Dear KMT, is anyone over there driving the bus? Why are you allowing Ma’s campaign to get continually sidetracked by extraneous fluff that at best would be a two day talking point? Right now you are single-handedly giving Tsai’s (deliberate and effective) low-key campaign the buzz it needed going in to ‘rally month’. As a political scientist who studies strategic behaviour, Ma’s campaign is exasperating. If it keeps going like this, I’m going to have to reserve a chapter in the book I’m writing on Taiwanese elections on ‘how not to run a campaign’.

Nobody cared about the piggybanks until you made a big deal out of it. Tsai is Hakka, why shouldn’t she appeal to that constituency? Tsai is popular with Hakka voters, and you’re not going to endear yourself by questioning her Hakka identity. So what if Tsai wants to be Robin Hood–if Robin Hood himself was standing for election do you think he would win? Do you really think filing a lawsuit against the DPP for allegations about the propriety of Ma’s meeting an oddsmaker will make it go away? Don’t you think it might make it more salient instead? Don’t think it’ll remind voters about the bad old days of heijin and using litigation to curb freedom of speech? Flip-flopping on farmers’ subsidies does not say “I’m in charge, I’ve got a plan, trust me” (albeit adopting a more viable position on a highly salient campaign issue). And that ‘peace pact’ gambit speaks of someone out of touch with public opinion and desperate seeking a keystone campaign issue.

I wrote a while back that KMT candidates always want to campaign on the economy but invariably let themselves get sidetracked; I guess I should be grateful that Ma’s campaign is making me look good. I don’t know if it is a sign of desperation, incompetence or hubris, but when your own legislative candidates are steering clear of you, its indicative of a problem. And when your campaign manager starts talking up your EQ, you know you’re in trouble.

Can Ma turn it around? Of course. The election is not for another 7 weeks-an eternity at the back-end of a campaign. But the way things are going, those 7 weeks must seem like an unending and terrifying gauntlet to Ma right now. Furthermore, Tsai Ing-wen is a careful and clean candidate, and I doubt there are any Chen You-hao’s hiding in her closet to come to Ma’s rescue. Is it too late to register a Ma-Soong joint ticket? (Just kidding).

Alex Huang says Ma should ignite a grassroots campaign by “sleeping less and shaking more hands“, but I don’t think that’s the answer. As charming as Ma can be on camera, KMT elites don’t do “smalltalk-with-little-people-in-crowded-smelly-markets” very well. Remember when Lien went to visit with emotional (and muddy) typhoon-affected villagers in 2000? When people started imploring him to send aid he reacted like someone took a dump on the 18th green right before his putt. This Soong ad in that vein (don’t forget hand-hygiene kids) has the added bonus of ‘Soong as Savior’.

In my view, a better strategy is to forget China, eliminate all the extraneous frippery, develop the ‘KMT are good stewards of the economy’ frame and attack Tsai’s plans for the economy. King Pu-tsung, you know what to do…

Mail me at jonathan.sullivan@nottingham.ac.uk, follow me on Twitter @jonlsullivan, or access my papers at http://jonlsullivan.com

The now-infamous opinion piece written by former marine officer and Harvard scholar Paul V. Kane, “To Save Our Economy, Ditch Taiwan” (New York Times, November 10, 2011) which advocated a renunciation of the US security commitment to Taiwan in exchange for China’s writing off US debt is, quite rightly, engendering serious blowback. So much so that it may in fact have the opposite effect for which Kane (and no doubt the leadership in Beijing) initially hoped.

For months now, think tanks and academics have tiptoed around the very same idea: that of revisiting the US defense commitment to Taiwan in favour of giving Beijing a louder voice in how it is implemented.

But Kane’s piece has been far less oblique than these others, laying bare the ethical component of their inherent quid pro quo. The result has been a widespread re-examination of just why the United States made a security guarantee toTaiwan in the first place, and forcing a reckoning of just what moral implications such an exchange would entail.

Moreover, the notoriety of Kane’s suggestion has allowed it to reach beyond the usually insulated world of analysts and policy wonks, and touch upon the general public. It has shined a light on the issue and dragged it to the forefront of popular discourse.

To be fair, Kane’s timing was off. Americans are getting tired of China. The much ballyhooed peaceful rise has been trumpeted in every media report and press briefing for the past decade, and the unspoken assumption that American power in the world is declining in favour of a passing of the torch to China has been allowed to suffuse the popular imagination without much introspection or challenge. Kane’s rather mercenary proposal has laid bare the ethical aspect of that slide, and it may well prove to be the straw that break the panda’s back, illustrating just how far the partnership with China has slowly and incrementally pushed Americans’ moral comfort zone over the years.

It is therefore not surprising that the reaction has been a loud rejection of any plan that would hand a functioning democracy over to an authoritarian government, especially in exchange for something so vulgar as money. Americans instinctively feel that this would leave a stain on their souls.

How does this affect Taiwan? The people, as well as the government, of Taiwan are almost pathologically fixated on what is said about them in the international arena. Thanks to Kane, many column-inches are now being filled by Western commentators expounding on the moral issues associated with selling out a longtime friend and ally, in a way and with a determination that has not been seen for years.

Many Taiwanese are naturally heartened by this: they are proud of their democracy; they have fought for it, and bled for it. They know, however, that they are in a fragile position, and being the pragmatic people that they are, they know that they cannot defend it (either militarily or diplomatically) without the United States in their corner.

Over the past few years, the narrative in the mainstream American media has been about how expensive the Taiwansecurity guarantee is, and how the little island democracy is an irritant to closer Sino-US ties. The Taiwanese have naturally begun to hedge their bets. This has been one of the reasons for the level of support shown to Ma Ying-jeou’s China-friendly policies and the resurgence of the old-guard way of thinking within the KMT.

This resulted in a redefinition of the status quo over the past few years: from one that was inching towards independence to one that is inching towards unification.

But as American voices backing support for their democratic ally have become louder in the past days, the Taiwanese confidence in being able to resist the slide into the PRC’s sphere have likewise gained traction. Many undecided voters are beginning to calculate which of the island’s two main parties is best able to maintain the status quo that they most hope to see: and that party is the DPP.

It is too early to see any of this is reflected in the polls, especially as its effects would be obscured by the many other issues defining the campaign so far, not least of which are some very poorly thought-out, ill-timed statements by the incumbent KMT. But if the fallout from the Kane proposal continues to loudly support the American value of respecting allies over money, and democracy over expediency, then we can expect to see a heartened and confident electorate go to the polls in January in support of the DPP candidate, Tsai Ing-wen.

Dean Karalekas is a researcher at National Chengchi University and a PhD student in its International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies. 

Watching Taiwan’s forthcoming elections from the vantage point of London, it does seem like the presidential election is the only campaign taking place.  The vast majority of both the Chinese and English print media coverage is concentrating on the struggle between Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen. The simultaneous legislative election in contrast is being largely neglected by the national media. As I have written in the Taipei Times, this is problematic from a perspective of democratic accountability. Under authoriritarian rule Taiwan’s parliaments were largely rubber stamp institutions. This is no longer the case in democratic Taiwan. The outcome of the Legislative Yuan election is as important if not more so than the presidential one. Without legislative majorities presidents are forced to either compromise with the majority party or face severe constraints, as the saw under the DPP era.

What are the prospects of these partly forgotten elections? Firstly, we can rule out a repeat of the Kuomintang’s (KMT) landslides of 2008. On that occasion the KMT with its allies won three quarters of the seats on only about 50% of the vote share. It is also unlikely that the DPP would be able to cobble together even a wafer thin majority.

Looking through the 73 district races it seems to me that we can divide them into approximately a third which the KMT should win, another third where the Democratic Progressive (DPP) has a clear advantage and then a final third which could go either way. These swing districts are likely to determine whether the KMT is able to win a workable majority or will be reliant on the allies of questionable reliability, such as the Non Partisan Alliance and Soong Chu-yu’s People First Party (PFP). Based on my initial predictions we may get see the KMT getting 40 district seats and the DPP 33. If they both gain 17 proportional representation (PR) seats each and the KMT and its allies win all six aboriginal seats, then we could get a Legislative Yuan with 63 KMT (including its allies) and 50 DPP seats. If we consider that in 2008 the DPP won a mere 13 district seats and 14 PR seats, then the DPP would be almost doubling its seats. Such a Legislative Yuan would offer genuine constraints in Ma’s ability to dictate legislative politics.

What about other parties you are probably asking? These KMT totals include some seats for its allies. Thus for instance up to three Non Partisan Alliance candidates have a strong chance of winning, as does the one NP candidate, and also 3 PFP district candidates have a fighting chance of success. In 2008 the NP came the closest of the smaller parties to winning seats through the proportional district, gaining almost 4 percent vote share. However, this time I can only see the PFP having a chance of passing the 5% threshold, largely as a result of benefitting from Soong’s presidential campaign.

Why is the outlook looking so different from 2008?

One variable that should favour the KMT is that it has an overwhelming incumbency advantage. IN contrast four years ago there was a rough balance between Pan Blue and Pan Green incumbent legislators. Back in 2008 the two elections were separated by three months, with the legislative contest in January and presidential one in March. The KMT’s landslide legislative majority in January gave it a significant momentum for the March presidential campaign. In 2012 the two elections are being held simultaneously. The KMT’s motivation was to enable its legislators’ vote mobilization to benefit its presidential candidate, while the DPP hopes for the reverse whereby a strong Tsai campaign will lift DPP legislative prospects. I am not sure who is right and there may well be regional variation in the effect. However, we can be sure that the voter turnout should be raised for the legislative election compared to 2008.

