Related to the future development of Taiwan’s external relations, which will be among most salient issues in the coming weeks of the national election campaign, the question of Taiwan’s limited international space will be ubiquitous. Ever since Taipei lost its UN membership in 1971, the government of the ROC has been subjugated to a fierce diplomatic battleground. Whereas during the eight-year period under the previous administration Taiwan had lost six diplomatic allies, since Ma Ying-jeou’s 2008 inauguration, the number of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies has remained constant; Taiwan at present shares full diplomatic relations with 23 countries and has 117 foreign missions spread over 80 countries. Although the record on full diplomatic recognition is not so impressive, diplomatic ties are still being perceived as the most substantive manifestations of Taiwan’s sovereignty. Stability of diplomatic ties since 2008 has been viewed by the KMT as an attestation of Ma’s successful approach to foreign relations consisting of diplomatic truce and proactive diplomacy in contrast to Chen Shui-bian’s failed diplomatic initiatives. However, has Ma’s historic deviation in his foreign policy approach towards China significantly improved Taiwan’s international status?

Undoubtedly, cross-Strait politics marked by reduction of tensions and stabilization has been highly supported by all countries and all parties involved. Nevertheless, stability is not enough for improving Taiwan’s international standing and the frustration of Taiwanese people has not been lessened. In order to meet Beijing’s demands, Taiwanese continue to compromise on their nation’s name, flag, and anthem. China continues to be the arbiter of the scope of Taiwan’s international participation. Furthermore, unrealized FTAs coupled with the PLA’s steadfast military threat and hence growing uncertainty regarding Taiwan’s future status are naturally not well received in Taiwan. Therefore, in the final weeks of campaign it is crucial for Ma to prove to his citizens that his ‘flexible diplomacy’ will not fail in convincing the Chinese leaders to stop isolating Taipei in the world community and give Taiwan adequate ‘international space’; that is, allow Taiwan to participate in various international organizations and let Taipei continue diplomatic ties with other countries. Likewise, Ma’s main opponent Tsai Ing-wen will need to come up with a better explanation on how her ‘Taiwan consensus’ approach will engage rather than disengage China and help to enhance Taiwan’s access to international arena.

So far, contrary to speculations, Beijing has not yet offered any significant carrots on this issue to facilitate Ma’s re-election. However, as the core problem that hinders progress in relations between Beijing and Taipei continues to be the disagreement over Taiwan’s sovereignty, forging a compromise is not easy. As long as the two sides avoid the issue or “agree on disagreeing” over the interpretation of “one China” as embodied in the so-called ‘1992 Consensus’ which forms the basis of the KMT’s China policy, the relations will proceed smoothly. However, such flexibility in the international arena where Taiwan’s manoeuvrability depends on a clear interpretation of Taiwan’s status is unrealistic. As long as the government in Beijing refuses to recognize the legitimate existence of the ROC, and maintains that Taipei has no legal right to establish diplomatic relations with foreign governments or to participate in any international organizations with statehood as a membership requirement, there will be no significant progress for the position of Taiwan in the international arena. Yet, in order make Taiwanese people, who increasingly define themselves as “Taiwanese” rather than “Chinese”, more willing to see Cross-Strait relations deepen, Beijing will need to provide a more sensible approach to Taipei’s demands.

Saša Istenič is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Asian and African Studies at University of Ljubljana, Slovenia and President of the Slovenian Taiwan Research Center www.tajvan.si

Our analytics show that interest in Taiwan2012 is globally dispersed (except for the Dakotas and Australia). Several upcoming events are further evidence. First, Hsiao Bi-khim will be talking at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia University on Wednesday, Nov 16. Details of the event, “Political Progress and Change in Taiwan: a DPP perspective” can be found here. We will have video of the event (and a report from our Columbia U correspondent Julia Famularo) soon after. Second, the Asian Political and International Studies Association meeting runs 24-25 November at the Overseas Chinese University in Taichung. The meeting will address “Regional Integration” and will welcome many distinguished Taiwan scholars, including Linda Arrigo who will be talking on Taiwan’s foreign relations as a legacy of the Cold War. Third, Dafydd Fell has convened a panel (with Chris Hughes, Malte Kaeding and me) to talk about the elections, at SOAS on December 14. Fourth, the LSE has three talks coming up in its “Law and Society in Taiwan” series in conjunction with NTU.

