters tend to favor the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) over the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), while the opposite applies to the more than 1 million Taiwanese who currently work in China, mostly in or around Shanghai, most of whom support the KMT over the belief that the party can better ensure their economic well-being by accelerating trade with China.

Whether the drawbacks and upshots of choosing January 14 for the combined elections were mere accidental offshoots resulting from cost-saving requirements or something more nefarious is a question that has yet to be answered. However, the International Committee for Fair Elections in Taiwan has speculated that the move may have been a calculated effort to give President Ma Ying-jeou’s KMT an advantage in the race, in which whether a few hundred thousand first-time voters can exercise their right to take part in the election can be all it takes to determine who will run the country for the next four years.

J. Michael Cole is deputy news chief and a reporter at the Taipei Times newspaper and a correspondent on China for Jane’s Defence Weekly.

[Note that the number of 1st time voters has been corrected from an earlier version of this post. Jon]

From my vantage point on the east coast of Taiwan, and frequently commuting to Taipei where I teach social sciences at a national university, I am finding the upcoming election campaigning quiet compared to past years. As I have witnessed all the elections in Taiwan since the democratization process began, this one is in a calm silence. Of course as little trucks are moving about with a loudspeaker blaring support for a candidate, it just seems perfunctory.

The Taiwan electorate will come to vote on 14th January for presidential and national legislative candidates. Nearly 14 million of Taiwan’s 23 million people will select between three presidential contenders: incumbent President and ruling Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT) Chairman Ma Ying-jeou, 61, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen, 56, and People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong, 69, a former KMT secretary-general.

Four years ago, Frank Hsieh, DPP presidential candidate, tried to keep his party in the Presidential Office. His lackluster campaign faltered, and Ma Ying-jeou returned that office to the KMT with a high majority of votes. In that campaign, Ma portrayed himself as the friend of the people with rural home stays, and promised that the KMT would return the island to its prosperity as in the past.

This time around, it seems Ma has become the lackluster candidate with old rhetorical style – nothing new, and offering hope of stability that only the KMT can offer. On the other hand, in the wake of the Japan earthquake and massive tsunami of 11th March 2011, the disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant has triggered concern that KMT policy for Taiwan’s nuclear power could be faulty.

Tsai is campaigning on a nuclear review. She proposed to safely phase-out nuclear power by retiring the three existing nuclear plants from the 1970s (the sooner the better) and by not allowing a fourth nuclear power plant to load fuel or begin commercial operation. This, Tsai said, “would avoid adding a fourth ‘time bomb’ to the three existing plants on one of the world’s most seismic active regions.”

James Soong is campaigning as he did in 2000, and as vice-presidential candidate on a KMT ticket in 2004 – both times loosing to the DPP. In 2008, he did not enter the race, and his People First Party suffered legislative setbacks. Although not a prime contender this time, to revitalize his party, he needs to be a candidate.

All said, the political spectrum is set in motion. In the coming days, there will be rallies – yet, I believe the electorate is silently decided. Below my window, on an empty street, a campaign truck with loudspeaker, in the voice of Ma Ying-jeou, rolls by slowly. The message: “Ma, the president, is the best candidate, and the election will be decided by a mere 50,000 votes, therefore its time to act.”

The survey polls must close a week before the election. The polls are seemingly biased to promote candidates. Although it’s interesting to note, when Soong announced his candidacy, Ma’s rating above fifty percent, suddenly dropped. Meanwhile in most polls, Tsai’s ratings have shown gradual ascendancy.

David Blundell is Professor of Taiwan and Asia-Pacific Studies at National Chengchi University

As the Taiwan presidential campaign enters its final week, one striking development has been an outpouring of support for President Ma Ying-jeou by some of Taiwan’s leading businesspeople, including Evergreen Group President Chang Yung-fa 張榮發 and Far Eastern Group Chairman and CEO Douglas Hsu (徐旭東).

On the one hand, it is perfectly understandable that commercial and industrial heavyweights should wish to speak out for Ma, as KMT rule has witnessed a growing rapprochement with China that has greatly enhanced Taiwan’s business environment. This cozy relationship between the party and big business can be traced back to Republican-era China, and may be best represented by the “Aladdin” classic “You Ain’t Never Had a Friend Like Me”. On the other hand, the impact such enthusiastic expressions of support may have the general populace remains to be seen, and reports have already begun to emerge of tensions between management (“suits”) and labor (“shirts”) over which candidate to support.