Back in 2008 KMT legislative candidates rode on the back of Ma’s presidential campaign, but after almost four years of the Ma presidency many KMT legislators no longer view him as helpful for their re-election drive. Another major shift in the public mood is the disappearance of Chen Shui-bian from the agenda. In 2008 many voters (Blue and swing) viewed the elections as a chance to punish the DPP and Chen Shui-bian for the string of corruption scandals that emerged from late 2005. This issue has almost faded away today. Even the candidacy of Chen’s son in Kaohsiung 9 has only created limited attention. While it is possible that Chen Chih-chung will split the Green vote sufficiently to allow the KMT to win that seat, his campaign has not generated much momentum yet or had any spill over effect beyond the district.

Under Tsai the DPP has created a sense that the party has put the Chen Shui-bian scandals behind it and recovered. This has been apparent in its improved performances in 2009 and 2010 local executive and city/county council elections. In 2010 executive and council elections the two main parties were essentially tied. That in itself represents an achievement for the DPP which had seemed down and out between 2005 and late 2008. One of the most remarkable developments in terms of legislative elections since 2008 has been the 12 legislative by-elections caused by resignations and corruption cases. The DPP won nine of these, including six which had been won by the KMT in 2008. The DPP also won in places such as Taitung and Hsinchu County, where in past it had sometimes not even bothered to nominate candidates. Naturally we need to be cautious about how we treat by-elections and it is quite possible that the KMT will regain control over some of these lost districts this time.

Another major difference between 2008 and today is in the field of nomination. In 2008 problems related to both presidential and legislative nomination served to create severe internal tensions within the DPP and undermine their campaigns. This time the process though less democratic, has gone much more smoothly. As far as I am aware there are no real DPP rebels proposing to stand against official DPP candidates and the party is looking much more united. At this stage it does appear that there are more potential KMT rebels threatening to stand and divide the KMT vote than in 2008.

A final area where the campaign looks very different is in the role of third parties. In 2008 the TSU took potential DPP votes in the PR section and also served to split the Green votes in many district races. This time the TSU will not nominate district candidates and has been weakened after four years out of parliament, so that it is unlikely to get more than 1-2 percent in the PR vote. In contrast the PFP is likely to have about a dozen district candidates; these will split the Blue vote in some districts. Both the NP and PFP will also take PR votes from the KMT. Lastly, in 2008 there was a plethora of other small parties contesting the PR vote section. Although they failed to get any seats or even get more than 1 percent, they did take votes away from the mainstream parties. This time there is less enthusiasm to contest this election from small parties that are not splinters from the KMT or DPP. Of these challenger parties, perhaps only the Green Party will exceed 1 percent.

I will try to write something that looks at the districts and offers some more detailed predictions later. It is best to wait until legislative registrations are completed at the end of this week. There will be much pressure applied and money spent in the next few days to persuade rebels and allied party candidates not to stand. There will probably be some surprises too.

Dafydd Fell is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies. His new book is entitled Government and Politics in Taiwan.

The presidential campaign is still young, but there have been numerous mis-steps already. Haven’t been keeping count? Ben Goren has, and he reckons its KMT 7 : DPP 1 (but remember that incumbents get lumped with anything that goes wrong in government). Ma is also unhappy with Tsai being labelled “robin hood”: “The Robin Hood that I know was chivalrous and robbed the rich to give to the poor. He did not tell lies to blacken the name of others.” Tsai’s response “Only a person who wants to oppress the people would be afraid if Robin Hood appeared. Robin Hood would be a thorn in his side” I feel another KMT misstep coming…

The BBC‘s Chinese service will interview Tsai Ing-wen on November 24, and Soong the day after. Bloomberg is on the case too; here’s their interview with Tsai. Michael Turton attended the opening of Tsai’s campaign HQ in Taichung, and comments that “the little rally was strictly by the numbers, professional, bland, but effective, like the campaign. Very pleasing to witness. The DPP is running a much better campaign than the KMT this time around, so far.” I totally concur. And if it were an even playing field, I’d say that it augurs well for Tsai. But it isn’t an even playing field. As an incumbent, Ma has substantial campaign advantages, some of which are true of all incumbents, others particular to the situation in Taiwan. Tsai’s demeanour is the perfect antidote to those who would fear DPP “extremism” or “ideologues”. But is the quiet, rational approach sufficient to make the case for a change in the status quo (i.e. Ma as president)? Maybe this is why the DPP plans 30 mass rallies in the run up to the election.

Zaoshi is important, but if the KMT keeps running Ma’s campaign the way it is, it won’t be necessary. I wrote the other day how KMT presidential candidates are always getting sidetracked. I don’t have an explanation for why, but there are a few potential factors. The KMT is a catch all party with fingers in many pies and DPP candidates are able to draw on a substantial history of KMT governance. The DPP is effective at using this in its attacks, frequently inducing the KMT to respond (indeed, one of the outcomes of Taiwan’s intense media coverage, is the high level of “responsiveness” that one sees during campaigns). The problem for the KMT is that with so many interests and so much media coverage, an effective opposition can quite easily force them off message. There are already numerous examples for this campaign (see KMT 7: DPP 1 above), to which we can add the rumours that Ma met with a gambling tycoon. Tsai of course demands that Ma comes clean over his meeting with said tycoon while one KMT official offers $10 million for proof. These rumours and rebuttals are another example of how “shit happens” to KMT candidates, and how it forces them to spend time and money addressing issues that it doesn’t want to.

Mail me at jonathan.sullivan@nottingham.ac.uk, follow me on Twitter @jonlsullivan, or access my papers at http://jonlsullivan.com

Celebrations of the Xinhai Revolution, that is, the uprising against Manchu rule that occurred in China over 100 years ago, have been taking place on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. ForBeijing, the Republic of China expired in 1949 and is therefore history but inTaiwan, the question of whether the ROC still exists on the island is still a topic of intense debate for the diverse political camps. Against this background, in view of the approaching presidential elections, it is hardly surprising that the ROC centennial celebrations have once more drawn attention to the island’s national identity problems.

For the Kuomintang, the Republic of China is still alive and flourishing although the KMT has acknowledged in some ways that the ROC today consists of Taiwan and some small islands: “the ROC is our country, and Taiwan is our home” was the proud announcement of the current president, Ma Ying-jeou.

The centennial celebrations provided Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT, now returned to power, with the opportunity to reclaim legitimacy with a smoothly polished version of the historical events of 1911-1912 that dovetails neatly with the current political discourse on the modernization ofTaiwan. This, linked with the democratic achievements after 1987, can be used to legitimize the rule of the KMT, today and in the past. In addition, attacks on the so-called de-sinification and Taiwanization movement promoted by the DPP can also be found within this discourse. Examples of this new legitimization discousrecan be found not only on the President’s website but also in almost all the publications issued by the pan-blue camp (including political parties such as the KMT, PFP, NP and media such as the United Daily New China Times, TVBS).

The difficulties inherent in formulating an argument against any 100 year celebration of anything meant that both the oppositional camp and the presidential candidate, Tsai Ing-wen were reluctant to challenge the celebrations. Some DPP-inclined academics, of course, emphasized the fact that the ROC government in Taiwan is a “regime in exile” and criticized any attempt to link the Wuchang uprising, that took place, when Taiwan was a Japanese colony, to the current democratic achievements in Taiwan. In contrast to the KMT, which sees Taiwan’s democratization as the fulfillment of Sun Yat-sen’s heritage, these critics regard these democratic achievements as having been fought for by the people of Taiwan against the authoritarian rule of the KMT, and as leading to the lifting of Martial Law in 1987, the direct election of a President in 1996 and the changeover of power to the DPP in 2000. For them, democracy has been achieved by attacking the legitimacy of the ROC and not by adhering to Sun Yat-sen’s ideology of the Three Principles of The People. Nevertheless, in order to win the support of the median voters, Tsai Ing-wen, the DPP’s presidential candidate who, in the past, avoided taking part in any centennial celebrations and was known for her avoidance of the words “Republic of China/ROC” has recently softened her stance: last month, she made a statement “Taiwan is the ROC, the ROC is Taiwan,” thus allowing for comparisons to be drawn with statements made by the former President, Chen Shuibian.

In state sponsored publications (such as Bainian Fenghua) today, Ma Ying-jeou seems to be regarded as the President of the ROC who has finally fulfilled the dream of Sun Yat-sen, the “Father of The Republic”, (a title that Sun was only given in 1940). For the pan-blue camp, the thoughts of Sun Yat-sen paved the way for the evolutionary development of democracy (tutelage) and also helped to develop the economic system (the ‘economic miracle’ in Taiwan). Furthermore, as a respected figure in all Chinese regions (probably with the exception of broad areas of Taiwan), Sun Yat-sen can lend legitimacy to the KMT’s representation of all Chinese worldwide.

How will this KMT disocurse be accepted within Taiwanese society? Unlike Chiang Kai-shek, who is portrayed as the cruel ruler who implemented the White Terror of the early ROC rule over Taiwan, Sun Yat-sen is not considered to be of any importance for Taiwanfrom the perspective of the pan-green camp. They emphasize the fact that Taiwanwas a Japanese colony in 1911 and 1912 and that Taiwanwas spared the chaos of the Warlord Period following the Xinhai Revolution. In addition, after 1949, the Three Principles of the People were misused: the frequent references to the Three Principles formed part of the policy of the authoritarian regime and for this reason, they are no longer taught in Taiwanschools and do not form part of the university entrance system. Even in the context of democratization, Sun Yat-sen did not play any role in Taiwan: the earlier attempts of liberals such as Lei Zhen (Lei Chen) and Yin Haiguang failed to establish democratic structures in Taiwan, in contrast to the successful indigenous democratic movement after the late 1970s.

It remains to be seen whether the recent focus on the 100 years of the ROC will continue to exert an influence in the long-term, considering the many inherent contradictions and the obvious attempts to create a coherent history which does not have any foundation in fact.

Dr. Jens Damm is currently on sabbatical from the Institute of East Asian Studies at Freie Universität Berlin and is serving as Assistant Professor at the Graduate Institute of Taiwan Studies, Chang Jung Christian University.