Finally, there is a double book launch at SOAS on Nov 16 (room 116 from 6pm) for two major new publications in Taiwan Studies. From the blurb: “The first book, entitled Taiwan’s Democracy: Economic and Political Challenges, is edited by Prof. Robert Ash, Prof. John W. Garver, and Prof. Penelope Prime. In this volume by an international team of experts, the continuation of Taiwan’s economic and political achievements and the new challenges that have surfaced are addressed in rich detail. One of the biggest such challenges is Mainland China’s economic success, which has added to the complexity of Taiwan’s economic and political policy options. A number of the contributors to this volume consider Taiwan’s response to China’s economic rise and show how Taiwanese firms have strategically taken advantage of the changing economic environment by moving up the value chain of production within Taiwan while also taking the opportunity to invest overseas. The second book, entitled Government and Politics in Taiwan, is written by Dr. Dafydd Fell. Taking a critical approach, Fell provides readers with the background to the history and development of the political system in Taiwan as well as an explanation of the key structures, processes and institutions that have shaped Taiwan over the last few decades. Topics covered include: the transition to democracy, party politics, cross-strait relations, foreign policy, electoral politics and voting, political economy, national identity and social welfare.”

Frank Ching has a piece today at The Diplomat which argues that the status quo could be the basis for a de facto peace agreement-if, or rather iff, the mainland can accept it. I will leave it to readers to form their own opinion on that, but there was one line that caught my eye. Namely, “ironically, passage of the Anti-Secession Law saw a lowering of cross-strait tensions.” I don’t know why an explicit threat having the intended effect should be described as “ironic” (implying an unintended outcome), and I also found empirical support for an Anti-Secession-effect in my analysis of CSB’s presidential discourse (in this CQ paper with Will Lowe, see e.g. Figure 3). A brief survey of the literature on the Law (e.g. here and here) makes me rather less sanguine than Mr. Ching about the robustness of the SQ.

Mail me at jonathan.sullivan@nottingham.ac.uk, follow me on Twitter @jonlsullivan, or access my papers at http://jonlsullivan.com

Bonnie Glaser just sent over her latest CSIS piece with Brittany Billingsley. The paper, entitled “Taiwan’s 2012 Presidential Elections and Cross-Strait Relations: Implications for the United States” is accessible here and is well worth a read. From the abstract (with permission):

The presidential election in Taiwan, scheduled for January 14, 2012, will have a significant impact on the cross-Strait situation regardless of the outcome. If President Ma is re-elected for a second term, Beijing may become impatient for faster progress toward reunification and put pressure on Ma’s government to launch talks aimed at settling political differences. Absent a domestic consensus on the island, cross-Strait political talks could be extremely divisive with possible negative repercussions both within Taiwan and between the two sides of the Strait.

If the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate, Tsai Ing-wen wins, she is unlikely to accept the two pillars on which mainland China has based its willingness to engage with Taipei: the 1992 Consensus on “one China” and opposition to Taiwan’s independence. Unless Beijing and Taipei can agree on a new formulation to guide their relationship, it is possible that cross-Strait interaction would slow and negotiations would cease. As of mid-November, polls show Ma in a dead heat with Tsai.

Beijing is watching the presidential campaign in Taiwan with great concern. Return of DPP rule could embolden domestic critics of Hu Jintao’s policy of pursuing “peaceful development” in cross-Strait relations to push for a tougher approach. Such a development on the eve of the leadership transition on the mainland could influence personnel arrangements and policies of the new leadership.

Much is at stake for the United States in Taiwan’s upcoming elections. Washington has a strong interest in the conduct of a free, fair, and open presidential election in Taiwan, not in supporting any particular candidate. At the same time, sustaining cross-Strait peace and stability is especially critical as the United States manages friction with Beijing on a broad range of economic, political, and security issues.

Can political integration work without a shared identity? Today, as Taiwan discusses whether or not to commence political talks with Beijing, and European integration is confronted by the biggest strains ever, it is a good time to ponder this question.

Six years ago, I published an article that debated the relationship between economic (structural) and political (institutional) integration. I argued that Taiwan represented an interesting anomaly of integrating its economic structures deeply with Mainland China, while taking no steps whatsoever in the direction of political integration. German unification represented the opposite case with political integration driving the process, while European integration lay somewhere in between.