Apart from rallying old friends to its cause, the KMT has also attempted to use the friends issue against its main rival by utilizing a tactic that might best be referred to as “Pin the A-Bian 阿扁 on the DPP”, where victory is achieved by convincing enough voters (especially independents and first-time voters) that DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen is little more than a successor to the corrupt administration of former President Chen Shui-bian. Whether this tactic can succeed remains to be seen, however, especially since Tsai and the DPP have been able to attract widespread support by avoiding extensive corporate sponsorship in favor of small-scale campaign contributions by ordinary citizens. The results have been strikingly clear in the “three little pigs” fundraising campaign (see my earlier post on this subject), which ended up netting more than NT$200 million from over 143,000 piggybanks donated by supporters nationwide. In order to count this mountain of small bills and even smaller change, the DPP had to recruit 150 volunteers who worked more than 3,000 man-hours for 20 days to operate various bill and coin sorting machines.

The differences between KMT and DPP supporters can also be seen in campaign rallies, as well as the mobilization processes that precede them. The KMT has been running “get out the vote” efforts for decades (including the use of occasionally questionable tactics), and has a stronger ground game due to its links to local elites. It also has the advantages of incumbency, including arranging for government agencies to spend tens of thousands of dollars on advertising related to campaign issues.

However, while the numbers of people attending KMT rallies have consistently been impressive, the degree of uniformity (people wearing identical baseball caps and carrying identical flags) often fails to match the level of enthusiasm, with attendees trickling out during (and at times even before) Ma’s stump speeches. In contrast, DPP rallies (especially those for Tsai) have tended to be much more vibrant and spontaneous (see the following video).

While crowd size and enthusiasm are hardly reliable indicators for predicting election results, the trends described above suggest that this election has indeed turned into a contest between “The People” and “The Machine”. Moreover, the tendency by many analysts to emphasize the importance of Cross-Strait ties and the “92 Consensus” (九二共識) has caused them to neglect the fact that in many ways this election is really about quality of life issues. As I noted in an earlier post for The China Beat, Ma was able to thrash DPP candidate Frank Hsieh in 2008 only partially due to popular desire for closer ties with China; the more important factor was disgust with the corrupt antics of the Chen Shui-bian administration. Moreover, as is also the case in the United States, the majority of voters appear to be concerned about the economy, especially stagnant (or even falling) wages, rising unemployment, higher prices, and an increasing number of companies forcing their workers to take unpaid leave.

If this continues to be the case, and if no last minute “surprises” occur (such as yet another shooting, a new “scandal”, or James Soong suddenly terminating his campaign and announcing unqualified support for the KMT), there is a real risk that Ma may end up losing this election, perhaps by an even larger margin than most people would have expected. If this does occur, then all the KMT’s CEOs and all of its chairmen may not be able to put its rule back together again.

Paul R. Katz  is a Research Fellow in the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica.

Taiwanese elections used to be very exciting events.  Not this time.  Even with the presidential and legislative elections combined, the electoral season this time round is marked by its relatively dull and uneventful nature.  Is this good?

I think so.  Elections in mature democracies are not normally eventful. Excitement is usually about how debates are won or lost.  Taiwan’s elections, particularly presidential ones, have, historically, been unusually eventful. Think about the PRC testing of missiles in response to the 1996 elections, Chinese threats of potential consequences should Chen Shui-bian be elected in 2000, and ‘the two bullets’ in 2004. Taiwan’s democracy is better off when its elections are less eventful.

Lest anyone think that the dull election so far implies Taiwan’s democracy is not so healthy I would like to point out that the tight competition between Tsai and Ma should put everyone at ease.  To an independent academic observer like me, at this stage of Taiwan’s development who or which party wins matters less than democracy winning.

In light of the very poor shape the DPP found itself after the 2008 elections, it is very heartening to see it making such a strong showing this time.  I am glad that Tsai is giving Ma a good run for his money not because I like her or the DPP – not being a Taiwanese I have no personal reason to prefer one Taiwanese party or leader to the other – but because a healthy democracy needs a strong opposition and keen electoral competition.  I would say the same of Ma and the KMT if the tables were turned and Ma were challenging Tsai as an incumbent president.  Whoever is in power and is dedicated to deepening Taiwan’s democratization should welcome strong electoral competition.

