October 10th, 2011 marked the 100th anniversary of the Xinhai Revolution which led to the demise of China’s last dynasty and the subsequent birth of the Republic of China (ROC). Known as Double Ten Day, this date is celebrated as the National Day in Taiwan. However, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) does not recognise this date; rather, it celebrates its own National Day on 1 October.

The ROC’s centennial has given politicians in Taiwan and mainland China another chance to express their political stances on the sovereignty of Taiwan, and from these expressions, three broad voices representing the blue, red, and green camps can be discerned.

The blue camp’s voice was reflected in Taiwanese president Ma Ying-Jeou’s National Day speech, in which he asserted that mainland China needs to recognise the existence of the ROC. Ma is also the blue camp’s candidate for the 2012 presidential election.

Maintaining the red camp’s stance, during a talk on the 100th anniversary of the fall of China’s last dynasty, Hu Jintao downplayed the existence of the ROC. Twenty-three times in Hu’s speech, he noted “the revival of the great Chinese people” as a result of the Xinhai Revolution and that it should continuously be pursued in our time, but he did not mention the ROC even once.

Lastly, the green camp, headed by Taiwan’s candidate for the 2012 presidential election, Tsai Ing-Wen, noted that the ROC is Taiwan, and Taiwan is the ROC.

These assertions reaffirm the three parties’ old schism over the existence of the ROC.

As usual, the red completely ignores the existence of the ROC, and repeatedly stresses that Taiwan should be reunited with China in due course. For the blue camp, the Kuomintang’s defeat in the Chinese Civil War led the ROC to temporarily relocate and re-establish itself in Taiwan; thus, the ROC does exist. Ma has avoided using the term ‘unification’, which the red camp enjoys advocating, but has stressed the necessity to institutionalise a peaceful relationship with mainland China. Although the blue and red camps have tackled the existence of the ROC and the question of unification differently, they share a similar tendency to situate Taiwan in the broader Chinese historical context.

On the other hand, the green camp has been known for its staunch stance on Taiwan’s unique identity and statehood. It views Taiwan’s history as more nuanced, such that it also encompasses the history of various indigenous people residing on the island. The green opposes the sole narration of Taiwan’s history and existence as a part of the greater Chinese history. Tsai’s abovementioned statement indicates that it is Taiwan that allows the ROC to exist. Therefore, while Taiwan’s history might include part of the history of the ROC, one cannot equate Taiwan’s history with that of the ROC.

It is worth noting that Tsai actually stirred debates last year when she contended that the ROC is a government-in-exile. However, by stating this year that the ROC is Taiwan and Taiwan is the ROC, Tsai made her stance more moderate. One can inevitably relate this to her effort to appease more voters in the middle (i.e., not too green, not too blue) in the upcoming presidential election.

Julie Yu-Wen Chen is an Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica in Taiwan and an Honorary Research Fellow at the Institute of Human Security at La Trobe University in Australia.

Paul Katz posted here last week on the Piggy bank scandal. The ever observant Michael Turton at the View From Taiwan points out that pigs have a history of symbolism in Taiwan. He reminds us that “when the KMT first arrived the locals would call the KMT the “pigs”. Rituals in which pigs were sacrificed then took on a political double meaning, the more so because the KMT became increasingly bent on reshaping traditional religion as the Taiwanese practiced it, under the slogan of “Simplify Customs and Save Waste”, deep into the 1970s. Indeed, the Taiwanese used to cover the pigs with colorful Nationalist political symbols, ostensibly demonstrating their loyalty to the regime in carrying out traditional religion, but since the pig was killed, the double meaning should be obvious”. In the same post, Michael posts an image of a children’s textbook from the early 1980’s showing how children donated their piggybanks out of love for the state.

I noted in another recent post, that KMT spokeswomen have outdone themselves in terms of their sanctimonious hand wringing over the “politicization of children” in the piggybank drive. On Twitter, the ever-punctilious @TimMaddog from Taiwan Matters linked to several examples of the KMT using children in their ads.

Ben Goren at Letters from Taiwan has been busy. First, he suggests some suitably irreverent campaign slogans for the major parties. You are invited, esteemed reader, to add your own in the comments below. Ben also flipped me some anecdotes about Taiwan’s readiness for a woman president. He says “while it seems that more women will vote for Ma, many ‘because his is so handsome’, another load will not vote for Tsai out of a feeling that she reminds them of the elementary school ma’am that punished them for not finishing their homework.” Although the gender voting dynamics are far from clear cut, Ben avers that “Taiwanese are ready for a female President and I think Tsai’s gender, despite the DPP playing it as a positive meme, will not factor too greatly into the final results”.

Tsai targeted rural aboriginal communities in latest leg of her campaign on the east coast, where “she pledged to advance Aboriginal autonomy and laws related to Aboriginal lands and maritime space, some of which have been seized by governments for several decades, and establish a “new partnership” between the government and Aborigines to “correct the historical mistakes that have lasted for hundreds of years.” See Scott Simon’s post comparing candidates’ indigenous policy platforms.

James Soong is in the news, and he’s not having a good day. First, he’s fed up with his computers being hacked. And he wants y’all to know he’s absolutely, positively not going to pull out of the campaign after doing a deal for seats in the legislature. Nah-ah, ain’t happening people… The first link here has a great Soong quote. Observe during this campaign: for a Big Man politico, Soong plays the injured soul so often and so well. Apropos being hacked, he laments how “furthering oneself by killing a rival is the act of a despicable man”. Is that Bushido?

Mail me at jonathan.sullivan@nottingham.ac.uk, follow me on Twitter @jonlsullivan, or access my published and working papers at http://jonlsullivan.com

Facing the transformation of the international order and the increasing influence of China in East Asia, policymakers in Taiwan acknowledge the necessity of engaging with China in order to survive the international political transformation and cope with more globalized economic competition. As presidential candidates, both Ma and Tsai require concrete cross-Strait policy platforms to inform the electorate about their methods to make use of Taiwan’s strategic position in East Asia as well as in the triangle relationship between China, Taiwan, and the United States. Since the principles of Ma’s and Tsai’s Cross Strait policy are respectively represented in the KMT’s “Golden Decade” and the DPP’s “Ten Year Policy Guidelines”, I briefly analyze the merits and shortcomings of their policy principles by comparing the two documents along with the security and economic conditions in East Asia.

China’s governing class is undergoing an authority handing-over process. Its current priority is to maintain domestic stability and peace in its neighborhood. Therefore, China is reluctant to see increasing competition in the cross-Strait relationship, initiated by US arms sales to Taiwan. It always tries hard to shape the cross-Strait problem as a domestic issue in order to drive out foreign intervention. In responding to China’s preference, the security dimension of the KMT and DPP’s cross-Strait policies have great similarity. On the one hand, they agree on maintaining a stable and peaceful cross-Strait relationship, since it is the most desirable outcome for most Taiwanese. On the other hand, they agree on improving self-defense capabilities against China since China does not relinquish its right of solving cross-Strait problems with a military approach. The KMT inclines to achieve the goal by technological innovation and arms sales primarily from the US, while DPP does not propose a concrete method.

However, a stable and peaceful cross-Strait relationship and enhanced military power seem contradictory. Neither Ma nor Tsai clarify how the two goals can coexist. In addition, from the perspective of US self-interest, the US needs China to deal with important issues in international affairs such as counter-terrorism and the Six-Party Talks. Foreign policy is always “realistic” and China’s role may compromise US willingness, or the contents of, arms sales to Taiwan. Accordingly, high dependence on US arms sales does not seem a cost-effective strategy and entails certain risks in the long-term. Moreover, the defense budget cut in recent years has led to domestic suspicion about the government’s determination to improve self-defense capabilities. Taiwan does not need (and cannot afford) an arms race with China, nor should it cut defense budgets year by year to express its benign motives to China . According to my experience of serving in the Taiwanese Marine Corps, it is more cost-effective to invest in developing advanced defense systems and increase the maintenance budget for self-developed systems as well as those we bought from foreign countries. Only by possessing a high quality (not large quantity) defense power capable of ensuring our own security do we have the leverage to negotiate the terms of a stable and peaceful Cross Strait relationship. Otherwise, China will call all the shots.

In terms of the economic dimension, China has made use of its large-scale internal market to increase Taiwan’s economic dependence and has tried to cut the political and economic connection between Taiwan and other countries in order to isolate Taiwan. Japan and South Korea also need China’s internal market for certain products (particularly the automotive and electronics industries) to stimulate their economic growth. China’s strategic objective is to increase East Asian countries’ dependence and thereby reduce US influence in the region. Further, China has become the second largest creditor (the first is Japan) of the US by buying huge sums of US governmental bonds. This increases China’s influence on US policy and ability to resist US attempts to shape East Asia’s balance of power.