Which of these models would ultimately prove to be the most enduring way to integrate, and was Taiwan’s awkward situation sustainable over time? Were both economic dependence and shared identity needed for lasting political integration to come about, or would either one of these suffice?

Events following the 2008 change of ruling party in Taiwan seemed to corroborate what my paper had anticipated: that extensive integration of economic structures would eventually lead to moves towards building some kind of an institutional framework for it. Indeed, the KMT government quickly opened direct travel and transport links and initiated several rounds of talks on economic issues, resulting in a series of agreements, culminating in the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA).

These actions went some way towards ‘normalizing’ Cross-Strait economic relations. However, it is a big leap from instituting preferential trade agreements to taking concrete steps towards political integration. In terms of pushing forward political integration, economic integration has probably already run its course and something else is now needed.

A security community of some sort has commonly been seen as necessary for political integration, ever since Karl W. Deutsch et al. published their classic work in 1957. In a security community, there is a high level of trust and war is no longer seen as possible between the political entities. The Nordic countries are a classical example. Contrast this to Taiwan, where even commencing talks on an eventual peace treaty recently proved highly contentious.

European integration has, in terms of its initial goal of maintaining and expanding peace on the European continent, been tremendously successful. For an elite-driven EU, the question is now whether actual political union can be created in a top-down way, without popular identification with the eventual goal.

Historical examples show that pluralistic security communities do not necessarily lead to political union. Deutsch argued that forming new political units from previously separated ones is much more demanding and historically rare than pluralistic security communities. Gradually integrating in a pluralistic security community of shared identity, common values and extensive interactions, is a longer but safer road than premature political union. For an example of how wrong political unions without an underlying security community can go, think of Yugoslavia.

Despite what the international media lets on, Taiwanese election campaigns have usually skirted around these existential issues. However, with Ma Ying-jeou raising the peace treaty idea, the 2012 joint presidential and parliamentary election may become the first election where the issue is tackled head-on. Yet, the issue is as dangerous for the KMT as it is for the CCP. It is not easy even for the DPP.

This debate may form the beginning of a consensus on how to deal with Mainland China. It may also end up exacerbating already acrimonious political divisions. Confronting this divisive issue may even be detrimental to more slow-moving integration processes of building a Cross-Strait security community.

Dr Mikael Mattlin is a researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. His recently published book on Taiwanese politics is titled Politicized Society: The Long Shadow of Taiwan’s One-Party Legacy (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2011).

Paul V. Kane, author of that NYT op-ed, has been roundly booed off stage. James Fallows writes, “I kept waiting for the “but seriously now…” transition to a real proposal, or the paragraph saying, “Obviously this would be crazy, yet it underscores…” It never came. Michael Turton is incredulous and ashamed of the NYT, but linked it to previously floated ideas. Until Mr Kane responds (its like waiting to see what that guy at the back of the bus is going to do next) I guess there’s nothing left to say. Apart from this of course:

Lots of poll activity over the weekend. Remarkably they all say pretty much the same thing: at present, the presidential race is a close call. A CLSA/Gallup poll has Ma at 44.2, Tsai 43.1 and Soong at 12.8. The latest TVBS poll gives Ma a one point lead over Tsai, with Soong at 9%. The gap has been closing at about 1% per TVBS poll since the summer. China Times also sees a one point gap between Ma and Tsai, with Soong around 10. UDN is reporting a 5 point gap and also finds that the vast majority of voters have not [yet, presumably] considered strategic voting. But 2/3 of Soong supporters would change to Ma. One of the interesting things about Taiwanese polls is how they are rumoured to be used as mobilization tools, by parties in cahoots with “friendly” media and pollsters. It is crucial for a candidate to be competitive and in with a chance of winning, but not so far ahead that supporters relax their own campaigning activities or even fail to turnout. One should take these polls with a pinch of salt, but it should be clear that Taiwan 2012 is shaping up more like 2000 than 2008.