Whichever party wins the elections, Taiwan’s democracy has proved itself to be robust and healthy, as the incumbent party and president is being seriously challenged for a second term.

If Ma should win, the testing election should reassure all that he and his administration have been put under real scrutiny and passed.  His record and platform are clear for voters to assess.

If Tsai should win, there should be acceptance that she is given a mandate to introduce changes, though it is not entirely clear what changes she has in mind. It would have been better if the implications of a Tsai victory will be spelled out in greater detail by Tsai in the remainder of the electoral season.  Voters have a right to know what to expect as they cast their votes.  Tsai’s statement that she is willing to form a coalition government does not give a sufficiently clear picture for voters to gain a real sense of what to expect if they enable her to win the presidency.  There is still enough time for her to rectify this problem.

Returning to the subject of being dull and uneventful, I think Bill Clinton got it right about elections: it’s about the economy, stupid, he famously said.  At least it should be.  Taiwan elections have so far focused too much on cross-Strait relations. They should not.  Tsai is right in saying that Taiwan needs a consensus on cross-Strait relations. It should not be about forming a consensus on how to deal with Beijing, implying that Taiwan reaches a consensus on its identity. That is not going to happen soon. No party in Taiwan can impose that, or get everyone to agree to one narrative.  The consensus should be for all political parties in Taiwan to agree to take a non-partisan approach to cross-Strait relations. Cross-Strait relations are an existential issue for Taiwan, and as such require a non-partisan approach.

Taiwan will be better off replacing its colour politics (Green vs. Blue) with competition over how to define a better framework to lead Taiwan to development. Taiwan benefits when it should not matter much to Beijing whether the DPP or the KMT wins elections. This will of course not happen anytime soon,  but let’s celebrate that Taiwan’s elections have not been made eventful over cross-Strait relations this year.

Steve Tsang is Professor of Contemporary Chinese Studies, as well as Director of the China Policy Institute and the Taiwan Studies Programme at the University of Nottingham. 

The prediction of election results is plagued with weak assumptions and missing information, yet these pitfalls seem to discourage few from making claims days if not months before the election date. Taiwan is no different. For the upcoming Legislative Yuan (LY) election, most predictions expect a closer balance in seats between the KMT and DPP, consistent with both changes in DPP nomination strategies as well as minor shifts in the general political climate.  Instead of delving into partisan distributions to anticipate election results, I wish to highlight an additional area of concern: public perceptions of the legislative electoral system.

Public perceptions of the LY in historically have been rather negative, yet this gives limited insight into perceptions of the electoral rules. As the second election under a two-vote mixed system, we expect that Taiwanese voters have a better understanding of the mechanical effects of the system. Simply put, those who were confused by the new rules the first time should have most of this confusion allayed after actually voting and viewing the election results. Yet, post election surveys in Taiwan showed around 60% of respondents claiming not to understand the system, with slightly lower rates among voters. This is despite efforts by parties and the Central Election Commission (CEC) to explain the new system. If accurate, this would cause for concern as to whether public preferences were being adequately translated into representation. Comparable surveys elsewhere are rare, but between a third and a half of voters in Japan, Korea, and New Zealand claim to not understanding their system, even as strategic voting follows patterns consistent with an understanding.

Further evidence from Taiwan shows that while respondents claim a lack of understanding, knowledge of the technical aspects of the system are high, suggesting that rather than an ignorance of the system there remains a disconnect in expectations. Considering the DPP’s poor showing in 2008, one shouldn’t be surprised that DPP supporters were more likely to claim to not understand the 2008 system, even after controlling for other demographic factors.

What does this mean for 2012? With many district races expected to be closer than before and greater parity in expected seat distribution, fewer claims of misunderstanding post-election should arise. Yet, if supporters of one party disproportionately claims to misunderstand the electoral system (especially if this party is in the opposition), this risks dismissing such results as unfair. Furthermore, with the People’s First Party (PFP) running a separate campaign, this opens greater opportunities for strategic voting within the pan-blue camp, and thus an additional means post-election to identify whether claims of misunderstanding are connected to cross-coalitional voting.

Timothy S. Rich is a Doctoral Candidate in Political Science at Indiana University.