Ma and Tsai propose different strategies to respond to this situation. Ma prefers active openness for Taiwan-China mutual investment through which he expects to resuscitate Taiwan’s economy and to make commercial profits. While Ma argues that the signature of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with China (which provoked serious domestic debate) would facilitate free trade agreements (FTA) between Taiwan and other countries, the claimed effect has not been clearly discerned yet (though the Senate “suggests” US-Taiwan FTA). However, the US and South Korea signed an FTA recently. It increases the opportunity for mutual investment and intensifies US economic connections with East Asia. In addition, the technological level and investment environments in Taiwan and South Korea are quite similar. Under the US-Korean FTA, Taiwan must prudently deal with the substitution effects of investment caused by tariff variation.

Tsai possesses a more cautious attitude about the impact of openness for Chinese investment, and emphasizes governmental support for native industries and economic autonomy. She also argues that Taiwan should engage with China from a multilateral framework (e.g. WTO) rather than through bilateral interaction or reckless unilateral action. This seems a more secure strategy for a small country to interact with another country with a much larger economy. However, Tsai’s argument remains stuck at the conceptual level and we get no clue about any precise method to achieve this goal.

In my opinion, Tsai’s strategy is conceptually correct but very difficult to carry out due to China’s international influence. Ma’s strategy is relatively risky, but easier to implement because it is more consistent with China’s interests. In sum, every problem has a solution, and every solution is a problem. Taiwanese people have to make their choice on 14 January 2012.

Dr. Sheng-Chih Wang is a Research Assistant in the Department of Diplomacy at National Chengchi University, Taiwan.

Indigenous people, accounting for about 2% of Taiwan’s population, are unlikely to influence the 2012 presidential election outcomes. Nonetheless, the relative success of the candidates in indigenous communities may influence elections for the Legislative Yuan, which has a quota of six indigenous legislators. The way in which candidates position themselves on indigenous rights, moreover, may indicate how they understand such issues as popular sovereignty and social justice. The goal of this post is to analyze how they position themselves in relationship to “multiculturalism” and “indigenism”.

The evolving framework of indigenous rights, as expressed in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007), is concerned about colonial injustice, affirms that indigenous peoples are equal to other peoples, and recognizes their right to self-determination. Indigenism, emphasizing indigenous sovereignty (self-government and land rights), can be contrasted with multiculturalism, focused more on ethnic harmony and social welfare.

In Taiwan, Article 10 of the additional articles of the ROC Constitution stipulates, “[t]he State shall, in accordance with the will of the ethnic groups, safeguard the status and political participation of the aborigines.” The 2005 Basic Law on Indigenous Peoples further outlines state responsibilities and indigenous rights, requiring the creation of indigenous autonomous zones. Yet there is still room for interpretation as policies are formulated and implemented.

All three candidates include indigenous rights in their platforms. Although “autonomy” emerges as a common leitmotif, there are differences in how they contextualize indigenous issues. Ma Ying-jeou’s (Chinese Nationalist Party, KMT) “Golden Decade” platform embeds eight planks under four guarantees: 1) the independence and integrity of the ROC; 2) the security and prosperity of Taiwan; 3) ethnic harmony and cross-straits peace; and 4) sustainable environment and just society. As part of “just society,” Ma subordinates indigenous rights to “ethnic harmony.” He promises to create indigenous autonomous zones (already stipulated by law), and make further progress on culture, education, and economic development. Ma’s platform thus frames indigenous rights in terms of ROC nationalism and ethnic harmony, positioning him closer to multiculturalism than to indigenism.

Tsai Ing-wen’s (Democratic Progressive Party, DPP) platform for the next decade of “development” is remarkably similar. With general goals of “strengthening Taiwan, consolidating Taiwan,” and core values of “looking to the world, equal justice,” she also subordinates indigenous issues under other goals. In the environmental section, she promises space to “develop indigenous tribal economies” in mountainous regions. Her 16th section, on “ethnic groups,” includes recognition in social memory, language rights, economic development, and the creation of autonomous zones. On autonomy, she promises to set up “self-managing” zones with secure financial resources. Tsai’s stated policy is thus closer to multiculturalism and social welfare developmentalism than to indigenism. Both Ma and Tsai seem to view indigenous people as ethnic minorities, rather than as colonized peoples with special rights in international law. The main difference between Ma and Tsai is that one subordinates multiculturalism to ROC nationalism, and the other to Taiwanese nationalism. From an indigenist perspective, both nationalisms are different variants of Han hegemony.

Dark horse candidate James Soong (People First Party, PFP) makes indigenous policy part of a bricolage of promises for youth, municipal reform, agriculture, indigenous peoples, disaster prevention, and education. His goals for indigenous peoples are framed as autonomy, equality, and development. His platform, beginning with themes of cultural “respect” and autonomy, states that the main principle is “self-sufficient development” rather than “long-term financial assistance.” The relative prominence of autonomy reflects the close relationship he cultivated with indigenous leaders while serving as Taiwan provincial governor; and suggests awareness of indigenism. Everyone knows that Soong is a Chinese nationalist, but he is the only candidate who does not explicitly subordinate indigenous policy to broader political goals or “ethnic relations”. His platform can be characterized as an ad hoc blend of light indigenism and heavy developmentalism. It was probably drafted by Walis Belin. Walis has been a KMT lawmaker, chair of the Indigenous Peoples’ Council (IPC) under Chen Shui-bian’s DPP administration – and is the political maverick who actually succeeded in creating the IPC in the first place.

If re-elected, Ma can continue to build upon the progress made during his first term. Most of the work at the IPC, led by Dr. Sun Da-chuan, emphasized social welfare while strengthening cultural foundations for autonomy. Tsai would likely replace Sun with an indigenous leader from Presbyterian networks, bringing a stronger preference for legal autonomy and experience with international activism. Soong, who has the strongest base in grassroots base in indigenous communities, is likely to get the most indigenous votes. If so, his legislative candidates will have better chances of getting elected, and may make forceful advocates for indigenous rights as members of the opposition. Walis Belin, surely not by coincidence, is one of those candidates. In terms of indigenous politics, he may be the real victor.

Scott Simon is Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at the University of Ottawa. He recently published an article on elections in indigenous Taiwan and blogs at the Centre for International Policy Studies blog 

Sanctimonious quotes from KMT women regarding the “politicization of children” during the DPP’s piggybank campaign. To wit, Chao Li-yun delivers her anguished verdict that “labelling children with political labels [sic] and ‘contaminating’ their innocence with politics is heart-rending. Could this also be seen as a type of bullying?” Continuing on, probably dabbing her wet cheeks, she explained how “many parents were saddened to see children appear at DPP fundraisers as Tsai’s electioneering tools”.

It is similarly sad when elderly partisans throw down in fisticuffs, as in this report of ad-hoc hospital waiting room campaigning gone wrong. A fight resulted when one old geezer “declined [the other’s] request to support Tsai,” because he could not vote for “one who wears a skirt”. (I wonder if this reflects a demure euphemism on the part of the journalist.) Typically, the local KMT politico called on Tsai to make a public apology, the local DPP rep issued some platitude about keeping calm, and everyone went home for tea.

A reasonable KMT piece about Soong’s campaign strategy and his (surrogates’) attacks on both blue and green. This piece includes a brilliant line, which they should copyright now otherwise I’m going to steal it and work into every article I write from now on. Ready? “Being a palace kongfu master, Soong is an expert of intrigues and machinations”. I imagine it is 100% accurate but its also fantastic-can’t you just picture Soong dressed in all black, skulking clandestinely around palace courtyards with scheming eunuchs and poisonous concubines? You can’t? Does this help?

The best case scenario for Soong is that the DPP and KMT attack each other, while he attacks them both while not suffering any attacks in return. This is not as implausible as it sounds, given that close rivals fight more intensely and there is generally nothing to gain from attacking a no-hoper. The key development will be if Soong’s campaign gains traction to the extent that he shows 15% in the polls. Since there is some debate about from whom Soong will be taking votes, neither KMT nor DPP could risk Soong getting that many votes. In this scenario, it is likely that Soong would be fired on by both parties, as happened in 2000 (when he was the clubhouse leader). In 2000 his accumulated capital (financial and social) enabled him to withstand dual attacks and, importantly, people knew he was in with a chance of winning. On this occasion Soong has none of these advantages, but then again, his motivation is probably not to win outright, but to gain leverage with the KMT to use post- election.