Political scientists have at least three reasons to eagerly look forward to the 2012 presidential and legislative elections in Taiwan. Firstly, it will be the second time under the new electoral system, wherein the Legislative Yuan (LY)  has move from the Single Non-Transferable Vote-centered (SNTV) system to a mixed one with the majority of deputies elected through single mandate FPTP districts (73 out of 113, or 65%). It will be interesting what lessons the parties have learned from previous elections, if any at all. Secondly, for the very first time both major elections will take place on the same day. Thirdly, elections in Taiwan draw a lot of excitement in any case.

This post offers a few observations from the 2010 municipal elections (with emphasis on mayoral elections) and their implications for the forthcoming legislative elections. The significance of municipal elections in 2010 stems from the high voter turnout. In total, more than 7.5 million people (turnout exceeded 70% in all 5 districts) cast their votes in 4 newly formed special municipalities (New Taipei City, Greater Taichung, Greater Tainan and Greater Kaohsiung) and in Taipei City. This is an impressive number considering that the turnout for 2008 presidential elections was 13.2 million people (76.3% turnout) and 10 million for the 2008 legislative elections (turnout slightly over 58%).

Results in 2010 appear at first sight to reveal a Kuomintang (KMT) win. If looked at as a football match then victory was narrow, KMT defeating the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 3:2. Yet, a more detailed look shows that the KMT camp had no reason to be overly excited. On a city council election level the match was tied since both big parties gained 130 seats.  However, in council elections representatives of smaller parties and independents usually score better than on the national level as the current electoral system to LY is massively disadvantageous for small parties. This makes these results less relevant compared to mayoral elections that were to a large extent 2-party business and one can reasonably predict that it is what LY elections will look like.

The real difference comes with the number of votes in the mayoral elections. The KMT got 3.37 million (or 44.5%) votes, while the DPP received 3.77 million. (or 49.9%). Just a quick look at the 2008 election results shows the extent of change in DPP’s electoral performance. In the 2008 LY elections the DPP received roughly 3.8 million (or 39%) votes and only 24% of seats (disproportionate effect of the newly enacted system) compared to KMT’s 5.3 million (or 53.5%) votes which secured them 72% of the seats.

A further look into each of the 5 districts reveals that Taipei remained strongly blue (KMT 55.7%, DPP 43.8%) and Tainan (KMT 39.6%, DPP 60.4%) and Kaohsiung (KMT 20.5%, DPP 52.8%) confirmed their status as pan-green strongholds. However, the KMT had to undertake fierce battles to claim victories in both Taichung (KMT 51%, DPP 49%) and New Taipei City (KMT 52.6%, DPP 47.4%). This means that the Kuomintang scored more goals but their possession was unimpressive, while the DPP’s forwards pressed hard into the KMT’s defense. Surely, goals are what matters the most in a football match, but it would be a huge mistake to become complacent after such a narrow contest, especially when the main rival is on the rise.

The overall message is clear: last year’s elections confirmed that the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is back in the game as a formidable challenger to the Kuomintang’s position and has moved on from the 2008 debacle. At the time this was written, National Chengchi University’s project Exchange of Future Events was predicting that the KMT will eventually win 60 seats (or 53%); less than the 81 held after 2008 but still a majority.

Michal Thim is currently enrolled in the International Master‘s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies at National Chengchi University in Taipei and research fellow at the Prague-based foreign policy think tank, Association for International Affairs.

Remember that Kane op-ed in NYT last week? The one that he’s been ridiculed for ever since? Turns out it was just an exercise in “Swiftian satire”. Just that no one found it very funny, except for Kane himself: “What is hilarious is that some academics in Taiwan and elsewhere stayed up late at night reading the piece literally and trying to build cases to refute its content, and castigating my logic and morals… Take your wife out to dinner!  Professor or Joe Blogger, it was time miss spent.” Its OK, Paul, I get paid to do this shiz (just not enough to take my wife out to the restaurants she likes).

Accusing Tsai of being a ‘fake Hakka’ because she doesn’t speak the language was crass and potentially damaging, especially given KMT language policies during the one-party era. So Ma quickly rolled out two ads, both apparently featuring language teachers exulting Ma’s serious attitude toward language acquisition. The ads are redolent of the ‘testimonies’ CSB used in 2000, in which school teachers, classmates etc. from the Tainan countryside (and a Nobel prize winner) testified to his good character, as part of the ‘CSB isn’t a madman who is going to declare independence’ cycle of ads. Ma needed a response, because this is the type of thing that could easily spiral out of control and mess up the campaign agenda (KMT peeps: remember the economy!). Tsai doesn’t want to initiate a big fight over identity, but something like this could be another gift horse (without the piggy-banks how much less buzz would Tsai have right now?). I’m not at all surprised that Ma wanted to nip it in the bud, but I predict that these ads won’t achieve that.

In these ads we’re asked to picture Ma as a great student–I don’t doubt he is–resonant in Taiwan where a substantial proportion of people spend a lot of time learning languages. We are shown the testimony of venerable teachers (Taiwanese respect teachers right?), who also happen to represent the ethnic groups Ma wants to appeal to (so, doubly effective right?). We’re told that learning the language is Ma’s way of showing respect, not just a tool for vote-getting (a charge that has been levelled at DPP candidates for many years re: Hakka voters). Personally, I look at these ads and think, ‘I can believe Ma is decent, earnest and a terrific student’. But, so what? You (not Ma personally, but his lieutenant) questioned someone’s identity (in a polity where identity is an ultra-sensitive issue and one on which the KMT is hugely disadvantaged) on the basis of something your party was largely responsible for. That doesn’t go away just because Ma looks like he gets straight A’s.

There is quite a bit of research in political communication on the effect of politicians’ looks, voice, body language etc. on voter attitudes. This latest piece just came out, and it supports what we already know: good looking people do better in politics. There’s also evidence, in a variety of contexts using experimental and real world designs, that men with deeper voices and more muscular frames do better, and that the effect of physical looks is more pronounced for women than men candidates (you guessed that last one, right?). I hadn’t considered this in the case of Taiwan2012, until I came across a recent SCMP article (sorry no link, but its “Tourism conquers the great divide” by Lawrence Chung, Oct 1 2011). The article itself is a bit of frippery about tourists from China marveling at Taiwanese freedoms, but it goes on to quote a Chinese student at NTU as saying: “Oh, Ma Ying-jeou is very handsome and very gentlemanly, while Tsai Ing-wen is very smart and sharp.” Personally I think this is an election for someone who is smart and sharp (handsome is an irrelevant quality when it comes to fixing the economy), and I think Ma will downplay the looks card. Attacking Ma for being an ineffective show pony has been a staple in DPP ads for years–I remember Li Ying-yuan in the 2002 Taipei Mayor race had a great line (from memory) “再怎麼帥，不能這麼草率” (no matter how handsome you are, you can’t be this slapdash). Didn’t help Li, but Tsai will use similar.

Finally, Sigrid Winkler, who posted here a couple weeks back, has a new piece out at Brookings on “The Challenge of Taiwan’s International Status”.

Mail me at jonathan.sullivan@nottingham.ac.uk, follow me on Twitter @jonlsullivan, or access my papers at http://jonlsullivan.com

The campaigns are heating up. How do I know? Chao Li-yun has drama, somebody sees Beijing’s fingers making mischief, the presidential debates schedule is out and the parties are hawking stuff to raise funds. Still need convincing?

You want issues? Tsai is offering to protect animal rights (and boy could Taiwanese animals use a break). On animal protection she says “ask why the government spends so much money on fireworks displays, instead of asking why we should spend so much on protecting animals”. Alas, the animal activists quoted here will still vote Ma because of his cross-strait policy—because they treat animals so well in China obviously [see comments below]. Ma is going after the education vote, while the DPP promises free health insurance to seniors on the offshore islands (not sure how big or influential that cohort is, but that’s the ‘a prize for everyone’ mentality of campaign season). Ma campaign says they’re going to focus on the economy, but KMT candidates always set out to campaign on the economy, and they almost always get sidetracked. For example, when you think of the Lien-Soong ticket, I bet you think personal attacks, anti-referendum, kissing asphalt due to a surfeit of Taiwan love. What they actually wanted to do was focus on the economy. Something will come up and the KMT campaign will go off message.

You want foot in mouth? KMT calls Tsai a “pseudo Hakka” because she can’t speak the dialect. After many of those guys put so many hours in with the lingua-phone learning campaign phrases in min nan, Hakka and native languages, you didn’t think they’d let this go did you? But it made it rather awkward when the Hakka Society reminded the KMT of the KMT’s policy of suppressing non-Mandarin languages during the one-party era (when Tsai grew up). Wu Poh-hsiung said Tsai Ing-wen had tried to “swindle Hakkas into voting for her” with just a few broken Hakka sentences. There is a very serious issue here, but is Wu really daring me to post video of [insert any number of KMT candidates past and present] speaking contemptibly bad [insert non-Mandarin language] in order to appeal to various ethnic groups?

Yes, campaign season is upon us (and its official, we have a three-horse race for president)

PS Remember that NYT op-ed? Want to see how Paul V Kane (or his PR) described it? From the man’s FB page, I quote “Kane discusses U.S. national security and with a provocative blend of irony, facts, Swiftian satire and seriousness – – the importance of “economic security” over military might, and he makes a modest proposal on how to leverage Taiwan with China to eliminate American debt and reduce the risk of a Sino-American war.”

Mail me at jonathan.sullivan@nottingham.ac.uk, follow me on Twitter @jonlsullivan, or access my papers at http://jonlsullivan.com

Related to the future development of Taiwan’s external relations, which will be among most salient issues in the coming weeks of the national election campaign, the question of Taiwan’s limited international space will be ubiquitous. Ever since Taipei lost its UN membership in 1971, the government of the ROC has been subjugated to a fierce diplomatic battleground. Whereas during the eight-year period under the previous administration Taiwan had lost six diplomatic allies, since Ma Ying-jeou’s 2008 inauguration, the number of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies has remained constant; Taiwan at present shares full diplomatic relations with 23 countries and has 117 foreign missions spread over 80 countries. Although the record on full diplomatic recognition is not so impressive, diplomatic ties are still being perceived as the most substantive manifestations of Taiwan’s sovereignty. Stability of diplomatic ties since 2008 has been viewed by the KMT as an attestation of Ma’s successful approach to foreign relations consisting of diplomatic truce and proactive diplomacy in contrast to Chen Shui-bian’s failed diplomatic initiatives. However, has Ma’s historic deviation in his foreign policy approach towards China significantly improved Taiwan’s international status?