This is the last weekend before next Saturday’s presidential and legislative elections.  As of this past Wednesday, no polls are allowed to be released ahead of the voting day.  A sort of ‘quiet’ time, so to speak, to let voters take stock and make up their  own minds without the ‘noisy’ poll results of the past many weeks clamoring for their attention.

Observing the election campaign on the ground since October, I noticed a curious though not totally unexpected occurrence — i.e. the legislative election is largely ‘under the radar’ — a bit ‘invisible’ — in relation to the presidential elections.  News such as PFP chairman James Soong joining the race, the three little pigs, real estate scandals, charges of violation of bureaucratic neutrality, excessive spending on the 100-year celebration, the Yu Chang biotech scandal, the persimmon price raucous, even the US visa-free nomination have flooded the airwaves but they are (made to) focused mainly on the presidential race.

The ‘presidentialization’ of elections is not totally unexpected.  As in the US, all focus is on the presidential race when congressional elections are held concurrently.  Scholars have also observed that even in parliamentary systems, there is an increasing focus on the party leaders who are jockeying to be the next prime minister.  Taiwan seems to conform to these observations.  The extra spice to Taiwan election version 2012 is that by all predictions the presidential race is going to be a photo finish.

So, apart from the brief attention surrounding the announcements of the party list candidates, the media and voters are relatively more fixated on the race for the presidency, seemingly oblivious to the other race.  Yet, in this semi-presidential system, the legislative elections will be a strong determinant on the complexion of executive-legislative relations for the next four years of the next presidency.

From my vantage point here in the southern port city of Kaohsiung, the city’s road intersections are plastered with the usual campaign billboards and flags of the presidential and legislative candidates.  Town hall style meetings and campaign events still occur around town but the legislative campaign here is decidedly low-key, definitely quieter than in the past.  In this pan-Green stronghold, pundits predict that the DPP will win 6 of the 9 constituency seats which leaves the KMT with only 3.  Across the whole island, the closeness of the presidential election is providing cover to a likely substantial change in the next legislative make-up.  Election experts and pundits alike predict that the KMT is likely to scrape by with a small majority due to favorable electoral districting but the DPP will definitely improve substantially and even the PFP may pick up some seats.

Notwithstanding the inattention of the voters and media to the legislative races, the simple fact is that the consequence of this ‘invisible’ election will be very visible indeed.  No one can totally rule out that the specter of a divided government will not come back to haunt Taiwan nor predict with confidence that with a drastic change in legislative make-up the next president (and executive team) will face a friendly and cooperative legislature

Alex Tan is Professor of Political Science at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand

A few days before the election, Taiwan’s presidential race is too close to call. It has been like a tug-of-war without an obvious winner for the past few weeks. Unlike the earlier stage of the campaign when Tsai Ing-wen was the obvious underdog with little or no chance to win, she is now posing a deadly threat to Ma Ying-jeou’ road to re-election.

However this assertion probably cannot be backed by any reliable opinion polls in Taiwan. In fact Ma has been the favored candidate who leads Tsai by a margin of 2% to 10%, or even higher in all polls. But as any experienced observer of Taiwan’s politics will say immediately that Taiwan-based media are not credible when it comes to election polling. This is largely caused by their respective political colors and partisan agendas. And for anyone who is running as a KMT candidate, a lead that is smaller than 5% in pre-election polls is almost like a verdict of defeat. This is because potential DPP voters are systematically under-represented in standard polling practices from past experiences.

Today many turn to the Exchange of Future Events of Cheng-chi University for hints. Using a different methodology, it has a more credible, though short, record confirmed by post-election results. In its recent official release issued on January 3, the agency predicted a Tsai victory by a margin of 7.2%, and 52 seats (or 46% of the total) for the DPP in the legislative election. But its accuracy is also subject to reasonable doubt, since the project is still young and the weighting scheme it adopts may need to be tested more rigorously as time goes by. Plus, like its analogy to the financial market, the likelihood in any market of a sudden correction of 7% cannot be ruled out.