Mail me at jonathan.sullivan@nottingham.ac.uk, follow me on Twitter @jonlsullivan, or access my published and working papers at http://jonlsullivan.com

Recent developments in North Africa have re-ignited public interest in the fate of dictators. Inspired by footage of Muammar Gaddafi’s death outside Sirte, BBC4’s ‘Archive on Four’, for example, recently examined the diverse ways in which modern dictators have faced demise, contrasting those who died in their beds to those who were executed, in the manner of Gaddafi, by their own people.

One dictator who tends not to have been included in such comparative discussions, however, is Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang was fortunate enough to die of natural causes in Taipei in 1975 (rather than in the throes of a violent uprising), and the rule of his son in subsequent years ensured that a state-sponsored cult of personality carried on well after his passing. Taipei’s Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall, ordered by Chiang Ching-kuo as an act of filial mourning, is probably the most tangible example of this.

It is in a post-Chiang Ching-kuo Taiwan, however, that the fate of Chiang Kai-shek becomes slightly more complex and unusual. The gradual transformation to democratic rule which occurred under Lee Teng-hui saw the official memory of Chiang Kai-shek either suppressed, or, in the words of Stéphane Corcuff, ‘ritualised’ in Taiwan. In the 1990s, groups such as the New Party certainly clung to the heritage of Sun Yat-sen, but few acting or former KMTstalwarts went out of their way to embrace the heritage of Chiang Kai-shek. Under Lee, the beginnings of a process which has since come to be referred to as ‘de Chiang Kai-shek-ification’ (quJianghua) began – at first gradually, but eventually, under the Taipei administration of Chen Shui-bian, in a far more systematic fashion.

Despite all this – or perhaps because of it – Chiang Kai-shek never really went away in Taiwan. Indeed, come the 2008 presidential elections, he was back as a major political issue, with DPP attempts to rename and reconfigure the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall setting off a major public debate about how Chiang deserved to be remembered in a Taiwan which Chiang himself would probably not have recognised. Ironically, the opening of Taiwan to large numbers of mainland tourists since 2008 has contributed to such debates, with many Chinese visitors expressing an interest in visiting sites associated with the Generalissimo, and in seeing Chiang’s body, which still lies in state (though concealed from direct view) in Taoyuan.

It is unlikely that the legacy of Chiang Kai-shek will arouse quite as much attention at the 2012 elections. The DPP under Tsai Ing-wen has not placed quite as much weight on KMT failures of past decades, preferring instead to focus on Ma Ying-jeou and the potential problems that a number of his policies may cause for Taiwan in the future.

Yet it is significant that even today, the memory of Chiang is still being called upon in Taiwanese political debate, either to defend Nationalist rule on the island or to illustrate KMT authoritarianism of an earlier era.

Only a few days ago, the one-time KMT premier Hau Pei-tsun used the anniversary of that long-forgotten ‘holiday’ – Chiang Kai-shek’s birthday – to defend Chiang’s reign, and argued that Taiwan would have no democracy today had it not been for the actions that Chiang carried out in the name of ‘anti-communism’ in the Cold War years.

Such comments do not represent mainstream public opinion inTaiwan. And despite leading to complaints from a number of groups, they have not yet resulted in the widespread and often divisive discussions about Chiang’s legacy that were witnessed in 2008. Nevertheless, it is indicative of the unresolved debates about the merits (or demerits) of Chiang’s rule on the island that his name continues to be invoked almost four decades since his death, and especially in the run up to elections. If nothing else, Hau’s comments – made only days after the new leaders of Libya informed the world that Gaddafi’s body has been laid to rest in an unmarked grave – suggest that Chiang’s legacy, like his as yet un-buried body awaiting interment in a hypothetically unified China, remains very much ‘up in the air’ in democratic Taiwan.

Jeremy E. Taylor is Lecturer in Chinese Studies at the University of Sheffield. He is the author of Rethinking Transnational Chinese Cinemas: The Amoy-dialect Film Industry in Cold War Asia (London: Routledge, 2011).

Next year’s Legislative Yuan election will be the second under a two-vote mixed member system, where legislators are elected in two tiers: 73 seats by single member districts (SMDs) alongside 34 seats delegated by proportional representation (PR). An additional six seats are delegated by two multiseat aboriginal lists. What should we expect this time around?

Although the 2008 election was a landslide victory for the KMT in terms of seats (72%, slightly more if coalitional partners are included), evidence both in Taiwan and in mixed systems elsewhere provide some insight into probable outcomes.

Since the two tiers are not linked (that is voting in one does not directly affect the other), the expectation is that over time support beyond the two strongest candidates or parties will diminish. District evidence in Taiwan already shows voters defecting towards stronger, usually DPP- or KMT-affiliated candidates, with less than five percent of the vote in SMD races for candidates beyond the top two in 2008. Evidence from mixed member elections since 1990 finds that across almost all see a similar reduction over time, with the East Asian cases (Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan) appearing particularly hostile to smaller parties in district races.  The five percent threshold for party list representation (a common threshold in mixed systems) further limits the chances of smaller parties, as evidenced by the both the New Party (NP) and Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) failing to garner a single seat.

The KMT success lies largely in factors beyond these institutional factors however. Scandals associated with the DPP drove swing voters towards the KMT.  A primary system further disadvantaged the DPP in areas that should have been highly competitive. While the KMT formula used public opinion polls and party member polling, the DPP only polled those self-identifying as “green”, and in doing so arguably nominated candidates more extreme than the median swing voter.

The question remains have parties learned? The KMT clearly do not expect a repeat of 2008. Smaller parties have little incentive to exhaust limited resources in most district races, but potentially can eke out party list seats. It also appears that the DPP has learned from 2008, opting towards candidates not as closely identified as deep green. Meanwhile if the DPP and TSU followed the suggestions of former president Chen Shui-bian and ran a unified party list similar to the coordination among the KMT and the People’s First Party (PFP), the pan-green coalition potentially would pick up an additional list seat.

Predicting any election months in advance is tricky business, but evidence of voter and party adaptation suggest that the electoral system itself does not prevent a greater balance in party representation.

Tim Rich is a PhD Candidate at Indiana University, working on Taiwan and South Korea.  He can be reached at tsrich@indiana.edu. 

Taiwanese businessmen (Taishang) have been investing in China for more than three decades. If you talk to any Taishang in China about their political identity (as I’ve been doing for the last 8 years of my research), most probably their response will be that “Business is business, politics is politics. We are businessmen and we don’t talk about politics”. However, can they really isolate themselves from politics?

Actually Taishang are one of the groups that will have a determining influence on the outcome of the presidential election. For the Taiwanese government’s concerns, Taishang and their families are a fundamental source of votes. Estimates vary wildly (from several hundred thousand to more than a million), but without doubt there are a substantial number of Taishang with families in China. Taishang supported the KMT policy from December 2008 to open the three direct links (trade, transport and postal service), which shortened the time of processing and saved some capital for production. Most importantly, the opening of transportation links cut down on the time it took Taishang to go home. However, with the global economic recession starting in 2009, most small and medium sized (SMEs) Taishang (which comprise the majority of Taishang in China) hoped the next government would establish a more solid economic agreement with China.

ECFA (Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement) obviously springs to mind when we talk about economic agreement. ECFA was signed in China in June 2010, and aimed to strengthen cross-Strait economic and industrial cooperation by waiving unnecessary custom fees and also many other detailed cooperation across the Strait, including agricultural production. Nevertheless, according to the Taishang I have interviewed, they don’t quite understand the meaning of ECFA and most importantly, when they are crying out for help to solve their tough situation in China, ECFA does not seem to do much for them.

Most Taishang expect the government to negotiate with the Chinese government a better deal for them in more practical terms. For instance, in acquiring loans from local Chinese banks. This kind of practical issue certainly was not included in the grand framework of ECFA, and yet it is greatly needed for most Taishang in China. For the presidential election in 2012, Taishang will vote not for the colour of a party, but for the party which can address their problems.

Chun-Yi Lee is a post-doctoral researcher at the University of Nottingham, where she works on Chinese labour issues and (separately) Taishang.

On Saturday, August 21, 2004, a giant screen near Taipei city hall was showing a live baseball game broadcast from the Olympic Games in Athens. Many Taiwanese spectators had come to witness this confrontation between their national team and Japan, the country which, a century ago, had introduced what was now the “national game” (guoqiu, 國球) into the island.