A poll two months out from the election is probably a better reflection of what we can expect than a poll seven months out, and what we’ve seen in this time is a consistent tightening of the polls. At this point, we can probably rule out a landslide for either side. But there is still room for substantial movements which are not necessarily indicative of dodgy polling. First, the number of self-reported undecideds is large: some of these know whom they will vote for, but aren’t saying. Second, there is a substantial number of non-partisans, presumably concentrated among younger cohorts, who are waiting to see what happens during the campaign. Third, despite the UDN figure cited above, there is likely a significant number of strategic voters, who likewise will wait to see what happens before deciding, possibly not before election day, whom to vote for. I wouldn’t be surprised if Soong’s poll numbers hold up during the campaign, but would be very surprised if he gets anywhere near the same proportion of votes on election day. The piquant element for both parties and their supporters is that we won’t know ahead of time how the attrition in Soong’s poll support shakes out in terms of votes.

Mail me at jonathan.sullivan@nottingham.ac.uk, follow me on Twitter @jonlsullivan, or access my papers at http://jonlsullivan.com

The NY Times editorial, “To Save Our Economy, Ditch Taiwan”, has raised my hackles – I always warned Taiwanese independence advocates that the US would sell them out, and here it is literal.

I have not been following the pre-election campaigns, but rather rely on my Taiwanese friends to give their boiled-down version of what’s in the news. More significant than public statements, I think, is the glimpses I have gotten on under-the-table long-term developments, by way of friends and acquaintances in government and business. Recently some Australian visitors to Taiwan asked my opinion, and I hit upon the analogy that Taiwan is a frog that is already in the jaws of a large python, but the python may find it hard to swallow. The “status quo” is of course not static, and has been moving predictably in China’s favor since the mid-1990’s.

At the present moment, several factors may be salient. First, Taiwan’s retired military and security officers have been going to China for at least the last two decades, and some even serve as consultants to China. A while back the Taipei Times made a count of over 400. I believe that China has thorough intelligence on Taiwan independence forces and others in Taiwan, and is poised to crack down when needed. For example, last month local newspapers revealed that a professor at the policy academy had copied personal information on Taiwan citizens criticizing China from police files and handed the information over to China. I have also run into numerous Chinese academics coming to Taiwan to “study” the Taiwan independence movement, but what they write generally reports the Kuomintang (KMT) line. As for Taiwan’s capacity for self-defense, to quote a private presentation by one of the correspondents for Jane’s Defence Weekly, Taiwan pays out for the fanciest and shiniest fire engines, but neglects to purchase the hoses. I’d guess that Taiwan’s purchases from the US are in effect protection money, only applicable for the current year.

Second, although China may depend largely on the KMT as its proxy to keep Taiwanese in line, it has been directly influencing KMT and even some current and former Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) elected officials with monetary rewards delivered through intermediaries. One of my sources on this is a member of the Kaohsiung City Council. For example, Chen Chu, mayor of Kaohsiung, was quickly punished for showing “The Ten Conditions of Love” about the heroine of Xinjiang, Rebiya Kadeer, by such a mechanism. It is likely that China, not merely the KMT, was ultimately behind the 2006 blitz to remove Chen Shui-bian.

Third, freedom of speech has markedly contracted. China has been reportedly buying into more and more Taiwan media. It can easily be observed that Taiwan TV news no longer addresses anything more significant than suicides, traffic accidents, and where to buy the best beef noodles (the reporters get convenient payouts from restaurants reported on). As in Singapore, and as in the new policy enacted by the security agencies and the Government Information Office in 1983 after the 1980 Kaohsiung Incident trials for sedition put egg on their faces in international press, political opponents can be crippled through libel charges. The courts have recently been fining those charged with libel $NT5-6 million, e.g. the fine for a commentator calling Shih Ming-deh (now aligned with Blues and Reds) a “political gigolo”. Within academia, universities have at the request of government officials removed from positions of authority professors who have criticized Ma Ying-jeou’s policies; and academics in general have shifted to self-censorship and avoidance of sensitive social and political topics.

Fourth, the rapid economic development of China has pushed past a tipping point: Native Taiwanese capitalists have in past decades understandably been eager to be free from the predatory KMT government and state corporations, and strongly supported the cause of democracy and Taiwan independence as well. But in the 1990’s they moved labor-intensive activities to China and elsewhere by the necessity of international competition, and now the Chinese market looms large as well. China has both increasingly accommodated the Taiwanese businessmen (e.g. allowing them international schools for their children) and enmeshed and controlled them (selective tax audits, with fines open to negotiation). This is the underlying dynamic, I believe, that even Tsai Ing-wen cannot undo, assuming she is elected.