At this point, this tight race reminds me of what had happened in 2000 and 2004. The last one-and-two punches landed by the candidates before the bell rings, sometimes referred to as “ao-bu” (Taiwanese pronunciation for low or disreputable tactics), can and will matter in an intense and tight competition like the current one. A further factor that is likely to have a decisive impact is already widely discussed (among other likelihoods such as gambling at the election result): i.e. will James Soong make any dramatic move, and will a larger proportion of his supporters swing back to Ma’s or to Tsai? Considering all of above, it is clear to me that in this presidential campaign no one can claim victory or feel assured to celebrate before the votes are practically all accounted for on January 14.

I think many issues mentioned in the media and in this blog are all important in this campaign. Cross-Strait relations, the widening gap in income disparity, welfare and justice issues, rising real-estate prices, national health and tax reforms, and the gender, age, and ethnic backgrounds of voters. Also important are the dynamics associated with campaign tactics, including proper use and misuse of government resources and governmental leaks and legal battles, name calling, framing or “counter-framing”. But to me the most significant meaning of this election is that it can be seen as a referendum on Ma and his party’s line in hastening their pursuit of economic integration and dependence on China in the past four years. After all the nasty rhetoric, debates and name calling, it all comes down to a very simplified term called the “92 Consensus”.

The 92 Conesus is credited as the “foundation” of all friendly engagements and accords signed between Ma and Beijing’s representatives since 2008. These accords contain many economic concessions originating from Beijing’s “good-will” as many have said. However, as some Taiwanese businessman have gradually realized, in China one does not and cannot win competitive bidding or make business deals openly in a market that is highly regulated by Chinese government and officials. The hidden rule is that business opportunities and deals are made possible behind the scene because they are often “gifts” from Chinese officials with political endorsement, in exchange for returned reciprocity. Recent accords signed with Beijing, plus highly advertised privileged purchases of Taiwanese products and agricultural produce from many Chinese provincial governors and representatives traveling to Taiwan bear the resemblances too well.

Ma was careful on many occasions to defend himself from being portrayed by his opponent as a protectorate of Beijing. And yet he has no hesitation about claiming “peace dividends” derived from recent cross-Strait developments as the major accomplishment of his first term, and the beginning of Taiwan’s “Golden Era”. Objectively speaking, this 92 Consensus was construed by the KMT and the CCP, and become widely supported by Taiwan’s key media and business interests, and by mainlander population and pro-unification voters. Even the U.S. appears to approve this development when cross-Strait tensions in effect became reduced following this “Consensus”. But this has been not the DPP’s and Tsai’s position. They argued that the alleged Consensus is a conspiracy of China, a sugarcoating of China’s strategic ambition to swallow Taiwan. The KMT is accused of being Beijing’s accomplice and Ma a liar. Today, both the CCP and the KMT have issued stern warnings: no one should expect business to be conducted as usual if Tsai were elected and the Consensus was not respected as a result. Taiwan might be cornered once more like it was under Chen Shui-bian, not just politically but also economically. But this warning does not seem to stop Tsai from mobilizing a large crowd and catching up from a distant polling position. Why? Are her party and supporters deaf or blinded from the reality? Why is Tsai able to pull the DPP back to the front stage and become a serious contender?

I observe that Tsai and the DPP have been successful in channeling the widespread discontent and distrust already existing in Taiwan for some time against the incumbent administration. Tsai’s campaign boosted the morale and turned the DPP from living under the shadow of Chen Shui-bian’s corruption scandal to become a newly reborn political force. It is evident that Tsai’s support comes from where the DPP has been the favored party, from regions where manufacturing workers, farmers, fisherman, self-employed and small enterprises make up the majority of the population. And her party is still the only viable alternative for Taiwanese nationalists, and some social activists like environmentalists. She is also more appealing to the younger generation in comparison to other DPP big shots. She can lead and unite a divided DPP, and get support from the other part of the electorate that feels bullied by the KMT and Beijing’s alliance, coerced to accept Beijing’s gifts, threatened or marginalized by all the “good things” and concessions allegedly radiating from the 92 Consensus. Tsai promises that she will build a “Taiwan Consensus” to replace the “92 Consensus” if elected. She is of course vague and cannot offer any specifics at the moment. And realistically this is a very difficult, if not impossible, promise to keep since she is bound to be boycotted and undermined by both the KMT and Beijing from the first day on if she becomes elected, without any doubt.