Undoubtedly, cross-Strait politics marked by reduction of tensions and stabilization has been highly supported by all countries and all parties involved. Nevertheless, stability is not enough for improving Taiwan’s international standing and the frustration of Taiwanese people has not been lessened. In order to meet Beijing’s demands, Taiwanese continue to compromise on their nation’s name, flag, and anthem. China continues to be the arbiter of the scope of Taiwan’s international participation. Furthermore, unrealized FTAs coupled with the PLA’s steadfast military threat and hence growing uncertainty regarding Taiwan’s future status are naturally not well received in Taiwan. Therefore, in the final weeks of campaign it is crucial for Ma to prove to his citizens that his ‘flexible diplomacy’ will not fail in convincing the Chinese leaders to stop isolating Taipei in the world community and give Taiwan adequate ‘international space’; that is, allow Taiwan to participate in various international organizations and let Taipei continue diplomatic ties with other countries. Likewise, Ma’s main opponent Tsai Ing-wen will need to come up with a better explanation on how her ‘Taiwan consensus’ approach will engage rather than disengage China and help to enhance Taiwan’s access to international arena.

So far, contrary to speculations, Beijing has not yet offered any significant carrots on this issue to facilitate Ma’s re-election. However, as the core problem that hinders progress in relations between Beijing and Taipei continues to be the disagreement over Taiwan’s sovereignty, forging a compromise is not easy. As long as the two sides avoid the issue or “agree on disagreeing” over the interpretation of “one China” as embodied in the so-called ‘1992 Consensus’ which forms the basis of the KMT’s China policy, the relations will proceed smoothly. However, such flexibility in the international arena where Taiwan’s manoeuvrability depends on a clear interpretation of Taiwan’s status is unrealistic. As long as the government in Beijing refuses to recognize the legitimate existence of the ROC, and maintains that Taipei has no legal right to establish diplomatic relations with foreign governments or to participate in any international organizations with statehood as a membership requirement, there will be no significant progress for the position of Taiwan in the international arena. Yet, in order make Taiwanese people, who increasingly define themselves as “Taiwanese” rather than “Chinese”, more willing to see Cross-Strait relations deepen, Beijing will need to provide a more sensible approach to Taipei’s demands.

Saša Istenič is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Asian and African Studies at University of Ljubljana, Slovenia and President of the Slovenian Taiwan Research Center www.tajvan.si

Our analytics show that interest in Taiwan2012 is globally dispersed (except for the Dakotas and Australia). Several upcoming events are further evidence. First, Hsiao Bi-khim will be talking at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia University on Wednesday, Nov 16. Details of the event, “Political Progress and Change in Taiwan: a DPP perspective” can be found here. We will have video of the event (and a report from our Columbia U correspondent Julia Famularo) soon after. Second, the Asian Political and International Studies Association meeting runs 24-25 November at the Overseas Chinese University in Taichung. The meeting will address “Regional Integration” and will welcome many distinguished Taiwan scholars, including Linda Arrigo who will be talking on Taiwan’s foreign relations as a legacy of the Cold War. Third, Dafydd Fell has convened a panel (with Chris Hughes, Malte Kaeding and me) to talk about the elections, at SOAS on December 14. Fourth, the LSE has three talks coming up in its “Law and Society in Taiwan” series in conjunction with NTU.

Finally, there is a double book launch at SOAS on Nov 16 (room 116 from 6pm) for two major new publications in Taiwan Studies. From the blurb: “The first book, entitled Taiwan’s Democracy: Economic and Political Challenges, is edited by Prof. Robert Ash, Prof. John W. Garver, and Prof. Penelope Prime. In this volume by an international team of experts, the continuation of Taiwan’s economic and political achievements and the new challenges that have surfaced are addressed in rich detail. One of the biggest such challenges is Mainland China’s economic success, which has added to the complexity of Taiwan’s economic and political policy options. A number of the contributors to this volume consider Taiwan’s response to China’s economic rise and show how Taiwanese firms have strategically taken advantage of the changing economic environment by moving up the value chain of production within Taiwan while also taking the opportunity to invest overseas. The second book, entitled Government and Politics in Taiwan, is written by Dr. Dafydd Fell. Taking a critical approach, Fell provides readers with the background to the history and development of the political system in Taiwan as well as an explanation of the key structures, processes and institutions that have shaped Taiwan over the last few decades. Topics covered include: the transition to democracy, party politics, cross-strait relations, foreign policy, electoral politics and voting, political economy, national identity and social welfare.”

Frank Ching has a piece today at The Diplomat which argues that the status quo could be the basis for a de facto peace agreement-if, or rather iff, the mainland can accept it. I will leave it to readers to form their own opinion on that, but there was one line that caught my eye. Namely, “ironically, passage of the Anti-Secession Law saw a lowering of cross-strait tensions.” I don’t know why an explicit threat having the intended effect should be described as “ironic” (implying an unintended outcome), and I also found empirical support for an Anti-Secession-effect in my analysis of CSB’s presidential discourse (in this CQ paper with Will Lowe, see e.g. Figure 3). A brief survey of the literature on the Law (e.g. here and here) makes me rather less sanguine than Mr. Ching about the robustness of the SQ.

Mail me at jonathan.sullivan@nottingham.ac.uk, follow me on Twitter @jonlsullivan, or access my papers at http://jonlsullivan.com

Bonnie Glaser just sent over her latest CSIS piece with Brittany Billingsley. The paper, entitled “Taiwan’s 2012 Presidential Elections and Cross-Strait Relations: Implications for the United States” is accessible here and is well worth a read. From the abstract (with permission):

The presidential election in Taiwan, scheduled for January 14, 2012, will have a significant impact on the cross-Strait situation regardless of the outcome. If President Ma is re-elected for a second term, Beijing may become impatient for faster progress toward reunification and put pressure on Ma’s government to launch talks aimed at settling political differences. Absent a domestic consensus on the island, cross-Strait political talks could be extremely divisive with possible negative repercussions both within Taiwan and between the two sides of the Strait.

If the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate, Tsai Ing-wen wins, she is unlikely to accept the two pillars on which mainland China has based its willingness to engage with Taipei: the 1992 Consensus on “one China” and opposition to Taiwan’s independence. Unless Beijing and Taipei can agree on a new formulation to guide their relationship, it is possible that cross-Strait interaction would slow and negotiations would cease. As of mid-November, polls show Ma in a dead heat with Tsai.

Beijing is watching the presidential campaign in Taiwan with great concern. Return of DPP rule could embolden domestic critics of Hu Jintao’s policy of pursuing “peaceful development” in cross-Strait relations to push for a tougher approach. Such a development on the eve of the leadership transition on the mainland could influence personnel arrangements and policies of the new leadership.

Much is at stake for the United States in Taiwan’s upcoming elections. Washington has a strong interest in the conduct of a free, fair, and open presidential election in Taiwan, not in supporting any particular candidate. At the same time, sustaining cross-Strait peace and stability is especially critical as the United States manages friction with Beijing on a broad range of economic, political, and security issues.

Can political integration work without a shared identity? Today, as Taiwan discusses whether or not to commence political talks with Beijing, and European integration is confronted by the biggest strains ever, it is a good time to ponder this question.

Six years ago, I published an article that debated the relationship between economic (structural) and political (institutional) integration. I argued that Taiwan represented an interesting anomaly of integrating its economic structures deeply with Mainland China, while taking no steps whatsoever in the direction of political integration. German unification represented the opposite case with political integration driving the process, while European integration lay somewhere in between.

Which of these models would ultimately prove to be the most enduring way to integrate, and was Taiwan’s awkward situation sustainable over time? Were both economic dependence and shared identity needed for lasting political integration to come about, or would either one of these suffice?

Events following the 2008 change of ruling party in Taiwan seemed to corroborate what my paper had anticipated: that extensive integration of economic structures would eventually lead to moves towards building some kind of an institutional framework for it. Indeed, the KMT government quickly opened direct travel and transport links and initiated several rounds of talks on economic issues, resulting in a series of agreements, culminating in the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA).

These actions went some way towards ‘normalizing’ Cross-Strait economic relations. However, it is a big leap from instituting preferential trade agreements to taking concrete steps towards political integration. In terms of pushing forward political integration, economic integration has probably already run its course and something else is now needed.

A security community of some sort has commonly been seen as necessary for political integration, ever since Karl W. Deutsch et al. published their classic work in 1957. In a security community, there is a high level of trust and war is no longer seen as possible between the political entities. The Nordic countries are a classical example. Contrast this to Taiwan, where even commencing talks on an eventual peace treaty recently proved highly contentious.

European integration has, in terms of its initial goal of maintaining and expanding peace on the European continent, been tremendously successful. For an elite-driven EU, the question is now whether actual political union can be created in a top-down way, without popular identification with the eventual goal.

Historical examples show that pluralistic security communities do not necessarily lead to political union. Deutsch argued that forming new political units from previously separated ones is much more demanding and historically rare than pluralistic security communities. Gradually integrating in a pluralistic security community of shared identity, common values and extensive interactions, is a longer but safer road than premature political union. For an example of how wrong political unions without an underlying security community can go, think of Yugoslavia.

Despite what the international media lets on, Taiwanese election campaigns have usually skirted around these existential issues. However, with Ma Ying-jeou raising the peace treaty idea, the 2012 joint presidential and parliamentary election may become the first election where the issue is tackled head-on. Yet, the issue is as dangerous for the KMT as it is for the CCP. It is not easy even for the DPP.