Many Greens think that Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP has a 50-50 chance of being elected, and I hope that she is, but I would not hold my breath. If so, we might have a new lease on the progress of democracy in Taiwan, at least for the time being. It will also be a crucial test of whether we do in fact have a democratic process in voting; but the long economic strength and patronage network of the KMT, intimidation from China, and intentional idiocy of the media inveigh against putting too much trust in real democratic process.

Linda Gail Arrigo is Assistant Professor at Taipei Medical University. Professor Arrigo has been visiting Taiwan since the 1960s, where she was closely linked to the opposition movement, being deported for her role in the Kaohsiung Incident. Prof Arrigo is an authority on human rights in Taiwan.

People’s First Party (PFP) chairman James Soong reaffirmed his commitment to run in next year’s presidential election. Soong’s split from the Kuomintang (KMT) in 2000 after failing to receive the party’s presidential nomination lead to the first transfer of power on the island, with Chen Shui-bian winning with only 39.3% of the vote. His unsuccessful vice presidential bid in 2004 followed by an abysmal showing in the 2006 Taipei mayoral election (garnering 4% of the vote) seemed to spell the end for both Soong’s larger ambitions and his party’s future. Yet, again Soong has emerged as a potential game changer in Taiwanese electoral politics.

The majority of the attention so far has been on how Soong’s entry will affect Ma Ying-jeou’s re-election efforts, seeing that Soong will largely be pulling votes away from disenchanted KMT supporters. Such worries seem premature at best (he may still pull out, especially if the KMT offers enough incentives) and a gross overestimation of Soong’s presidential pull at worst. This is not 2000 however and voters and parties alike are increasingly savvy regarding the implications of splitting the blue vote on the national stage.

The return of Soong however arguably presents a greater threat to the KMT in the Legislative Yuan election. With the PFP coordinating on district elections and the party list with the KMT in 2008, the KMT won two-thirds of the seats. If even a marginally rejuvenated PFP opts instead to run its own candidates in select districts against the KMT (with or without its own party list), this provides a window for additional seats to swing towards the DPP. For example, of the 52 districts in which the KMT candidate beat out a DPP candidate, 13 were by less than ten percent. Assuming a political environment more conducive to the DPP than 2008, the presence of even marginal PFP candidates in any of these districts could have turned these races in the DPP’s favor.

The coupling of the presidential and legislative elections next year presents a unique opportunity for James Soong and the remnants of the PFP. For now, only Soong knows his end game.

Timothy S. Rich is a doctoral candidate in political science at Indiana University, working on the impact of electoral reforms. Visit his research pages here.

Shouldn’t the military stay out of politics? I remember when CSB won in 2000, there were swirling rumors (fancy that) that the military would rebel. That didn’t happen, but it remains a constituency with a strong preference (understatement) for the KMT. Ma hooked up with some military big-wigs to attend “a joint commemoration of Chiang Kai-shek and Sun Yat-sen”. He delivered a speech “ringed by 11 retired generals” (what an image) in which he invoked “Sun Yat-sen’s deathbed exhortation: peace, struggle on, save China”. This earned him big props from said generals. Hau Pei-tsun (father of the incumbent KMT Taipei Mayor), said Ma is “the only [suitable] candidate”. Hsu Li-nong trumped that by saying “today there is no literal battlefield where we might exert our Whampoa spirit. Today, our battlefield is the election … Today, supporting Ma Ying-jeou in the election is defending the Republic of China”. Good imagery, but shouldn’t the military stay out of politics?