Wearing the jersey of the national team, his face made up and holding two plastic cones (known as “sticks of encouragement,” jiayoubang 加油棒), Ma Ying-jeou, the mayor of the capital city, was sitting amidst the supporters. Four years later, a picture of this event was used in a blog for the 2008 presidential campaign. The candidate invited Taiwanese people to support the national team and to return to the bleachers for national professional league matches, which had suffered from low attendance since its creation in 1990, hit by corruption and match-fixing scandals connected to the illegal gambling underworld. Since being elected, Ma has opened the three seasons of the professional league. His wife, Chow Mei-ching, regularly attends games played by the Brother Elephants team, based in Taipei, often with disadvantaged and disabled children.

Ma, however, is unfamiliar with baseball. Unlike many Taiwanese, he never played this game at school. When he tries it publicly, his face is strained by the effort, and his technical deficiencies make his inexperience obvious. However, he cannot ignore the importance of the social representations and historical references of baseball to which the whole Taiwanese society can relate. In doing so, he is not remarkable amongst Taiwanese politicians from any political party.

He sometimes wears the jersey of the New York Yankees, including on election posters. This not insignificant choice refers to the Taiwanese player Wang Chien-ming (王建民), who played that year in the legendary American franchise, enjoying great popularity and media coverage. In this way, Ma appropriated a symbol of the pro-independence camp, for which Wang had declared his support, and took advantage of the success and moral values attached to him. In doing so, he is perpetuating the long tradition of relations between the KMT and baseball.

On October 15, 2007, as part of the “Long Stay”, Ma stopped in Hungyeh (紅葉), a Bunun village in Taitung County famous for its elementary school baseball team. Still wearing the jersey of the Yankees, he posed for a photograph with elected KMT officials and former players in front of the museum dedicated to the team, adjacent to the school. In 1968, it won several victories against a Japanese team on tour in Taiwan, who had been falsely considered as the world champions in the age 10-12 category. This event, largely organized by the KMT, became legendary, despite being marked by irregularities and was followed by the incredible domination of the Republic of China who won the World Junior Championships seventeen times between 1969 and 1996. These titles were the result of a broad national mobilisation behind the Party-State, including the overseas Chinese, and the promotion of “Confucian” values defended by the KMT through young players supposed to embody them.

In October 2007, once again in Taitung County, Ma stayed in Chengkung professional high school, whose baseball team is as much known for its performance as its lack of resources. As with Hungyeh, it represents the “aboriginal” and “poor” team, owes its success uniquely to the effort of its players, the ingenuity of its coach and the school’s support: another image promoted by the KMT. On June 21, 2008, a few days after his investiture, Ma returned to Chengkung and made a donation of NT$200,000 to the high school team which had achieved good results in the national championship. The same day, he went back to Hungyeh elementary school to attend the graduation ceremony. Baseballs signed by him, exhibited in the museum under the photograph mentioned above, attest to the dates of his visit.

In September 2011, King Pu-tsung, the director of Ma’s campaign visiting the United States to challenge Tsai Ing-wen’s visit, sent an unofficial video message of encouragement from the President to Wang Chien-ming. In 2007, the KMT had denounced a “politicization of sport” by Hsieh Chang-ting, the DPP candidate, who came to New York to attend a game played by Wang. On September 21, 2011, Chow Mei-ching was in Los Angeles to open a game featuring the Dodgers, the team of Kuo Hung-chih (郭泓志), another Taiwanese baseball star. On November 1st, Ma opened the tour of American Major League Baseball All-Stars in Taiwan. On the eve of the 2012 presidential election, Ma continues to occupy the field of baseball.

Jérôme Soldani is a Doctoral student in anthropology at the Université de Provence (Aix-en-Provence, France) and can be reached at jeromesoldani@hotmail.fr. He wishes to thank Catherine Librini and Martin Cruse for help with the translation from French.

Taiwan’s quest for participation in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is facing a bleak future, no matter what the outcome of the elections are  in January 2012. Taiwan’s most recent attempts to participate in the World Health Organization (WHO), albeit having eventually been successful, showed Taiwan’s failure to internationalize the issue of its participation in international organizations, with the issue instead entering  an internal cross-Straits framework, a trend which is unlikely to be averted again soon.

In its quest for observer status in the WHO’s World Health Assembly (WHA), after all other attempts had failed, Taiwan had taken its only available route out of the dilemma. Most other WHO members had displayed reluctance to push strongly for Taiwan’s participation in this state-based organization when faced with China’s opposition, and in the light of a thaw in cross-Strait relations, China had portrayed some willingness to work on a compromise with Taiwan. Eventually, Taiwan’s Kuomintang government talked directly to China in bilateral consultations behind closed doors and a solution was found. However, Taiwan might just have made a deal with the devil: the WHA experience sets an important precedent for Taiwan’s participation in other international organizations, especially for organizations anchored in the UN framework.

Taiwan is currently still engaged in attempts to obtain meaningful participation in the UNFCCC and the ICAO. Taiwan’s participation in UN sub-organizations, which all have statehood as a membership precondition, has always been regarded as a highly sensitive issue by other members of the international community. Now China and Taiwan have proven that they can work it out between themselves, and other major powers can thus back off from becoming involved. So far, only the US Senate has passed a resolution in support of Taiwan’s ICAO participation in summer 2011.

Hence, whether the current Taiwanese efforts will ever bear fruit seems to be almost entirely left to China’s goodwill, which will be contingent on the quality of cross-Strait relations after the upcoming leadership changes both in China and Taiwan in 2012.

Should Ma Ying-jeou remain president, expectations are that he will continue to promote conciliatory relations across the Strait, in which also Taiwan’s participation in international organizations can be discussed if only the government in Beijing is willing to offer a gesture. However, this is a condition not likely to be met, as China has no good reason for doing so.

With Tsai Ing-wen in power, cross-Strait relations are bound to re-enter a period of tension, in which China might even revoke its agreement for Taiwan’s observer status in the WHA. Other pushes for participation in international organizations by a future DPP government will most likely refocus more strongly on portraying Taiwan as a sovereign state, and therefore will not be welcomed either by China or other big powers.

However, even in the most optimistic future projections concerning Taiwan’s stance, there appears to be little incentive for China to strive for a better Taiwanese inclusion in more UN-related organizations. Taiwan’s WHA participation has shown little of the desired effect to boost the current KMT leadership in Taiwan, and in contrast to the WHO case there is next to no international pressure on China to move forward in the UNFCCC and ICAO. Moreover, China is on the verge of a leadership change. China’s leaders have all been notorious for leaving their mark on Beijing’s Taiwan policy, and bearing in mind that time is playing against Taiwan with increasing cross-Strait economic interdependence as well as China’s rise, the future Chinese government is unlikely to be too forthcoming to Taiwan.

In short, Taiwan’s quest for participation in international organizations has entered a cul-de-sac, without much space for backing out while being caught in the narrow alley of Taiwan’s ambiguous international status.

Dr Sigrid Winkler is Senior Associate Research Fellow at Free University of Brussels and is currently conducting field work in Taiwan. She can be reached at sigrid.winkler@vub.ac.be

A newly formed security task force will protect presidential candidates on the stump. And they’re taking it very seriously; there’s enough firepower here to start a small war. Let’s hope they won’t be needed—violence on the campaign trail has not been a major issue in Taiwan since the early ’90s, but high profile shootings of CSB and Sean Lien on the stump (regardless of the unclear circumstances surrounding these incidents) have obviously forced a reaction. But, given that the majority of election related violence in recent times has come after the election (indeed in reaction to the election results), it is interesting to note that this crack force will disband on the stroke of midnight on Election Night.

The most recent TVBS poll and the China Times Poll both see Ma ahead, but would you expect any different, really? I imagine the Soong effect will take a while to gestate and may not be immediately evident in the polls. Today, the KMT is urging party members to refrain from attacking Soong, but if Soong’s campaign gains traction that diktat will quickly change. I think one reason people want to see Soong in the race is to witness his odd relationship with the KMT play out some more.

No change in graft levels: Taiwan’s levels of corruption and bribery in business and government remain unchanged. Er, is that good or bad news? Oh. Taiwan tied for 19^th place with Turkey and India. Proving that removing the government (all government) instantly reduces levels of corruption, Belgium came in 3^rd.

WSJ catches up on the piggy banks story. No doubt you read Paul Katz’ take here first.