This debate may form the beginning of a consensus on how to deal with Mainland China. It may also end up exacerbating already acrimonious political divisions. Confronting this divisive issue may even be detrimental to more slow-moving integration processes of building a Cross-Strait security community.

Dr Mikael Mattlin is a researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. His recently published book on Taiwanese politics is titled Politicized Society: The Long Shadow of Taiwan’s One-Party Legacy (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2011).

Paul V. Kane, author of that NYT op-ed, has been roundly booed off stage. James Fallows writes, “I kept waiting for the “but seriously now…” transition to a real proposal, or the paragraph saying, “Obviously this would be crazy, yet it underscores…” It never came. Michael Turton is incredulous and ashamed of the NYT, but linked it to previously floated ideas. Until Mr Kane responds (its like waiting to see what that guy at the back of the bus is going to do next) I guess there’s nothing left to say. Apart from this of course:

Lots of poll activity over the weekend. Remarkably they all say pretty much the same thing: at present, the presidential race is a close call. A CLSA/Gallup poll has Ma at 44.2, Tsai 43.1 and Soong at 12.8. The latest TVBS poll gives Ma a one point lead over Tsai, with Soong at 9%. The gap has been closing at about 1% per TVBS poll since the summer. China Times also sees a one point gap between Ma and Tsai, with Soong around 10. UDN is reporting a 5 point gap and also finds that the vast majority of voters have not [yet, presumably] considered strategic voting. But 2/3 of Soong supporters would change to Ma. One of the interesting things about Taiwanese polls is how they are rumoured to be used as mobilization tools, by parties in cahoots with “friendly” media and pollsters. It is crucial for a candidate to be competitive and in with a chance of winning, but not so far ahead that supporters relax their own campaigning activities or even fail to turnout. One should take these polls with a pinch of salt, but it should be clear that Taiwan 2012 is shaping up more like 2000 than 2008.

A poll two months out from the election is probably a better reflection of what we can expect than a poll seven months out, and what we’ve seen in this time is a consistent tightening of the polls. At this point, we can probably rule out a landslide for either side. But there is still room for substantial movements which are not necessarily indicative of dodgy polling. First, the number of self-reported undecideds is large: some of these know whom they will vote for, but aren’t saying. Second, there is a substantial number of non-partisans, presumably concentrated among younger cohorts, who are waiting to see what happens during the campaign. Third, despite the UDN figure cited above, there is likely a significant number of strategic voters, who likewise will wait to see what happens before deciding, possibly not before election day, whom to vote for. I wouldn’t be surprised if Soong’s poll numbers hold up during the campaign, but would be very surprised if he gets anywhere near the same proportion of votes on election day. The piquant element for both parties and their supporters is that we won’t know ahead of time how the attrition in Soong’s poll support shakes out in terms of votes.

Mail me at jonathan.sullivan@nottingham.ac.uk, follow me on Twitter @jonlsullivan, or access my papers at http://jonlsullivan.com

The NY Times editorial, “To Save Our Economy, Ditch Taiwan”, has raised my hackles – I always warned Taiwanese independence advocates that the US would sell them out, and here it is literal.

I have not been following the pre-election campaigns, but rather rely on my Taiwanese friends to give their boiled-down version of what’s in the news. More significant than public statements, I think, is the glimpses I have gotten on under-the-table long-term developments, by way of friends and acquaintances in government and business. Recently some Australian visitors to Taiwan asked my opinion, and I hit upon the analogy that Taiwan is a frog that is already in the jaws of a large python, but the python may find it hard to swallow. The “status quo” is of course not static, and has been moving predictably in China’s favor since the mid-1990’s.

At the present moment, several factors may be salient. First, Taiwan’s retired military and security officers have been going to China for at least the last two decades, and some even serve as consultants to China. A while back the Taipei Times made a count of over 400. I believe that China has thorough intelligence on Taiwan independence forces and others in Taiwan, and is poised to crack down when needed. For example, last month local newspapers revealed that a professor at the policy academy had copied personal information on Taiwan citizens criticizing China from police files and handed the information over to China. I have also run into numerous Chinese academics coming to Taiwan to “study” the Taiwan independence movement, but what they write generally reports the Kuomintang (KMT) line. As for Taiwan’s capacity for self-defense, to quote a private presentation by one of the correspondents for Jane’s Defence Weekly, Taiwan pays out for the fanciest and shiniest fire engines, but neglects to purchase the hoses. I’d guess that Taiwan’s purchases from the US are in effect protection money, only applicable for the current year.

Second, although China may depend largely on the KMT as its proxy to keep Taiwanese in line, it has been directly influencing KMT and even some current and former Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) elected officials with monetary rewards delivered through intermediaries. One of my sources on this is a member of the Kaohsiung City Council. For example, Chen Chu, mayor of Kaohsiung, was quickly punished for showing “The Ten Conditions of Love” about the heroine of Xinjiang, Rebiya Kadeer, by such a mechanism. It is likely that China, not merely the KMT, was ultimately behind the 2006 blitz to remove Chen Shui-bian.

Third, freedom of speech has markedly contracted. China has been reportedly buying into more and more Taiwan media. It can easily be observed that Taiwan TV news no longer addresses anything more significant than suicides, traffic accidents, and where to buy the best beef noodles (the reporters get convenient payouts from restaurants reported on). As in Singapore, and as in the new policy enacted by the security agencies and the Government Information Office in 1983 after the 1980 Kaohsiung Incident trials for sedition put egg on their faces in international press, political opponents can be crippled through libel charges. The courts have recently been fining those charged with libel $NT5-6 million, e.g. the fine for a commentator calling Shih Ming-deh (now aligned with Blues and Reds) a “political gigolo”. Within academia, universities have at the request of government officials removed from positions of authority professors who have criticized Ma Ying-jeou’s policies; and academics in general have shifted to self-censorship and avoidance of sensitive social and political topics.

Fourth, the rapid economic development of China has pushed past a tipping point: Native Taiwanese capitalists have in past decades understandably been eager to be free from the predatory KMT government and state corporations, and strongly supported the cause of democracy and Taiwan independence as well. But in the 1990’s they moved labor-intensive activities to China and elsewhere by the necessity of international competition, and now the Chinese market looms large as well. China has both increasingly accommodated the Taiwanese businessmen (e.g. allowing them international schools for their children) and enmeshed and controlled them (selective tax audits, with fines open to negotiation). This is the underlying dynamic, I believe, that even Tsai Ing-wen cannot undo, assuming she is elected.

Many Greens think that Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP has a 50-50 chance of being elected, and I hope that she is, but I would not hold my breath. If so, we might have a new lease on the progress of democracy in Taiwan, at least for the time being. It will also be a crucial test of whether we do in fact have a democratic process in voting; but the long economic strength and patronage network of the KMT, intimidation from China, and intentional idiocy of the media inveigh against putting too much trust in real democratic process.

Linda Gail Arrigo is Assistant Professor at Taipei Medical University. Professor Arrigo has been visiting Taiwan since the 1960s, where she was closely linked to the opposition movement, being deported for her role in the Kaohsiung Incident. Prof Arrigo is an authority on human rights in Taiwan.

People’s First Party (PFP) chairman James Soong reaffirmed his commitment to run in next year’s presidential election. Soong’s split from the Kuomintang (KMT) in 2000 after failing to receive the party’s presidential nomination lead to the first transfer of power on the island, with Chen Shui-bian winning with only 39.3% of the vote. His unsuccessful vice presidential bid in 2004 followed by an abysmal showing in the 2006 Taipei mayoral election (garnering 4% of the vote) seemed to spell the end for both Soong’s larger ambitions and his party’s future. Yet, again Soong has emerged as a potential game changer in Taiwanese electoral politics.

The majority of the attention so far has been on how Soong’s entry will affect Ma Ying-jeou’s re-election efforts, seeing that Soong will largely be pulling votes away from disenchanted KMT supporters. Such worries seem premature at best (he may still pull out, especially if the KMT offers enough incentives) and a gross overestimation of Soong’s presidential pull at worst. This is not 2000 however and voters and parties alike are increasingly savvy regarding the implications of splitting the blue vote on the national stage.

The return of Soong however arguably presents a greater threat to the KMT in the Legislative Yuan election. With the PFP coordinating on district elections and the party list with the KMT in 2008, the KMT won two-thirds of the seats. If even a marginally rejuvenated PFP opts instead to run its own candidates in select districts against the KMT (with or without its own party list), this provides a window for additional seats to swing towards the DPP. For example, of the 52 districts in which the KMT candidate beat out a DPP candidate, 13 were by less than ten percent. Assuming a political environment more conducive to the DPP than 2008, the presence of even marginal PFP candidates in any of these districts could have turned these races in the DPP’s favor.

The coupling of the presidential and legislative elections next year presents a unique opportunity for James Soong and the remnants of the PFP. For now, only Soong knows his end game.

Timothy S. Rich is a doctoral candidate in political science at Indiana University, working on the impact of electoral reforms. Visit his research pages here.

Shouldn’t the military stay out of politics? I remember when CSB won in 2000, there were swirling rumors (fancy that) that the military would rebel. That didn’t happen, but it remains a constituency with a strong preference (understatement) for the KMT. Ma hooked up with some military big-wigs to attend “a joint commemoration of Chiang Kai-shek and Sun Yat-sen”. He delivered a speech “ringed by 11 retired generals” (what an image) in which he invoked “Sun Yat-sen’s deathbed exhortation: peace, struggle on, save China”. This earned him big props from said generals. Hau Pei-tsun (father of the incumbent KMT Taipei Mayor), said Ma is “the only [suitable] candidate”. Hsu Li-nong trumped that by saying “today there is no literal battlefield where we might exert our Whampoa spirit. Today, our battlefield is the election … Today, supporting Ma Ying-jeou in the election is defending the Republic of China”. Good imagery, but shouldn’t the military stay out of politics?