At the end of the day, as happened in Taiwan’s past elections, the Blue and the Green camps each stands on the north-south, mainlander-Taiwanese, upper-lower social stratum, high-flying cross-strait businessman and ordinary grass-roots people cleavages. And while nationalistic confrontation appears to have receded, it is engrained in the debates surrounding the “92 Consensus” versus the “Taiwan Consensus”.

I think that of course Ma still has a shot to win the presidential campaign, but the DPP will succeed in gaining more seats in the Legislature. If it cannot upset the KMT’s dominance this time (though I think the chances are high), it can perform more effective checks on the administration power than before. I have no doubt whatsoever that the DPP has rebounded convincingly from its humiliating defeat in 2008. The turning around of Tsai’s campaign, and the DPP candidates for the legislative election was not a result of her charisma or the DPP’s brushed up platform, but rising dis-satisfaction with Ma’s leadership and the tilting of the KMT’s policy toward special interest groups who are sucked into the “gifts” Beijing have awarded them, or may award them in the future. I am sure that voters must have heard the warning shots fired by KMT officials, business hot shots and Beijing. But for them the more important priority resides in putting the political brakes on the seemingly runaway westbound express train driven by Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT’s business allies.

Professor Mau-kuei Chang is Research Fellow at the Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica.

In just a few more days, the curtain will finally rise for the much-anticipated Presidential and Legislative elections in Taiwan. Speculations are rife whether the DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen will be able to successfully challenge the incumbent Ma Ying-jeou. Most observers predict that it will be a close race, and I personally believe that the DPP does indeed stand a good chance – but alas, in face of Taiwan’s notoriously unreliable opinion polls, such speculations are not very rewarding.

Still, many people have voiced their concerns about the possible consequences for Taiwan-China relations in the vent of a DPP victory. For the most part, the forecasts have been uniformly gloomy: the general logic assumes that a DDP-led government would be unwilling and unable to accept the ambiguous “92 consensus”, which would lead to a complete breakdown of  Taiwan-China negotiations, causing havoc to Taiwan’s business interests on the mainland and in the Asia-Pacific region, while the temperature in cross-Strait relations would drop to new freezing point. In recent weeks, scores of leading pan Blue-politicians and representatives of Taiwan’s business elite have capitalized precisely on this catastrophic scenario, warning about the dire consequences if the DPP should “rock the boat” in cross-Strait relations. I believe that those concerns are largely unwarranted. Indeed, I even propose that a change of government in Taiwan could actually be beneficial to a healthy development of cross-Strait relations.

First, I consider it highly unlikely that Beijing would be so foolish as to carelessly cast away the achievements of cross-Strait integration, which both sides have labored so industriously to achieve during the past four years. The costs, both in economic and political terms, would be too enormous to be considered seriously. From the many integration projects in the world (the European Union, for one), we know that integration is incredibly difficult to achieve, but also extremely hard to undo. In many fields, the liberalization policies have fundamentally altered, for better or worse, the basic rules of cross-Strait interactions. Economic players on both sides of the Strait have adapted to the new rules, and restructured their behavior accordingly. Technically, it would of course be possible for Beijing to “turn back the clock” – indeed, the ECFA agreement explicitly provides an “exit clause”. Such a rash act, however, would cause major upheavals in the delicate fabric of economic ties between the two sides, and any hope of eventually building up political “trust” would be rendered utterly remote.

Furthermore, we can safely assume that China’s policy makers in charge of cross-Strait policies are no fools, and have already drawn up contingency plans for the eventuality of a DPP victory. So far China has remained remarkably low-key on the topic, which I take as a sign that Beijing wishes to keep its options open.

Second, it is quite possible that in future cross-Strait negotiations, a DPP-led government might even be able to achieve more benefits for Taiwan. This effect, known as “Schelling’s paradox of weakness” to political scientists and well-documented in the European integration process, assumes that a government whose choices are constrained by a highly skeptical electorate can actually gain more leverage in its negotiations with other states. Beijing knows that it will need to provide more incentives, both economically and politically, to convince the majority of DPP-supporters of the wisdom of further cross-Strait integration – thus enabling a DPP-led government to carry on the process. The same logic, incidentally, applies to the thorny question of Taiwan’s political status: the leadership in China is fully aware that the DPP cannot and will not accept the “92 consensus”, and that no amount of pressure can force the DPP to yield. Hence, in order to safeguard the achievements of the past, China might be compelled to grudgingly – and maybe tacitly – accept an alternative formula which can satisfy both Beijing and the supporters of the pan-Green camp, and which will allow both sides to save face.