Jerome F. Keating calls Ma’s presidency an era of Smoke and Stagnation. He writes, “Ma’s campaign team claims that of the 400 policies proposed by his administration in 2008, 90% have been fulfilled. That translates into 360 fulfilled promises, but can anyone name at least even 25 of those 360 fulfilled promises?” Good point. Then again I can’t even remember what I had for lunch.

Finally, organizing my files I came across Ma on 全民開講 a couple weeks back. Nothing to see here, I’m just posting it so that I have an excuse to promote a regular feature that I’ll be starting on Monday next week; Taiwanese shorts. I realize that title doesn’t sound especially attractive (or maybe it does) and it may not survive the weekend. In essence, it will be a daily collection and summary of stories and analysis coming out of the Taiwanese media and from the candidates’ campaign media.

Mail me at jonathan.sullivan@nottingham.ac.uk, follow me on Twitter @jonlsullivan, or access my published and working papers at http://jonlsullivan.com

Although the paradox of today’s world is that hunger still persists despite the production of more than enough food to feed the entire human population, agriculture generally does not make news headlines in Taiwan. Until now.

Alongside discussions on Cross Strait relations, the issue of agriculture has surprisingly lept to the forefront in many of the recent verbal tussles between the DPP and the KMT. Amidst the ferocity of inter-party debates inTaiwanthat usually confounds the general audience instead of clarifying the issue at hand, two separate issues, one real and one false, should be noted in terms of the agricultural debate in Taiwan.

The “real” issue is that Taiwan’s agricultural sector is in crisis. While the move from an agricultural based economy to a service and knowledge based economy and the growth in popular education have drawn more young people in Taiwan away from villages and into cities, leaving behind an aging population to till the land, the price of agricultural goods in Taiwan has remained extremely low. A recent incident captures the situation: while making a general inquiry on the low price of goods against the minister of agriculture Chen Wu-xiong in the Legislative Yuan, DPP legislator Chen Ming-wen angrily threw a bunch of bananas on the floor, venting his frustration on the incumbent minister’s seeming indifference towards the meager price of origin of bananas at 1NT/Kg

Before the “slamming” of bananas in the parliament, the DPP put out a campaign video exploiting the image of aged farmers complaining about their worn-out kneecaps and how hard work cannot keep up with the rising cost of living.

Regardless of whether the emphasis on farmers is outright political manipulation by the DPP, heralding the issue has recently generated heated inter-party debate on “agricultural subsidy for old farmers” (laonong jintie).

In response to the DPP’s attack on the agricultural issue, the ruling KMT government has fought back with the “fake” issue of “farm manor” (nongshe). Vigorous DPP critic and KMT legislator Qiu Yi fired a series of attacks on the DPP vice presidential candidate Su Jia-quan on the issue of property misuse. Su, former mayor of Ping-tung county and former minister of agriculture in the previous DPP government, is uncovered by Qiu to have constructed a European styled mansion on property registered for farm use. Revelation of the estate plays directly against the clean and sympathizing image that the DPP hopes to project to farmers.

Attention on the hard issue ofTaiwan’s agricultural development seems to have been redirected since the revelation on Su. There are several implications. Firstly, while the general audience may be attracted to the cross-fire on the farm manor issue, which may become a fleeting detail once the presidential election concludes, the critical issue of agriculture is snubbed to the detriment of everyone on the island. Although great mansions and the throwing of bananas are sure to gain more viewers than difficult debates on real issues, it may be advisable for the observer to think again on future implications, especially when the issue at hand is “food.” On the other hand, with most of Taiwan’s agriculture based in the central and southern part of the island, it remains to be seen how the KMT responds to the agricultural issue to attract voters in these regions. For the DPP, it may need to turn its attention towards the real question at hand and dilute mass attention on individual misdeeds if it seeks to win.

Tony Tai-Ting Liu is a doctoral student at the Graduate Institute of International Politics, National Chung Hsing University,Taiwan. He can be reached at stanggoftibia1984@yahoo.com.tw

Shelley Rigger’s new book, Why Taiwan Matters is out. If you’re in the market for an intro to Taiwanese politics, this might be for you. The following is an excerpt from my review for the China Quarterly.

Shelley Rigger is one of the most incisive analysts of Taiwanese politics in the field. Her first two books are among the finest on democratisation in Taiwan and are still highly relevant more than a decade after being published. But those of you hoping (as I was) for a sequel to Politics in Taiwan (Routledge, 1999) or the riveting From Opposition To Power: Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (Rienner, 2001), will be disappointed with her new book.

Rigger, as always, shows her observant eye and wisdom hewn by three decades researching Taiwan. The trademark anecdotes and tales from the field, seamlessly integrated into an ebullient text, will resonate with Taiwan Hands and charm students. One sympathizes with the way in which Rigger’s obvious affection for Taiwan is tempered by frustration and occasional bewilderment about its politics. Many readers will recognize Rigger’s sympathetic portrayal of the (in my words) plucky underdog, misconstrued and mistreated, which, despite performing economic and political ‘miracles,’ is unable to enjoy the fruits of its labour and is constantly under the threat of losing the astonishing gains it has made.

Taiwan as a polity, as a nation or whatever descriptive you prefer, is at a crucial juncture. Taiwan faces a series of political and economic challenges, and after three decades of political liberalization continues to wrestle with fundamental questions about what Taiwan is and should or should not be. Strategic challenges outside of Taiwan’s control are equally pressing.

In some quarters in the US there is growing demand for a reassessment, if not recalibration, of the relationship between the US and Taiwan that has prevailed during the past three decades. Such is the gravity of this scenario that respected Taiwan scholars have felt impelled to rebut the argument that the US should “abandon” Taiwan in order to facilitate its increasingly complex relationship with China. A strong demonstration to US policymakers that Taiwan matters as a long-time ally, global economy and exuberant liberal democracy could have been another important undertaking for the book.

The book is not a specialist text, nor does it offer much in the way of the rhetorical or polemical fireworks that the title may suggest. Instead, this thin, subtle and captivating book provides a convenient introductory student text with its potted histories, text boxes and chapter summaries. It is strong on structure and coherence and newcomers will feel secure in the light-footed linear approach and uncomplicated expositions. As an introduction to Taiwanese politics, it lines up against Dafydd Fell’s Government and Politics in Taiwan (Routledge, 2011) on a suddenly well stocked introductory text book shelf.

Despite my initial disappointment, which is partly a legacy of the rather misleading title (although the more apposite ‘Taiwan is an interesting study’ is admittedly less racy), the highest praise I can give Rigger’s book is that if I were undergraduate today with no prior experience of Taiwan, after reading this book I would sign up straight away for a Taiwan class and start planning a summer vacation trip there.

Mail me at jonathan.sullivan@nottingham.ac.uk, follow me on Twitter @jonlsullivan, or access my published and working papers at http://jonlsullivan.com

Faced with the first competition for president between a man and a woman, both candidates’ campaign teams have interesting decisions about two of the main plays in Taiwanese elections: the macho and the cutesy.

In previous campaigns, President Ma has gone with a suave Bond-type image combined with the urban-outdoorsman. Despite looking like a man who enjoys a good manicure (nothing wrong with that), he has also been known to channel his inner-Putin; running marathons, swimming across icy lakes and I’m sure many other manly pursuits besides.

Tsai’s team have an interesting challenge in how to present a rather unusual DPP candidate. Tsai doesn’t have the same background that facilitated Chen Shui-bian’s masterful “son of Taiwan” shtick in 2000. She doesn’t have the earthy appeal of a Su Tseng-chang (whom she defeated in the DPP primary), nor the Dangwai lineage of her predecessors. And she seldom wears a windcheater (de rigeur for male candidates). At the outset, Tsai had something of the professorial aloofness of Peng Ming-min (minus the Taiwan independence obviously. Newcomers take note: when Peng was running in ’96, it was accurate to describe him as the ‘independence supporting DPP candidate’).

One of the difficulties for Tsai is that no one knows what helps a woman get elected president in Taiwan. Former Vice President Annette Lu had a stellar political lineage, educational pedigree and a strong identity as Taiwan’s premier feminist. But voters were really choosing her running mate, and by the 2004 re-election campaign she had become rather like having an incontinent pet around when visitors come for tea.

Unsurprisingly, male presidential candidates have tended toward the man of action (e.g. “rescuing” disaster victims) or the paternal (e.g. LTH’s sofa stories). Chen bucked the trend in 2000, both with his “sentimental journeys” and the explicitly cutesy A-Bian merchandise (discussed at length in this paper on Kawaii in Taiwanese politics, the author of which will post her expert views here soon).