Michael Turton looks at the sudden uptrend in election related trinkets. The DPP has its piggy-banks, and so like a teenager coveting an iphone4, the KMT had to get its own Taiwan Talisman. I’m sure there’s something serious to be said here about symbolism and the nexus between religion and politics, but I got sidetracked by MT’s observation that “Ma’s sudden and temporary outbreak of Taiwaneseness will be instantly cured on Jan 15, 2012”. Remember the dramatic scene in 2004, when Lien and Soong (then running on a joint ticket) prostrated themselves at different stump locations to kiss the ground, showing their love for Taiwan? It was brilliant political theater and came at a moment when, because of CSB’s Taiwan identity campaign and the failure of Lien-Soong’s initial campaign agenda to resonate, they needed to do something like that.  After that does anyone still think politicians aren’t opportunistic? Four years earlier, Lien spent a fortune telling people Soong didn’t love Taiwan, and was soon hotfooting it to Beijing to talk with the PRC as if he had a mandate to do so! (Pic by Fang Pin-Chao for the Taipei Times)

I linked to Dafydd Fell’s Brookings election overview the other day. He has an updated overview in the TT. Dafydd is still surprised that the polls are so tight and disappointed that the legislative campaigns have flown under the radar. He also points out that “this has been the least passionate presidential election in Taiwan’s history”. I am unfortunately not present in Taiwan for this campaign, but from a distance it appears less inspiring (and divisive) than the first three presidential campaigns which I did witness. There are numerous potential explanations for the slightly underwhelming emotions surrounding what is a crucial election. The candidates are low key and intellectual rather than affective speakers. The salient issue, the economy top-to-bottom, does not inspire the same kind of passionate rhetoric that national identity would. On several issues, the parties are not too far apart-nothing like, for example, Lee vs. Peng. Tsai is not as polarizing, or have as many enemies, as CSB. Given how close the presidential election is, and our best guesses that the KMT will control the legislature, but with a much smaller majority, post-election there will be need for bi-partisan cooperation. This may be having an effect on the low levels of competition we see now.

Although its my bad luck to be blogging “the least passionate presidential election” to date (and I do secretly yearn for Soong to introduce some spice), it might be a positive sign for Taiwanese democracy. Elections have perhaps become so routinized that they don’t arouse the same passions as previously: and remember that those same passions often spilled over into unseemliness. Democratic institutions have perhaps gained sufficient trust that people do not have the same level of fear should their chosen party not win. So, boring doesn’t necessarily mean bad. And the elections are still 2 months away, plenty of time to heat up.

Mail me at jonathan.sullivan@nottingham.ac.uk, follow me on Twitter @jonlsullivan, or access my papers at http://jonlsullivan.com

I guess if you’re reading this blog, you’ll have probably seen it by now. If you haven’t, feel free to take a minute out from reading this post to check it out. If my Twitter feed is anything to go by, it has really touched a nerve. But that might be because the people I follow are rather more knowledgeable about Taiwan’s situation than the author, Paul V. Kane, a former Marine and Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government. The title alone, “To Save Our Economy, Ditch Taiwan”, was enough to give my followees palpitations. It is unfortunate that, as Paul Mozur (WSJ’s Taiwan correspondent) put it on Twitter, “everyone ignores Taiwan for months, then a particularly stupid editorial comes out and everyone reads it”.

I agree with Mozur’s sentiment, but the implication that we should ignore this op-ed because it is myopic and uninformed is wrong. The very fact that it reached the pages of the NYT is reason enough to take it seriously. The NYT is not in the habit of giving column space to madmen-from which I infer that there is sufficient sentiment in the US that the prevailing relationship with Taiwan should be re-calibrated, although perhaps not to the extent that Kane describes. It is not implausible that, if framed in Kane’s stark terms, a war weary American public and opportunistic politicians could support the notion that America’s self-interest (in Kane’s terms, writing off the debt that China holds and avoiding a potentially devastating war over Taiwan) is best served by sacrificing its obligation to defend Taiwan. That is, in my opinion, wrong on many levels, but it is not implausible.

If you’re still reading at this point, thank you. Now let’s count the ways in which Kane’s op-ed goes off the rails. First, the notion that “America has little strategic interest in Taiwan” is astonishingly naive. Second, the idea that Taiwan is going to declare independence is literally incredible. Third, if “absorption” is “inevitable” then why worry that “the cautious men in Beijing” will lose patience and try to “take Taiwan by force”? Fourth, Taiwan is a bone of contention in US-China relations, but its not the only one. After “giving up Taiwan” do you not think China will move on to the next bones of contention on its (increasingly long) list? What next, quit Japan, Central Asia, global financial institutions? Fifth, “a Taiwan deal could pressure Beijing to end its political and economic support for pariah states like Iran, North Korea and Syria”. Why would it? Sixth, “Congress should see a deal with China as an opportunity to make itself credible again”. Are you serious, Mr Kane? Finally, the thing that’s getting a lot of peoples’ goat, invoking the future of America’s children-what about Taiwan’s children?

There is so much more to write on this, but I just wanted to get my initial thoughts up. I will leave you in the capable hands of Nancy Tucker and Bonnie S Glaser (whom I’m delighted to say will post here very soon) and their article “Should the US abandon Taiwan?” For those of you with Kane-induced fear of following the link, the answer is a resounding “no”.

Mail me at jonathan.sullivan@nottingham.ac.uk, follow me on Twitter @jonlsullivan, or access my papers at http://jonlsullivan.com

I wrote yesterday that James Soong would be right to brace for a KMT assault. I imagine he knows whats coming, because he faced it before in 2000. In this ad from 2000, Soong speaking directly to camera, says “when I decided to run, I knew I was going to face savage attacks, because I’m competing against two parties”. He doesn’t give those attacks any credence by addressing their content, instead deftly moving on to say that both parties have neglected the real desires of the people. He continues with a restatement of the “everyman” image he earned and cultivated in the 1990s, saying that ‘I’ve listened to the people, I know what they want and I can deliver’.

Against the “everyman who gets stuff done” image Soong put across in his ads, the KMT went after Soong’s character. In this ad they explicitly question his everyman status, rhetorically asking off the bat “are you really just a regular guy?” As evidence that he’s not like you and me, they cite his luxury apartments in exotic locales. In this election, where “love for Taiwan” had become a salient theme (before it came to dominate in CSB’s re-electioon campaign), the ad asks rhetorically whether having luxury boltholes overseas demonstrates love for Taiwan. A nice technique in the ad is overlaying footage of Soong denying his real estate portfolio (and saying he’ll withdraw if found true) against apparent evidence of its existence. The killer line at the end “do you believe it?”, ostensibly about the claim that he would withdraw, but linked to a large volume of materials attacking Soong’s integrity.

In 2000, Soong faced very big scandals and many personal attacks from Lien and Chen and yet still stayed competitive to the end. This was largely down to the substantial social capital he had built up in his previous offices. The timing was also right for Soong, with voters wanting change but still not sure that they trusted a DPP president. Anecdotally, I remember Taiwanese saying to me things like “sure, Soong has his faults, but in that he’s no different from any other politician, but unlike the others at least he gets things done for people like me”. Soong does not have the same capital with which to protect himself this time, and it will be interesting to see if his everyman shtick still resonates long after he was really in position to prove it.

Mail me at jonathan.sullivan@nottingham.ac.uk, follow me on Twitter @jonlsullivan, or access my published and working papers at http://jonlsullivan.com

I finally got round to checking out two election resources. First, there is the Taiwan election 2012 Flickr group, with contributions from Michael Turton, David Reid and other serious photographer-types. If you are following the elections from afar, its going to be a great way to access some of the flavour of the campaigns. Second, there is a dedicated YouTube Taiwan 2012 site. To my shame (partly because I have a paper coming out in the China Quarterly exhorting researchers to make better use of online resources) I only caught up with this today. It is a definite improvement on the site they ran for the municipal elections.

As far as I can tell, the two major contributions are news clips from all the major TV stations, arranged by channel (the 即時新聞 tab). Balance and choice; good job Google. Second, there is a very neat collection of party campaign materials (divided by party, including minor ones) under the 候選人頻道 tab. The promised 候選人專訪is at present virtually empty, but there’s also some good stuff on the main presidential candidates’ Google+ pages (linked from the homepage). I couldn’t find any talk show coverage on the site, but you can find, for example,  全 民 開 講’s YouTube channel here. Talking of talk shows, check out this PhD thesis by Alice Chu. I don’t think it came out as a book, but please correct me in comments.

The Taipei Times has a feature on young voters, which they define as 20-something. With that definition, we’re talking about a pretty large cohort, about 20% of the electorate. This cohort also sees exceptionally high turnout, around 80%. If they are like their counterparts in other democracies, they should also be less entrenched in their political views and thus more likely to be influenced by shorter-term factors, like what transpires during the campaign. Whereas a large component of older cohorts made their minds up long before the campaign, younger voters are treated as more win-over-able.

It is not surprising that parties want to secure the ‘young’ vote, but apart from how they wrap their message up with social media window dressing, are parties addressing what these voters want? For that matter what do they want? Not surprisingly, they want an economy in which they can get a job and build a decent life, which is pretty much what other cohorts want as well. Shelley Rigger, quoted in the article, is spot on when she says “for a long time, young people in Taiwan felt school was really hard, but there was a reward at the end of it. For today’s youth, it’s not clear that there’s anything waiting for them at the end.” Fashionable gimmicks, national identity rhetoric and personal attacks are no substitute.

Mail me at jonathan.sullivan@nottingham.ac.uk, follow me on Twitter @jonlsullivan, or access my published and working papers at http://jonlsullivan.com

In mid-October, Ma proposed his will of signing a “peace accord” with China. He supplemented this proposal by arguing that the signature of the Cross Strait peace accord should proceed under three conditions, namely the country’s need, public support, and congressional superintendence. Later, he added that the signature should be determined by referendum. Ma’s proposal led to several domestic and international repercussions. I firstly summarize the opinions of Taiwan, China, and the United States, and then provide my own observation.