Of course, I may be wrong on both accounts. It is also possible that China will decide to take a firm stance on what it regards as the political principle of territorial integrity, and hazard the consequences of a breakdown in cross-Strait exchanges. In that case, however, we should ask ourselves whether the whole project was worth the trouble in the first place. Taiwan, after all, is a democratic society, and the question of how to frame the country’s de-facto sovereignty is still up to the voters to decide. If the integration processes across the Taiwan Strait should indeed prove unable to cope with this simple fact of life, then it might be better discarded rather earlier than later. The longer the process lasts, the more painful it will be when it finally runs aground – which it must inevitably in the long run (unless we assume that the KMT will remain in power forever).

In my opinion, the impact of a DPP victory for cross-Strait relations will be manageable. In the economic realm, at least, exchange will continue on the basis of what has been achieved to date. The political process, in contrast, might be temporarily impaired, as Beijing may be reluctant to enter into new major agreements, and pin its hopes on a return-to power of a more China-friendly government in the future instead. Such a stumbling block could actually be a good thing, since it will provide both sides with an opportunity to take a step back, explore new possibilities for a mutual understanding, and even come up with ideas on how the mechanism of integration might be improved.

As a true German, let me finish on a metaphor from car-manufacturing: the misfiring of an engine can be a very burdensome thing and lead to the breakdown of the whole machine. At the same time, a temporary malfunction should remind us that no mechanism can forever run smoothly, but requires constant maintenance and care. On very few occasions, it might even lead us to insights on how a completely new, and better, engine may be designed.

Stefan Fleischauer is Co-Managing Director of the European Research Center on Contemporary Taiwan (ERCCT) at the University of Tuebingen. 

In a democracy, every election has the feel of a possible revolution. The commanding heights of power can be transferred from one group to another. Incumbents feel threatened. There is invariably a temptation to use or abuse the levers of power so as not to lose power to a group of challengers, which ruling groups feel or fear are ignorant of how the world works and what one’s own nation needs. These generalizations hold true for Taiwan as they do for other democracies. The ruling KMT sincerely feels it would be a disaster if it fell from power.

What makes Taiwan different is the role played by an outside force, an authoritarian China, or, more accurately, the ruling CCP, on and in Taiwan’s domestic affairs. Authoritarian ruling groups in China use their superpower clout not only to threaten, with economic retaliation, any government which carries out normal relations with the government of the independent nation of  Taiwan but also uses resources to try to influence the outcome of the vote by Taiwanese. This foreign government on the continental land mass of Asia make deals with interests in southern Taiwan, the base of the challenger party, the DPP, implicitly threatening that voting for the DPP could cost local people, citizens on the island of Taiwan, where it hurts, their wallets and pocket books.

The power-holders in China also threaten the challenger party on Taiwan that if it does not accede to China’s one-China principle, the expansionist claim that the country of Taiwan is actually a local part of a China ruled by Beijing, then the CCP government will not cooperate with a DPP government. Instead, the Taiwanese people will be punished for voting contrary to the will of world power China.

To this Chinese ruling group, one that is increasingly repressive, chauvinistic and assertive, it does not seem to matter that the challenger party on Taiwan is in no way a threat to China and is committed to continuing intense economic relations with China as in fact actually occurred the last time that a DPP member was President of Taiwan. The present DPP candidate has made clear that she would not pursue the policies of the previous DPP government whose leader tried to mobilize support on Taiwan by putting a thumb in Beijing’s eye. The Taiwanese people rejected those silly games as proof that that DPP president had taken his eye off the ball, that he did not devote himself to improving the lives of the Taiwanese people. For that reason, the DPP was punished in the 2008 election. It learned an expensive lesson which it does not want to pay again. The present DPP candidate will not play games on the China issue. She will focus on the real problems of the Taiwanese people. She will try her best to work with China based on common interests.

The real question then  is, can the CCP take yes for an answer or is there, inside of the mind-set and politics of ruling groups in China a possibility that the CCP regime would act toward Taiwan in nasty ways, as has been recently the case with Chinese policies toward Vietnam. That is, there could be a China problem which is too frequently made invisible by the mistaken view that there is a Taiwan problem, when Taiwanese of both political parties want the warmest relations possible with their neighbors in China.