Given the phenomenon of “cuteness” in Taiwanese society and the expectations on women to act in certain ways (as explicated in this paper), expect Tsai’s campaign team to design something cute for her to do. In this sense, the piggy bank thing was a gift gratefully received.

It is a difficult balance for Tsai, a serious and intellectual woman. But it also presents Ma with questions of his own. Should he go all out action man, or bring out his feminine side?

Mail me at jonathan.sullivan@nottingham.ac.uk, follow me on Twitter @jonlsullivan, or access my published and working papers at http://jonlsullivan.com

Ma reaches out to business leaders for advice on economic slow down. I can imagine that dialogue: Ma: the economy sucks, what are we gonna do? Business leaders: We? Um, you mean you don’t have a plan for that? Reminds me of Chen Shui-bian’s Economic Development Advisory Conference in 2001. Those halcyon days of broken economy served with a soupçon of bipartisan cooperation.

James Soong’s election candidacy is currently underwhelming a lot of Taiwanese commentators. One comment in the link above makes a good point though (and shows how the DPP are treating Soong’s entry), that Soong could split the anti-Ma vote, which is bad news for Tsai. Then again, there is no guarantee that the anti-Ma vote would go to Tsai anyway. With Soong in though, it should increase turnout. Radio Australia has an Interview with Parris Chang talking about Soong and the election.

This critique of a recent BBC article and its coverage of the election is notable because, despite living in the UK, I didn’t realize they had any Taiwan coverage.

Reuters highlights key political risks to watch during the election. In the “what to watch” section you are advised to keep track of “opinion polls and campaigning in the run-up to the vote”. Thanks for the tip Reuters, I’ll keep it in mind.

“The team is now in control and the campaign is running smoothly” Tsai on her campaign’s progress so far. Doesn’t this just sound like “famous last words” or the prelude to some devastating debacle?

From community service to a legislative seat? (Well, people have gone from far worse punishments to the Legislative Yuan). Former presidents son intends to throw his hat in the ring. Read this and tell me if it sounds like a good idea: “Chen Chih-chung, who is serving a community service sentence, said Tuesday that he will definitely run for a legislative seat”. That’s just what the DPP needs: make CSB, corruption, nepotism etc as salient as possible…

Mail me at jonathan.sullivan@nottingham.ac.uk, follow me on Twitter @jonlsullivan, or access my published and working papers at http://jonlsullivan.com

Since the year 2000, “north Blue, south Green” has become a commonly-used term in Taiwan to describe how the Koumintang (KMT) receives more electoral support in northern Taiwan while the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) gains more popularity in the south. Figures 1 and 2 depict the geographic pattern of Taiwan’s presidential election outcomes of 2004 and 2008 respectively. At first glance, the north-south divide does not seem as remarkable as the east-west divide. However, the population proportion of the mountainous eastern Taiwan is only 2%, so the term “north Blue, south Green” actually applies to the western half of Taiwan. In the 2004 presidential election, the DPP not only won a landslide victory in the south but also gained certain parts of the north that finally won the election by 50.1% of the vote. By contrast, the DPP retreated to its base camp in the south and lost the 2008 presidential election with 41.6%.  Why does the voting pattern in Taiwan show this north-south divide.

There are two imagined national communities competing with each other in Taiwan: one Chinese and the other Taiwanese. The Chinese nationalistic discourse is built upon the shared historical experiences of immigrants from the mainland who arrived after World War II, while the common experiences of the Hohlo people form the cornerstone of the Taiwanese nation. Taiwan and mainland China were united under a single regime for a period of only four years over the past century, so, according to the Taiwanese nationalistic discourse, the people of Taiwan are not part of Chinese society. Chinese nationalists, in contrast, identify themselves and the people of mainland China as members of the same society. Thus a distinct disparity of opinion concerning independence or unification with mainland China arises when these two discourses are trying to achieve consistency on both political and social boundaries. People who identify themselves as Taiwanese are more likely to support the pro-independence DPP while people who identify themselves as Chinese or both Chinese and Taiwanese are more likely to support the pro-unification KMT.  Furthermore, as national identity is characterized by ethnic references, the Hohlo people are the group who most support the DPP and most mainlanders are KMT supporters.  This shows how the north-south divide of voting patterns in fact indicate is the distribution of ethnic groups.

Figure 3 displays the distribution of the Hohlo population. Obviously, the percentage of the Hohlo people is higher in the southwest than in northern or eastern parts of Taiwan. This map partially explains why the DPP has strongholds in the south.  Moreover, I also found that similar people may foster different imagined national communities when exposed to different ethnic surroundings. Namely, the higher the percentage of Hohlo people in a locality, the more likely it is that people would self-identify as Taiwanese, no matter to which ethnic group he or she belongs. On the other hand, the more mainlanders there are in a township, the less likely people are to identify themselves as Taiwanese regardless of individual ethnicity. Therefore, people resident in southwestern Taiwan are more likely to accept Taiwanese nationalistic discourse and vote for the DPP.

Ko-Hua Yap is a Research Fellow at the Center for Geographic Information Science at Academia Sinica. For further analysis of the geographical political divide in Taiwan, see his recent paper.  

With Taiwan’s continued nativisation (bentuhua), more and more people tend to claim they are Taiwanese instead of Chinese (or both) if asked about their identity. Similarly, Taiwan’s literary production over the past few decades has demonstrated this identity shift. Compared with the anti-Communist and nostalgia-embedded literature in the early post-war period, literature from Taiwan since the 1970s has exhibited a growing identification with the island’s social reality. Writers of different ethnic backgrounds share a common concern over Taiwan’s multi-layered colonial history and frequently tackle identity issues in their literary works.

The most significant development in literature on Taiwan over the past few decades perhaps lies in its thematic and stylistic diversity. The thematic creativity is shown through writers’ varied ways of representing Taiwan. As a reader, one is blessed with many choices ranging from the native Taiwanese writers’ reconstruction of Taiwan’s history (such as the recent Taiwan trilogy by Shi Shuqing), second-generation mainlander writers such as Zhu Tianxin’s juancun (military compounds for the KMT officials and their dependents) memory, to aboriginal writers’ ocean narratives. The stylistic experiment can be found in writers’ different approaches to the previous taboo topic – the February 28th Incident. Adopting a post-colonial stance, Li Qiao for instance endeavours to call for an autonomous cultural system for the Taiwanese populace. Quite differently, Lin Yaode leans towards the post-modern subversion by replacing the nationalist historiography with his multi-threaded tale full of myths and fantasies.

Unfortunately, when it comes to political elections, candidates’ viewpoints and appeals do not seem to display much creativity or offer enough (good) choices. If we take a look at Ma’s and Tsai’s recent speeches, this becomes clear. Ma Ying-jeou’s mention of a peace agreement with mainland China on October 17, 2011 to cease the hostility is noteworthy. Although Ma stated that this would take place  within 10 years and only after a referendum, such a move of Ma is not only devious but also bewildering. It is an attention-diverting tactic because voters, weary of the independence-unification rhetoric, would like to hear more concrete plans on how to develop Taiwan and to improve Taiwanese people’s livelihood. Moreover, it is dangerous to put Taiwan’s sovereignty on the negotiation table within the current “one China principle” which the KMT accepts. Ma is likely to win more support if he proposed democracy and law on the table of political negotiations with China, or paid more attention to domestic affairs.

The DPP candidate Tsai Ying-wen’s latest campus lecture at Chang Jung Christian University is equally worrying, especially her praise of Margaret Thatcher’s suppression of the miners’ strike in 1984-85. Compared with her centre– left view on housing policies put forward during the campaign for the mayor of New Taipei City (xinbeishi), Tsai’s leaning towards the right has become apparent, and her belief in global competition and elitism seem to have crystallized. It is fine for the KMT and DPP to converge on similar positions. It is also fine for the candidates to change their stance (if they do have a clear stance). Nevertheless, given the limited choices, Taiwanese voters ought to be especially prudent when making their voting decisions!

Lin Pei-Yin is Lecturer in Taiwanese studies at Cambridge University.

“How do we know what Tsai is thinking, when even she herself does not know?” asks Ma Ying-jeou. I pondered this long and hard, settled on telepathy, but figured that wouldn’t work either, so I gave up.

Questioning a rival’s consistency is of course a staple of campaign discourse everywhere, but it is something that DPP candidates have to deal with more often than their KMT counterparts. No doubt due to the party’s looser organizational structure, which necessitates more in-party horse-trading and compromises than in the KMT (which was/is quasi-Leninist), DPP candidates have to show greater flexibility in their positions (no excuse for flip-flopping though).