In Taiwan, there are several conjectures about the reason for Ma to propose the Cross Strait peace accord. Firstly, it is because of the stalemate result of public opinion polls between Ma and Tsai. Ma sought to regain an advantageous position by emphasizing his effort in improving the Cross Strait relationship. The Mainland Affairs Council claims that the purpose of Ma’s proposal is to institutionalize the status quo. Second, it is to repay China’s surrender of profits in signing the ECFA and opening up free independent travel of Mainland tourists to Taiwan. Third, Ma tries to shift public focus away from people’s livelihood and economic issues, where he does not achieve success. Fourth, to gain the support of Taiwanese businessmen in Mainland, this accord is a substitution for the Taiwanese Businessmen Investment Protection Agreement (which China is reluctant to sign). These are possible reasons, but since we are not Ma, we can never know his genuine motive.

Tsai responded that Ma’s proposal could lead to four crises, including sacrificing Taiwan’s sovereignty, changing the status quo of the Cross Strait relationship, undermining democratic values, and diminishing strategic depth. Ma replied that the peace accord serves as a fire wall between Taiwan and China. Its goal is to achieve reciprocal peace and prosperity. The Democratic Progress Party (DPP) criticized it by arguing that the Taiwanese people do not authorize Ma to unilaterally change the status quo and initiate political negotiations with China. The DPP also proposed several questions. First, if the National Party (KMT) wins the election, it has the right to define the substance of Ma’s three conditions (just like ECFA). Second, since Ma claimed that he has largely improved the Cross Strait relationship and the probability of war is quite low, why do we need a peace accord? Third, when the People’s Republic of China does not recognize the Republic of China and tries to eliminate it from the international society, what is our status if we really sign the peace accord? Finally, if the result of a referendum opposes the peace accord, what would Ma do? In sum, the DPP tries to equate Ma’s peace accord proposal to his will of advancing unification. Almost half of the Taiwanese electorate tag a “unification-oriented” mark on Ma owing to his practice in the past three years (though Ma himself has given every effort to deny it). Therefore, the DPP’s discourse gains certain persuasiveness in Taiwan.

China did not reply directly, and expressed that it cognized and respected Ma’s proposal. China is not eager to sign a peace accord with Taiwan. Its preference is the growth of the economy first and foremost while politics comes secondary. Only after stabilizing Cross Strait economic and civil cooperation and eliminating the obstacle of political negotiation will China consider Ma’s proposal. Nevertheless, Ma’s proviso of referendum provoked China because China regards a referendum as pointing towards Taiwanese independence. Besides, China has expressed its grievance against Ma’s volatile policy direction.

On the US side, the ex-President Clinton doubted the reliability of China’s commitment. He did not hold a positive perspective on Ma’s proposal according to his experience in facilitating the signature of peace accords between Israel and Palestine (their conflict lasts to date). I think the comparison between Israeli-Palestinian and China-Taiwan relationships does not make sense owing to their difference in almost every dimension, e.g. cultural similarity, capability, territorial and economic scales, etc. The US is very cautious about the possible turbulence in East Asia caused by Ma’s proposal. Most importantly, Ma’s proposal might damage the validity of the Taiwan Relations Act and give China the excuse to annex Taiwan with a military approach. It implies that China might break the blockade of the first island-chain set by the US and undermine US interests in the Western Pacific region.

In my opinion, Taiwan has very little leverage to negotiate a peace “accord” in favour of Taiwan under its current power gap with China. It is meaningless to discuss or even to sign the peace “accord” before China dispels its military threat to Taiwan and relinquishes its goal of annexing Taiwan. Besides, a peace accord is signed by the warring parties in a single country, while a peace treaty is signed by warring sovereign countries. If Ma really tries to protect Taiwan’s sovereignty, and if China and Taiwan indeed interact on the basis of “mutually non-denial” as claimed by Ma, he should propose a peace treaty rather than a peace accord. However, the validity ofa peace accord or peace treaty for a non-democratic regime is very doubtful, just as the result of the Munich Agreement and the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Soviet Union illustrates. The validity of Ma’s peace accord for non-democratic China might share a similar fate. Finally, after the authority handing-over process, China’s priority is to stabilize the economy and neighborhood situation. To sign a peace accord with Taiwan is not its priority. However, if some unforeseeable factors lead to domestic upheaval, China might shift from domestic conflict to threatening Taiwan. Policymakers in Taiwan should prepare for this scenario cautiously.

In sum, Ma’s Cross Strait peace accord proposal seemed like a failed campaign strategy, and led to an inconvenient spillover of negative repercussions from domestic to the international level.

Dr. Sheng-Chih Wang is a Research Assistant in the Department of Diplomacy at National Chengchi University, Taiwan.

What to make of James Soong? I don’t know, other analysts don’t know, so why not indulge in some idle speculation? Or like the Asia Times, which really let’s its imagination go wild with this one? Try and keep up now: Soong’s presidential campaign is a strategy to keep the PFP salient so that it can win enough seats (specifically Hualien, Kinmen and three aboriginal seats) to become pivotal (no less than a “kingmaker”) in the 8th Yuan, as a coalition partner to the DPP (which, even if it wins the presidency will inevitably be a minority in the legislature). Soong will simultaneously avenge age-old snubs by Ma (remember 2000?) and Lien Chan, by taking the latter’s beloved APEC job. In the event of Tsai winning, Soong will avert a reprisal of tensions with China because he is “trusted by Beijing” (probably not an endorsement you should put in your campaign ads, James) and an acceptable “shackle” to “DPP adventurism” (that’s what it says, don’t shoot the messenger, ok?).

This reminds me of a public speaking course I attended where we had to say words out loud, any words randomly ordered, for a minute in order to warm the voice box up. This particular collection of words looks to me suspiciously like the transcript of a James Soong daydream. However, the article does resist, heroically, the temptation (or is it an international diktat?) to write “pro-independence DPP”, instead going with the demure “anti-unification DPP candidate”.

As prescient as this Asia Times article may turn out to be, this UDN piece is more interesting on a number of levels. It opens with the line “loads of people are asking themselves, James, what the heck are you up to?” UDN can only think of four possibilities: he wants to be president, he wants to lead the PFP caucus in the Yuan, he wants to become head of the Executive Yuan or SEF (and thereby set himself up to influence cross-Strait relations), or finally he simply wants to pull Ma down and help Tsai get elected. Number one is out. Number two is scratched, because if his goal was that limited he could it achieve it in any number of less hassle-some ways. Paraphrasing, number 3 is a one in a million shot because whichever party wins, there’s no way they’d give such a shifty character as Soong an important position like that.

Which only leaves this: Soong wants to bring Ma down and allow Tsai to win. Remember that UDN is traditionally predisposed toward the KMT (that might be an understatement), and Soong should expect (I’m sure he does) a lot of attacks from this direction. The key point of the build up is this: 3-5% of the vote is all Soong needs to assure Tsai of victory. If I can interpret: “if you’re angry with Ma and considering voting for Soong, remember, it only takes a few people like you and the DPP will get in”. Of course we don’t know how many votes Soong might receive, and from whom he might take them. But this commentary (if I’m right to make this inference) is eerily reminiscent of blue media stories in 2000 and indeed a lot of KMT campaign advertising. Many materials have featured similarly precise quantifications of what is essentially the “DPP fear factor”, that long time staple of KMT campaigns: a vote for anyone but us will let the DPP in which in turn will lead to a) war with China, b) economic collapse or c) both.

The “quantification of danger” is something to watch out for once the Soong effect starts to show up in the polls, because if he starts showing anything like 10% levels of support, it will have a significant effect on the dynamics of the campaign. Remember that polling 10% support wouldn’t mean he would actually get 10% of votes, because as a third party spoiler his actual vote count will suffer attrition as those who tell pollsters they support Soong face up to the reality of wasting their vote in the booth. Another thing to look out for is how Tsai deals with the inevitable fear attacks if she takes the lead in the polls. Being the frontrunner in the polls is an unusual position for a DPP presidential candidate to be in. Indeed I think I’m right in saying that no DPP candidate has enjoyed that status, not even CSB when he stood for re-election. Being the frontrunner would render Tsai more vulnerable to fear attacks (as the possibility of her winning becomes more credible). It will be interesting to see whether her team will try to inoculate against such attacks if her numbers continue to improve.

Mail me at jonathan.sullivan@nottingham.ac.uk, follow me on Twitter @jonlsullivan, or access my papers at http://jonlsullivan.com

With southern Taiwan strongly pro-DPP and northern Taiwan strongly pro-KMT, both the local and international media as well as the two major parties in Taiwan have identified central Taiwan, especially the municipality of Taichung, as a major battleground in the ongoing election campaigns. In this piece I’ll summarize some of the issues that impact voters in the Taichung area.

The fundamental factor shaping voting patterns is the colonial pattern of resource flows erected by the KMT. Historically in Taiwan, resources flow out of peripheral rural areas and south and central Taiwan and to the north. In practice this has meant that the South is beggared to pay for Taipei’s extravagant lifestyle, and a disproportionate share of development funds have gone to the two municipalities of Taipei and (less so to) Kaoshiung. This colonial pattern of resource flows from south to north is a powerful driver of pro-DPP sentiment in the south and center, where Taiwan independence controversies mask a bitter struggle over the island’s resources between the center and periphery, between party elites in the KMT and southern KMT supporters, and between the two major parties.

As a result, in the last few years, the urban areas of Tainan, Kaohsiung, Taichung, and Taipei county have all upgraded themselves to municipalities in order to obtain a bigger slice of the government funding pie. Taichung annexed its entire county to form a new municipality in December of 2010, deeply impacting the local area’s politics.

Further, because of the central government’s lavish treatment of Taipei and other issues, local governments outside Taipei are deeply in debt, especially in the south and center. This means that the counties are dependent on central government funding flows, while voters experience a lack of the services and infrastructure they need. This makes them consider switching parties and politicians.