It is often said that Taiwanese vote largely on the basis of local economic concerns. But China has been inserting itself into those local economic matters with a desire to influence electoral outcomes. Among other things, the January 2012 elections in democratic Taiwan will reflect how successfully or poorly this Chinese interference in Taiwan affairs has been.

Edward Friedman is a politics Professor and East Asia expert at the University of Wisconsin at Madison

As the world heads into 2012, Taiwan moves closer to electing its next president. It is a tradition in Taiwan to hold a flag raising ceremony in front of the presidential hall at the start of every year, and hundreds of people make their way to the Ketagalan Boulevard early in the morning just to attend the event. Besides rejoicing in the pleasant atmosphere of seeing the “blue sky, white sun, red ground” (qingtian bairi mandihong, i.e. the R.O.C. flag) beat in the sky and the Honor Guards marching neatly before the presidential hall, the early birds are rewarded with hats and scarves produced in the colors of the flag. The high point of the event is marked by raising of the flag while the crowd sings the national anthem.

With the election just around the corner, it is usual for the candidates to avoid meeting in public and New Years Day is no exception to the norm. While President Ma attended the flag raising ceremony in the country’s capital, unsurprisingly, DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen and fellow supporters chose to celebrate the beginning of 2012 at their home base in Tainan. Compared to Taipei, Tainan’s fair weather was just right for early morning events, even though in this case, the flag might not beat as hard without strong wind attending to it. Aside from the lovely weather, what is worth noting in the “green” ceremony is that Tsai seems to have some trouble singing the national anthem. In other words, she skipped a few lines.

In order to fulfil the demands of good citizenship in Taiwan, one is expected to know the national anthem by heart and rise to the anthem whenever it is played. As a person who grew up and went through proper education on the island, Tsai can be expected to know the national anthem well, just like any other good citizen should.

So she missed a few lines, big deal right?

Wrong. Tsai’s refusal to speak the words should not be slighted, as it is loaded with political meaning, especially at this critical juncture. What Tsai deliberately skipped over may be said to be the essence of the anthem, Doctor Sun Yat-Sen’s teaching of the Three Principles of minzu, minquan, minsheng (nationalism, democracy and people’s welfare). The opening lines that Tsai “forgot” due to amnesia go as “sanminzhuyi, wudangsuozong, yijianminguo,” which literally means “the Three Principles of the People are the purpose of the party, for the establishment of a republic.”

Once the words of the anthem are put under the spotlight, it is clear why Tsai avoided singing the lines. Referring to the national anthem, the “party” could mean no other than the Kuomintang or Nationalist Party, which happens to be the DPP’s main rival in the coming election, while the “republic” could stand for no else than the Republic of China, something that has haunted Tsai ever since she began campaigning for the election. Party rivalry aside, the major stumbling block for the DPP effort to reclaim office is cross-Strait relations. With Taiwan successfully rebuilding its relationship with China under the KMT administration in the past three years, leading to increased economic exchange across the Strait, the DPP confronts the pressure of doing better or just keeping up with the KMT’s record. The dilemma that Tsai faces in this election is whether to hold firmly to the DPP’s basic purpose of Taiwanese independence in order to consolidate the support of party hardliners, or to ease up on the DPP’s basic position in search of potential opportunities for interactions with Beijing.

So far, the result has been disappointing. Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP has failed to provide the public with a clear platform on cross-Strait relations. With the election just around the corner, tackling the issue of cross-Strait relations may be “too little too late” anyways. If most of the voters in Taiwan are rational enough to focus on the big picture of peace and prosperity across the Strait, other considerations aside, the DPP can look forward to a tough battle ahead. The key variable now lays with James Soong, who succeeded in dividing the election in 2000.

In the end though, leaving politics aside, it is a pity to see Tsai make the effort to skip the first line of the national anthem. After all, “democracy” is one of the key values proposed in the Three Principles (and what the “Democratic” Progressive Party stands for) and “republic” has a much deeper meaning than just the now politicized state title of “Republic of China.”

Tony Tai-Ting Liu is doctoral student at the Graduate Institute of International Politics, National Chung Hsing University, Taiwan. He can be reached at: stanggoftibia1984@yahoo.com.tw