Michael Turton looks at the sudden uptrend in election related trinkets. The DPP has its piggy-banks, and so like a teenager coveting an iphone4, the KMT had to get its own Taiwan Talisman. I’m sure there’s something serious to be said here about symbolism and the nexus between religion and politics, but I got sidetracked by MT’s observation that “Ma’s sudden and temporary outbreak of Taiwaneseness will be instantly cured on Jan 15, 2012”. Remember the dramatic scene in 2004, when Lien and Soong (then running on a joint ticket) prostrated themselves at different stump locations to kiss the ground, showing their love for Taiwan? It was brilliant political theater and came at a moment when, because of CSB’s Taiwan identity campaign and the failure of Lien-Soong’s initial campaign agenda to resonate, they needed to do something like that.  After that does anyone still think politicians aren’t opportunistic? Four years earlier, Lien spent a fortune telling people Soong didn’t love Taiwan, and was soon hotfooting it to Beijing to talk with the PRC as if he had a mandate to do so! (Pic by Fang Pin-Chao for the Taipei Times)

I linked to Dafydd Fell’s Brookings election overview the other day. He has an updated overview in the TT. Dafydd is still surprised that the polls are so tight and disappointed that the legislative campaigns have flown under the radar. He also points out that “this has been the least passionate presidential election in Taiwan’s history”. I am unfortunately not present in Taiwan for this campaign, but from a distance it appears less inspiring (and divisive) than the first three presidential campaigns which I did witness. There are numerous potential explanations for the slightly underwhelming emotions surrounding what is a crucial election. The candidates are low key and intellectual rather than affective speakers. The salient issue, the economy top-to-bottom, does not inspire the same kind of passionate rhetoric that national identity would. On several issues, the parties are not too far apart-nothing like, for example, Lee vs. Peng. Tsai is not as polarizing, or have as many enemies, as CSB. Given how close the presidential election is, and our best guesses that the KMT will control the legislature, but with a much smaller majority, post-election there will be need for bi-partisan cooperation. This may be having an effect on the low levels of competition we see now.

Although its my bad luck to be blogging “the least passionate presidential election” to date (and I do secretly yearn for Soong to introduce some spice), it might be a positive sign for Taiwanese democracy. Elections have perhaps become so routinized that they don’t arouse the same passions as previously: and remember that those same passions often spilled over into unseemliness. Democratic institutions have perhaps gained sufficient trust that people do not have the same level of fear should their chosen party not win. So, boring doesn’t necessarily mean bad. And the elections are still 2 months away, plenty of time to heat up.

Mail me at jonathan.sullivan@nottingham.ac.uk, follow me on Twitter @jonlsullivan, or access my papers at http://jonlsullivan.com

I guess if you’re reading this blog, you’ll have probably seen it by now. If you haven’t, feel free to take a minute out from reading this post to check it out. If my Twitter feed is anything to go by, it has really touched a nerve. But that might be because the people I follow are rather more knowledgeable about Taiwan’s situation than the author, Paul V. Kane, a former Marine and Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government. The title alone, “To Save Our Economy, Ditch Taiwan”, was enough to give my followees palpitations. It is unfortunate that, as Paul Mozur (WSJ’s Taiwan correspondent) put it on Twitter, “everyone ignores Taiwan for months, then a particularly stupid editorial comes out and everyone reads it”.

I agree with Mozur’s sentiment, but the implication that we should ignore this op-ed because it is myopic and uninformed is wrong. The very fact that it reached the pages of the NYT is reason enough to take it seriously. The NYT is not in the habit of giving column space to madmen-from which I infer that there is sufficient sentiment in the US that the prevailing relationship with Taiwan should be re-calibrated, although perhaps not to the extent that Kane describes. It is not implausible that, if framed in Kane’s stark terms, a war weary American public and opportunistic politicians could support the notion that America’s self-interest (in Kane’s terms, writing off the debt that China holds and avoiding a potentially devastating war over Taiwan) is best served by sacrificing its obligation to defend Taiwan. That is, in my opinion, wrong on many levels, but it is not implausible.

If you’re still reading at this point, thank you. Now let’s count the ways in which Kane’s op-ed goes off the rails. First, the notion that “America has little strategic interest in Taiwan” is astonishingly naive. Second, the idea that Taiwan is going to declare independence is literally incredible. Third, if “absorption” is “inevitable” then why worry that “the cautious men in Beijing” will lose patience and try to “take Taiwan by force”? Fourth, Taiwan is a bone of contention in US-China relations, but its not the only one. After “giving up Taiwan” do you not think China will move on to the next bones of contention on its (increasingly long) list? What next, quit Japan, Central Asia, global financial institutions? Fifth, “a Taiwan deal could pressure Beijing to end its political and economic support for pariah states like Iran, North Korea and Syria”. Why would it? Sixth, “Congress should see a deal with China as an opportunity to make itself credible again”. Are you serious, Mr Kane? Finally, the thing that’s getting a lot of peoples’ goat, invoking the future of America’s children-what about Taiwan’s children?