Taichung itself should never have been in play. A few years ago the friendly, outgoing Mayor of Taichung, Jason Hu, a KMT heavyweight and former former foreign minister, was highly popular with his constituents. He had crushed his DPP opponent in the previous election, and memories of his DPP predecessor, a local faction politician widely held to be corrupt, were not happy. Bit by bit, however, Taichung area residents have become increasingly dissatisfied with the mayor’s leadership.

One major factor has been the development of along the west side of the city, where giant new apartment buildings rise like a glass and steel henge around the city’s outskirts and thrust a long finger of new development toward the city center. In the best build-it-and-they-will-come style, these are aimed at presumed Chinese investors. This wave of development has also included both the new science park on the slopes of Tatu Shan, the 300 meter high hill that stands between the city and the ocean, and the residential and commercial areas that surround it. Unfortunately for the KMT, during the months prior to the Dec 2010 election many local factions on that side of the city, feeling shut out of the pie, dropped their longtime support of the KMT and switched to the DPP. Because these factions are frequently aligned with local temple associations that function as the nexus for powerful local clans, local organized crime, local businessmen, and other influential individuals, temples on that side of the city switched sides as well. Although control of temples is seldom mentioned in media analysis of Taiwan’s politics, they are a key element in local politics. So influential are they that politicians have been convicted of vote buying for donating to local temples in order to get them to influence their devotees.

Conversely, the new wave of luxury development has almost totally neglected the east side of the city and the hills beyond. Additionally, the city was supposed to have had a metro years ago. Construction has finally begun, but the interminable approval process, delays, and changes in the plan, along with the city’s uneven development that has enriched developers but few others, has left many voters disappointed in the administration of Mayor Hu.

A second factor in the changes in Taichung is the new municipality. While the city itself may be solidly pro-KMT, the rural areas are thought to lean DPP. After the upgrade the outgoing KMT chief of the county was said to have simply given up on his job, since he would no longer have it come Dec 25th when the new municipality was born and the county was swallowed. Moreover, Taichung mayor Jason Hu was widely perceived to have neglected the county in his campaigning.

In May of 2010 a spectacular gangland killing profoundly altered the political calculus. An assassin simply walked into the office of reputed gangster Weng Chi-nan and shot him. Four police officers were present playing Mahjong with the victim and did nothing; investigation later established that perhaps as many as ten policemen had been in and out of the dead man’s office that day. This highlighted Taichung’s dismal reputation for collusion between police and organized crime and its reputation as the island’s crime center under Jason Hu. The killing followed on the heels of a massive funeral in the city for a major organized crime figure, attended by 20,000, including prominent politicians and mayor himself. The public professed to be sick of the city’s lack of order, and the local media went baying after the issue in its finest Golden Retriever style.

Other issues came in a cascade. In March a fire killed nine people in an overcrowded bar; Mayor Hu responded by closing more than 300 drinking establishments because they were improperly registered. Not only did this cause outrage in the city over the loss of the city’s vibrant music scene, it also made public the fact that the process for overseeing the certification of restaurants under Jason Hu was corrupt and ineffective. Because Taichung is perhaps the center of the island’s live music scene, this caused little ripples of resentment all over the island. Moreover, critics claimed that large establishments owned by individuals close to the KMT had remained open. Hu also went even further to announce a ban an island tradition, outdoor tables at convenience stores, a favorite place for workers to gather for beer and snacks in the evening. Locals rolled their eyes and then laughed when it wasn’t enforced.

In 2010 Jason Hu did manage to win reelection in a tight election, probably due to an assassination attempt on a KMT politician by a local gangster in Taipei, which perversely generated sympathy for the KMT after KMT officials mendaciously claimed it was an example of “pan-Green violence.” Many voters felt cheated by this propaganda and there may be a small backlash of compensating votes for the DPP in the 2012 election. The current DPP vice presdential candidate, Su Chia-chuan, lost the 2010 mayoral election in Taichung to Jason Hu, but performed extremely well in Taichung, suggesting that he may have a positive influence on the DPP’s prospects.

Many other basic political factors remain unchanged. The KMT’s control over local neighborhood politicians and political networks, as well as the local government, temples, bureaucracy and police is more or less intact. The DPP’s local area networks remain underdeveloped and dependent for support on local clan and factional organizations that are likely to switch sides if a better deal is offered. The KMT controlled legislature passed a law to freeze its local politicians in place for another five years in the event of DPP victories in 2010, meaning that local government remains a KMT fief. In some ways, given the massive KMT advantage in funding, structure, and organization, it is a powerful testimony to the incompetence of that party’s leaders and to the skill of DPP Chair Tsai Ing-wen in reviving the DPP and fielding credible candidates, that central Taiwan has become a key to victory in the upcoming Presidential and legislative elections.

Michael Turton is a Taichung resident and blogs at the highly regarded, influential and recommended The View From Taiwan.

In the first half of the presidential campaign, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was bothered by one thing only: the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) seemed to be shadowing their every move.

The KMT sent King Pu-tsung, President Ma Ying-jeou’s campaign manager, on a US trip at almost the exact same time as DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen’s. King visited every city Tsai went to and delivered a speech at Harvard University, where Tsai also spoke, on the same day.

On the policy front, the DPP claimed that the KMT was being a “copycat” by plagiarizing Tsai’s platforms, including her policies on housing, tax reform, agricultural subsidies and labour.

The KMT denied the DPP’s claim.

The DPP went on to launch its slogan for the second part of the campaign – “Taiwan’s first female president,” a claim that the KMT can not duplicate for an obvious reason.

Her campaign adopted the slogan not because it is “trendy” or “fashionable,”, but because women are often more able to solve problems in a harmonious way through better communication than men, Tsai said, adding that women are usually more perseverant and persistent as well.

In constituencies of Hakka ethnicity, the DPP has been using “Hakka girl for president” as its main slogan to promote its candidate who shares the same characteristics – frugality and perseverance, among others – with Hakka women.

Tsai did try to run her campaign in a much “softer” way in comparison to previous DPP candidates. She made clear that she does not like “negative campaigning” nor fighting the rhetorical battle.

However, the slogan also has a strategic implication in securing more votes from women.

Seen as a progressive and confrontational party since its founding in the martial law era, the DPP has had a hard time to appeal to women voters, often trailing the KMT by more than 10 percentage points in elections.

Frank Hsieh’s loss to Ma, whose good-looking appearance is believed to be one of his advantages in vying for female voters, in the 2008 presidential election by more than two million votes marked the lowest point. An unofficial tally showed that more than 4.8 million of Ma’s 7.65 million votes, or 62.7 percent, came from women voters.

The party also cited various countries, including Iceland, Thailand and Germany, which are led by a female head of state, as examples, and said that it is time for Taiwan to have a female leader.

It would be crucial for Tsai to bridge the gap and vie for women’s support on the presumption of their preference for a female leader.

Results of various recent public opinion polls are mixed. A survey conducted by the Taiwan Brain Trust between Oct. 28 and 29 found that Tsai has cut her deficit in women’s support against Ma to 39.3%-35.7%, which the DPP said is the closest of any DPP presidential candidate, and has led Ma by 2.8 percent.

Another poll conducted by Taiwan Association of Pacific Ocean Development between Oct. 31 and Nov. 2 found that Tsai still trailed Ma 38.6%-30.3% in terms of women support and she is behind Ma by 7.3 percentage points overall.

The appeal seemed to be received well in DPP rallies and Tsai’s presidential campaign visits everywhere. However, do Taiwanese women voters prefer a female leader? Are they ready to do something the Americans did not do? It remains unknown until election day.

Chris Wang is a political analyst, writer and editor at the Taipei Times. He writes here in a personal capacity.

On April 27^th this year, party chairperson Tsai Ing-wen captured the 2012 presidential nomination for Taiwan’s main opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).  This made her the first female presidential candidate in ROC history. Meanwhile in South Korea, another woman—Park Geun-hye—is expected to be nominated by the Grand National Party (GNP) for the 2012 presidential election as polls consistently have her far ahead of other GNP hopefuls.

Political life in East Asia is often characterized as male dominated, especially compared to its Western counterpart. Yet, recent elections throughout the region suggest a small but growing trend of strong female candidates across the political spectrum. In the cases of Tsai and Park, both carry the heavy burden of resurrecting the hopes of their particular parties. For Tsai, whose party lost in both the presidential and legislative elections in 2008, the main aim is  to steer the party towards the middle on the issue of Taiwan’s future status while simultaneously developing an engagement policy regarding China distinct from that of the Kuomintang (KMT).

Tsai’s stronger than expected showing in the 2010 Xinbei mayoral election, a region historically more favorable to the KMT, showed her ability to appeal to both party loyalists and the ever desired median voter. For Park, presidential politics are nothing new. As the daughter of authoritarian era leader Park Chung-hee, she narrowly lost her own bid for the GNP nomination in 2007. Her widespread appeal is seen by GNP insiders as a counterbalance to the general decline in party support under President Lee Myung-bak, further weakened by the success of the Democratic Party (DP) in by-elections held on April 27th.

Admittedly Tsai and Park are not necessarily representative of their parties or female politicians in East Asia.  In both countries as well as in Japan, female legislators remain underrepresented and relegated primarily to party list seats and not the more numerous district seats. This is likely due either to the difficulty in recruiting quality female candidates or more probable still, the hesitance of parties to run such candidates out of concern of their limited electoral appeal.  Still, while traditional views of a woman’s role within society are slow to change, we appear to see a growing willingness among a diverse set of voters in East Asia to transcend such historical and cultural constraints.

Certainly predicting any election in advance is risky business. Even if neither Tsai nor Park become the first female head of state in what we might call Confucian East Asia, the importance of major parties nominating nationally competitive female candidates should encourage future challenges to the political glass ceiling.

Tim Rich is a PhD Candidate at Indiana University, working on Taiwan and South Korea.