During Chen Shui-bian’s re-election campaign, the KMT/PFP ran a fantastic ad mocking his changeability (but ignored the fact that the Blue-held legislature wouldn’t pass any of his party’s bills so he didn’t really have a choice). I remember it particularly for the demonstration of the subtleties of the Chinese language.

Bian bian bian

On a similar note, Ma’s slogan 台灣加油讚 is a very efficient use of words. Unfortunately it translates to “Go Taiwan, Bravo!”  which is corny, and frankly a bit odd. But as a play on min nan speakers’ pronunciation of 加油站(gas station) it rolls off the tongue very easily. And 讚 is a min nan word, which gained mainstream popularity as an alternative to the more staid, and less local 棒 (both approximate ‘awesome’).  I’ll have a post very soon about how ‘Taiwan something’ (Taiwan first, Taiwan next, Taiwan number one etc) became the norm for slogans.  This one achieves quite a lot, particularly given that Ma would like to reach out to voters in the south.

Mail me at jonathan.sullivan@nottingham.ac.uk, follow me on Twitter @jonlsullivan, or access my published and working papers at http://jonlsullivan.com

People who have spent time in Taiwan will tell you that Taiwanese take education very seriously. From the cram schools for grade schoolers to the cram schools for middle schoolers to, well you get the point. Everyone, it seems, is studying something. Whether you put it down to “Confucianism” or the simple fact that exams have a disproportionate influence on the trajectory of peoples’ lives, educational achievement is prime indicator of success.

Most Taiwanese politicians are highly educated. Granted, mafia types and other unsavoury characters have pitched up in the legislature (and, some would say, the Cabinet) from time to time, but generally speaking, the level of achievement is highly impressive.

I will post something on this later in the campaign about how candidates flaunt their academic credentials. For extra spice, this year’s presidential contest pits graduates of two prime education brands, Harvard and the LSE. Until I compile the data on the candidates’ mentions of their educational backgrounds, I give you a glimpse of how international print media have covered the issue.

At some point during the 2008 presidential campaign, it struck me that I couldn’t turn on CNN or open the FT without seeing “Harvard-educated” in connection with (then challenger, now incumbent) Ma Ying-jeou. To be fair, I imagine many Harvard graduates find it hard to avoid mention the greatest university in the world every now and then, and if other people want to talk about it what’s a Harvard grad to do?

So, I asked Nexis to give me major English newspaper reports that included the candidate’s name, and institution of highest degree (I checked that all the returned articles were kosher) in the three month period prior to the relevant presidential election. For 2012, I asked for the preceding three months, and these latest figures are likely to change.

Candidate	Year	Status	Party	Institution	Mentions
Lee Teng-hui	1996	Incumbent	KMT	Cornell (PhD)	181
Peng Ming-min	1996	Challenger	DPP	Paris (JSD)	1
Lien Chan	2000	Incum. VP	KMT	Chicago (PhD)	10
Chen Shui-bian	2000	Challenger	DPP	National Taiwan University (LLB)	33
James Soong	2000	Challenger	Ind	Georgetown (PhD)	18
Chen Shui-bian	2004	Incumbent	DPP	National Taiwan University (LLB)	9
Lien Chan	2004	Challenger	KMT	Chicago (PhD)	16
Frank Hsieh	2008	Incum. party	DPP	National Taiwan University (LLB)Kyoto (ABD)	4 4
Ma Ying-Jeou	2008	Challenger	KMT	Harvard (JSD)	55
Ma Ying-Jeou	2012	Incumbent	KMT	Harvard (JSD)	27
Tsai Ing-wen	2012	Challenger	DPP	LSE (PhD)	2

Three things stand out. First, Cornell in 1996 is obviously exceptional. In the twisted logic of cross-Strait relations, Lee’s speech at his alma mater led China to launch missiles off the coast of Taiwan. Second, with the exception of Chen Shui-bian in 2000, DPP candidates’ education is not as salient as that of their KMT counterparts (don’t call conspiracy yet, because)… Third, KMT candidates (and Soong) all had graduate degrees from elite American schools, whereas DPP candidates, while respectable, can’t match their pedigree. Journalists, it seems are just as education brand conscious as many Taiwanese.

So can the LSE stack up against Harvard in the presidential campaign? Maybe it has the right touch of exoticism for Taiwanese should they be jaded from hearing too much about the greatest university in the world.

Mail me at jonathan.sullivan@nottingham.ac.uk, follow me on Twitter @jonlsullivan, or access my published and working papers at http://jonlsullivan.com

James Soong is set to formally join the presidential race. We just put the clocks back in the UK, I didn’t realize they went back to the year 2000 (when Soong was last competitive) or 2005 (when he was last relevant). “A worthy adversary” says Tsai in reaction to Soong’s presidential campaign announcement. Another reminder that Tsai Ing-wen is a very polite lady indeed. Maybe she’s just trying to give him some confidence so he does better than his last outing (<4% in Taipei Mayor race in ‘06, ouch).

DPP declares November “little pigs month” as piggybank fundraising campaign achieves success. But they’re going to need a lot of cash to compete with the multiple millions (of government, not party, money it says here) invested in Ma’s advertising campaign. By chance, UDN chooses this moment to highlight the need for campaigns to refocus on the importance of current economic strains; but presumably they meant those facing the entire Taiwanese economy rather than just those facing the parties’ campaign coffers

Tsai and Ma are now neck-and-neck according to a local election poll. Not a poll in fact, but National ChengChih University’s Center for Prediction Markets. I’m guessing this makes it more accurate than your average Taiwanese media poll.  Apparently Ma peaked on Oct. 16 when he was seen as 18.7% more likely than Tsai to win. But Tsai’s fortunes have improved and at month’s end the two candidates appear level pegging. So, did something happen between Oct 16 and Halloween?

Finally, stop me if you’ve heard this one before: Taiwan is a beacon of democracy for the development of mainland China…

Mail me at jonathan.sullivan@nottingham.ac.uk, follow me on Twitter @jonlsullivan, or access my published and working papers at http://jonlsullivan.com

Once upon a time there were three small children (triplets, actually) who donated their piggy-banks to DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen. There is little doubt that some parental guidance prompted their deed, but it did make for great footage on the evening news. Unfortunately though, the big bad Control Yuan began to huff and puff, blowing the house down by announcing that it would investigate the Tsai campaign for violating election laws pertaining to campaign contributions by minors. In the end, some Tsai staffers had to return the money, causing the triplets’ grandfather made an even larger donation in their place.

Triplet piggy-bank-gate on the evening news

But the story doesn’t end here. Now the Tsai campaign, prompted by the outrage and disbelief sparked by the Control Yuan’s actions, has announced a new campaign to collect 100,000 piggybanks full of donations (see here and here). The results of this tactic will soon be apparent.

Why has such a little story become such a big deal? Apart from the obvious reasons (the children are adorable, and nobody likes a government that appears to be heavy-handed), there are other factors at play as well. As in the West, the piggybank represents thrift, and while these little piggies may be a recent innovation the practice of children saving money in receptacles generically referred to as puman 撲滿 (especially those made of bamboo or porcelain) goes back to ancient times. In modern Taiwan, other popular puman have included those of postmen (until recently, almost everyone put their savings in post office accounts) and the Datong 大同 company mascot.

The pig is also one of the twelve animals of the Chinese zodiac, symbolizing wealth and prosperity (my son Philip is a “golden pig” or jinzhu 金豬, charged with the sacred task of ensuring his old man’s retirement once his pittance of a pension runs out). Pork is an essential component of the Taiwanese (and Chinese) diet today, although in the past it was only eaten on festive occasions, with many festivals featuring offerings of enormous pigs (zhugong 豬公) to the gods (for the political implications of pigs as offerings, see Robert P. Weller’s Resistance, Chaos and Control in China).

Finally, there is the symbolism of the small donations that are largely responsible for fueling the DPP campaign, as opposed to the size of the well-oiled KMT machine and the support some local corporations as well as Taiwanese businessmen in China are credited with providing to Ma Ying-jeou’s own presidential campaign (One reason the election is being held two months earlier than usual, just prior to the Lunar Neww Year, is to allow these businessmen the chance to return home to vote; Taiwan has yet to institute a viable absentee ballot system). If these patterns continue, the entire election may come to be cast as a battle of The People vs. The Machine, with the implications of victory for either side being profound indeed when it comes to the future of Asian democracy.