There is so much more to write on this, but I just wanted to get my initial thoughts up. I will leave you in the capable hands of Nancy Tucker and Bonnie S Glaser (whom I’m delighted to say will post here very soon) and their article “Should the US abandon Taiwan?” For those of you with Kane-induced fear of following the link, the answer is a resounding “no”.

Mail me at jonathan.sullivan@nottingham.ac.uk, follow me on Twitter @jonlsullivan, or access my papers at http://jonlsullivan.com

I wrote yesterday that James Soong would be right to brace for a KMT assault. I imagine he knows whats coming, because he faced it before in 2000. In this ad from 2000, Soong speaking directly to camera, says “when I decided to run, I knew I was going to face savage attacks, because I’m competing against two parties”. He doesn’t give those attacks any credence by addressing their content, instead deftly moving on to say that both parties have neglected the real desires of the people. He continues with a restatement of the “everyman” image he earned and cultivated in the 1990s, saying that ‘I’ve listened to the people, I know what they want and I can deliver’.

Against the “everyman who gets stuff done” image Soong put across in his ads, the KMT went after Soong’s character. In this ad they explicitly question his everyman status, rhetorically asking off the bat “are you really just a regular guy?” As evidence that he’s not like you and me, they cite his luxury apartments in exotic locales. In this election, where “love for Taiwan” had become a salient theme (before it came to dominate in CSB’s re-electioon campaign), the ad asks rhetorically whether having luxury boltholes overseas demonstrates love for Taiwan. A nice technique in the ad is overlaying footage of Soong denying his real estate portfolio (and saying he’ll withdraw if found true) against apparent evidence of its existence. The killer line at the end “do you believe it?”, ostensibly about the claim that he would withdraw, but linked to a large volume of materials attacking Soong’s integrity.

In 2000, Soong faced very big scandals and many personal attacks from Lien and Chen and yet still stayed competitive to the end. This was largely down to the substantial social capital he had built up in his previous offices. The timing was also right for Soong, with voters wanting change but still not sure that they trusted a DPP president. Anecdotally, I remember Taiwanese saying to me things like “sure, Soong has his faults, but in that he’s no different from any other politician, but unlike the others at least he gets things done for people like me”. Soong does not have the same capital with which to protect himself this time, and it will be interesting to see if his everyman shtick still resonates long after he was really in position to prove it.

Mail me at jonathan.sullivan@nottingham.ac.uk, follow me on Twitter @jonlsullivan, or access my published and working papers at http://jonlsullivan.com

I finally got round to checking out two election resources. First, there is the Taiwan election 2012 Flickr group, with contributions from Michael Turton, David Reid and other serious photographer-types. If you are following the elections from afar, its going to be a great way to access some of the flavour of the campaigns. Second, there is a dedicated YouTube Taiwan 2012 site. To my shame (partly because I have a paper coming out in the China Quarterly exhorting researchers to make better use of online resources) I only caught up with this today. It is a definite improvement on the site they ran for the municipal elections.

As far as I can tell, the two major contributions are news clips from all the major TV stations, arranged by channel (the 即時新聞 tab). Balance and choice; good job Google. Second, there is a very neat collection of party campaign materials (divided by party, including minor ones) under the 候選人頻道 tab. The promised 候選人專訪is at present virtually empty, but there’s also some good stuff on the main presidential candidates’ Google+ pages (linked from the homepage). I couldn’t find any talk show coverage on the site, but you can find, for example,  全 民 開 講’s YouTube channel here. Talking of talk shows, check out this PhD thesis by Alice Chu. I don’t think it came out as a book, but please correct me in comments.

The Taipei Times has a feature on young voters, which they define as 20-something. With that definition, we’re talking about a pretty large cohort, about 20% of the electorate. This cohort also sees exceptionally high turnout, around 80%. If they are like their counterparts in other democracies, they should also be less entrenched in their political views and thus more likely to be influenced by shorter-term factors, like what transpires during the campaign. Whereas a large component of older cohorts made their minds up long before the campaign, younger voters are treated as more win-over-able.