Professor Paul R. Katz is a Fellow at Academia Sinica and author of the brilliant China Beat blog’s Tales From Taiwan.

Recent initiatives submitted by Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou about signing a peace agreement with China within 10 years to end hostilities have sparked intense public debates on one of the most sensitive topics of cross-Taiwan Straits engagement in the run-up to the January presidential election.

In fact, it was not the first time the topic was mentioned in the presidential campaign.

King Pu-tsung, chief executive manager of Ma’s re-election campaign office, first floated the idea on Sept. 12 during his visit to the US from Sept. 9-20, saying that cross-strait engagement does not rule out any possibility, including a peace agreement, if Ma was elected to a second term.

The Presidential Office denied the claim the following day, with the presidential spokesman Fang Chiang Tai-chi saying that there is no urgency in launching political talks with China, nor does Ma plan to visit China in any capacity any time soon.

However, Ma said in a presidential press conference on Oct. 17 that his administration would “cautiously consider” whether Taiwan should sign a peace agreement with China within the next decade, adding that such a move would require three preconditions – genuine needs of the country, strong domestic backing and supervision by the legislature.

The proposal was questioned by the opposition Democratic Progressive party (DPP).

Tsai Ing-wen, the DPP’s presidential candidate and Chairperson, told a press conference on Oct. 19 that the proposal exposed Taiwanese to four serious risks — the sacrifice of Taiwan’s sovereignty, a change in the “status quo” across the Taiwan Strait, the jeopardizing of Taiwan’s democratic values and damage to the nation’s strategic depth in bilateral negotiations

Ma’s proposal was “irresponsible and impetuous” and that it amounted to the manipulation of a highly sensitive political issue to cover up his administration’s failures, as well as a bargaining chip that benefits his presidential campaign, she said.

To answer the criticism, Ma said on Oct. 20 that a national referendum would be required before signing any peace agreement with China.

The DPP went on to urge Ma to launch talks on amending Taiwan’s Referendum Act to include articles requiring that cross-strait political negotiations be subject to referendums. The KMT rejected the invitation, saying that an amendment is “unnecessary.”

While several pro-China newspaper had lambasted the referendum idea, which has long been seen as one of China’s “red line,” China did not make an official response until Oct. 26, when Taiwan Affairs Office spokesman Yang Yi said that the move was good for both sides, but criticized the referendum initiative without mentioning Ma.

A poll conducted by Taiwan’s Research, Development and Evaluation Commission in May showed that less than 40 per cent of people were satisfied with Ma’s cross-strait policy. The results were not released until early October.

Surveys have consistently shown strong public backing for talks between Taiwan and China, the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) said in an Oct. 24 statement.

The timing and intention of Ma’s initiative were intriguing.

Most observers agree that cross-strait policy is Ma’s biggest advantage over his DPP rival, since he has reduced tension across the strait. That could be the reason why Ma decided to shift the focus of his campaign from domestic affairs back to the China policy.

The proposal could also be an attempt to “marginalize” the campaign of People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong, who holds similar China policy with Ma and could jeopardize Ma’s bid at the ballot box, because voters would likely choose between the KMT or the DPP if China policy became the central theme of the campaign and there would be no room left for the third candidate, observers said.

Regardless of what intentions Ma might have, the initiative appeared to have hurt his campaign with recent poll showed that his lead over Tsai had shrunk from 5 to 8 per cent to 3.7 per cent.

Chris Wang is a political analyst, writer and editor with the Taipei Times.

Taiwan will hold what will probably turn out to be a watershed election on January 14 next year. Voters will pick a president and vice president and members of the Legislative Yuan (the unicameral lawmaking body in Taiwan). It will be the first time elections will be held for the executive and legislative branch simultaneously. It is likely the results of the election will impact Taiwan politically and in a number of other ways for some years to come.

There are a number of factors that need to be considered in understanding and predicting the results of the elections.

Domestic issues include first the economy. Taiwan’s economy suffered from a recession in 2008 that lasted through much of 2009. President Ma and the KMT suffered a loss of voter support as indicated by public opinion polls as a result. In late 2009 and through 2010 growth was quite impressive. Recently it has slowed down, but remains respectable.  The question is: Will the economy help Ma and the KMT or not? The DPP has countered the contention by both that they have put the economy back on track, saying that the gap between rich and poor is still increasing; that big business has benefited, not small business; that the north has prospered while the south has not. Overall, the economy is in a good position , but the trends are not necessarily positive.

Another issue that may influence voters is the issue of governance. The reputations of Ma and the KMT are not so good in this area. How important is governance? Is the DPP better at solving such problems than the KMT?

Then there are various issues unique to this election. Lee Teng-hui is going on trial for taking government funds and money laundering. James Soong has entered the presidential race; he is in the process of getting signatures to ensure his name is on the ballot. His motives are not clear. History indicates that when the KMT splits it loses: 1994 and 2000.

Taiwan’s relations with China and the U.S. constitute external variables. The Ma administration claims it can maintain relations better with both. There are plenty of indications this is true. But will his success in dealing with China create a backlash that Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP can exploit? Certainly they can to some extent. Many people feel Ma is getting too close to China and that endangers Taiwan’s sovereignty. Ma claims the U.S. supports him and not the DPP. This rings true. But is the Obama administration supporting Taiwan? There are many reasons to doubt this. Academics and various pundits in the U.S., especially those supporting or advising the Obama administration, suggest the U.S. should abandon Taiwan. The specific issue of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan is said to be the barometer of how Ma is doing. Yet what has happened in this realm has sent mixed signals.

There are various theories at play in Taiwan that are supposed to help predict the election. But none of these has worked very well over time, other than some obvious ideas about the economy and who can afford an expensive campaign. Opinion polls abound. But most seem to favor one side or the other and report optimistically for their favourite. How much are they to be believed? Most indicate the number of undecided voters is large; that is believable. Thus the election is up for grabs.

John F Copper is  Stanley J. Buckman Professor of International Studies at Rhodes College in Memphis, Tennessee and is the author of more than thirty books on China and Taiwan.

With a nod to Bruce Buffer, We Are Live! The campaigns for the President and Legislature are heating up and we will be here from now until after the elections on January 14^th 2012. We have a line-up of the best and brightest Taiwan Hands, including academics from across the social sciences and humanities, your favourite Taiwan bloggers and hopefully some candidates standing for election. We will feature comprehensive analysis of Taiwanese politics from a variety of perspectives and spanning the political spectrum.

What can you expect to see on the blog? In addition to posts from our esteemed guests, we will provide regular summaries and links of the best (and worst) coverage from various western and Taiwanese media, coverage of the parties and candidates’ activities on the campaign trail, in addition to scholarly analysis of this and previous campaigns and Taiwanese politics more generally. We will also compile a range of resources for following the elections and try to bring out some of the flavour of the campaigns with our correspondents on the ground in Taiwan.

In short, if it is relevant to the 2012 elections there’s a good chance you will find it here.

As followers of Taiwanese political coverage know, every election in Taiwan seems crucial (somehow putting me in mind of this. Warning: British humour). And you know that someone somewhere is writing a piece that starts “a little more than seventy days from now, Taiwanese will head to the polls in an election that could decide the course of Taiwan’s future, relations with China and prospects for peace in the Asia Pacific etc.” We will try to avoid the common hyperbole and solecisms that blight a lot of coverage of Taiwanese elections. We will instead attempt to address, with a greater degree of nuance, the important questions that the first joint presidential and legislative elections throw up.

What do voters make of Ma’s “détente” with China? Having lost his lustre and sunk to George W. Bush level approval ratings, will his ideas to fix the economy (and incumbency advantage) be enough to get him re-elected? Who is Tsai Ing-wen and if she wins will it mean a return to the “bad old days” of the Chen Shui-bian era? Can a resurgent DPP offer a strong enough alternative to make Tsai competitive? Will James Soong put a spanner in the KMT’s works (again)? Will the KMT continue its stronghold on the legislature? What effect will holding parallel elections for the first time have on turnout and vote choice?

This blog will address these and many other questions in the two and a bit months leading up to the elections. We welcome guest contributions from all points of view—contact me at jonathan.sullivan@nottingham.ac.ukto discuss ideas. You can also follow me on Twitter @jonlsullivan for comments and links that don’t make it to the blog or access my published and working papers at http://jonlsullivan.com

Finally, we hope you’ll enjoy our coverage and might even find it useful.

From November 1st to February 1st 2012 I will be running the Taiwan 2012 blog, with comprehensive coverage of the campaigns for presidency and legislature.