It is not surprising that parties want to secure the ‘young’ vote, but apart from how they wrap their message up with social media window dressing, are parties addressing what these voters want? For that matter what do they want? Not surprisingly, they want an economy in which they can get a job and build a decent life, which is pretty much what other cohorts want as well. Shelley Rigger, quoted in the article, is spot on when she says “for a long time, young people in Taiwan felt school was really hard, but there was a reward at the end of it. For today’s youth, it’s not clear that there’s anything waiting for them at the end.” Fashionable gimmicks, national identity rhetoric and personal attacks are no substitute.

Mail me at jonathan.sullivan@nottingham.ac.uk, follow me on Twitter @jonlsullivan, or access my published and working papers at http://jonlsullivan.com

In mid-October, Ma proposed his will of signing a “peace accord” with China. He supplemented this proposal by arguing that the signature of the Cross Strait peace accord should proceed under three conditions, namely the country’s need, public support, and congressional superintendence. Later, he added that the signature should be determined by referendum. Ma’s proposal led to several domestic and international repercussions. I firstly summarize the opinions of Taiwan, China, and the United States, and then provide my own observation.

In Taiwan, there are several conjectures about the reason for Ma to propose the Cross Strait peace accord. Firstly, it is because of the stalemate result of public opinion polls between Ma and Tsai. Ma sought to regain an advantageous position by emphasizing his effort in improving the Cross Strait relationship. The Mainland Affairs Council claims that the purpose of Ma’s proposal is to institutionalize the status quo. Second, it is to repay China’s surrender of profits in signing the ECFA and opening up free independent travel of Mainland tourists to Taiwan. Third, Ma tries to shift public focus away from people’s livelihood and economic issues, where he does not achieve success. Fourth, to gain the support of Taiwanese businessmen in Mainland, this accord is a substitution for the Taiwanese Businessmen Investment Protection Agreement (which China is reluctant to sign). These are possible reasons, but since we are not Ma, we can never know his genuine motive.

Tsai responded that Ma’s proposal could lead to four crises, including sacrificing Taiwan’s sovereignty, changing the status quo of the Cross Strait relationship, undermining democratic values, and diminishing strategic depth. Ma replied that the peace accord serves as a fire wall between Taiwan and China. Its goal is to achieve reciprocal peace and prosperity. The Democratic Progress Party (DPP) criticized it by arguing that the Taiwanese people do not authorize Ma to unilaterally change the status quo and initiate political negotiations with China. The DPP also proposed several questions. First, if the National Party (KMT) wins the election, it has the right to define the substance of Ma’s three conditions (just like ECFA). Second, since Ma claimed that he has largely improved the Cross Strait relationship and the probability of war is quite low, why do we need a peace accord? Third, when the People’s Republic of China does not recognize the Republic of China and tries to eliminate it from the international society, what is our status if we really sign the peace accord? Finally, if the result of a referendum opposes the peace accord, what would Ma do? In sum, the DPP tries to equate Ma’s peace accord proposal to his will of advancing unification. Almost half of the Taiwanese electorate tag a “unification-oriented” mark on Ma owing to his practice in the past three years (though Ma himself has given every effort to deny it). Therefore, the DPP’s discourse gains certain persuasiveness in Taiwan.

China did not reply directly, and expressed that it cognized and respected Ma’s proposal. China is not eager to sign a peace accord with Taiwan. Its preference is the growth of the economy first and foremost while politics comes secondary. Only after stabilizing Cross Strait economic and civil cooperation and eliminating the obstacle of political negotiation will China consider Ma’s proposal. Nevertheless, Ma’s proviso of referendum provoked China because China regards a referendum as pointing towards Taiwanese independence. Besides, China has expressed its grievance against Ma’s volatile policy direction.

On the US side, the ex-President Clinton doubted the reliability of China’s commitment. He did not hold a positive perspective on Ma’s proposal according to his experience in facilitating the signature of peace accords between Israel and Palestine (their conflict lasts to date). I think the comparison between Israeli-Palestinian and China-Taiwan relationships does not make sense owing to their difference in almost every dimension, e.g. cultural similarity, capability, territorial and economic scales, etc. The US is very cautious about the possible turbulence in East Asia caused by Ma’s proposal. Most importantly, Ma’s proposal might damage the validity of the Taiwan Relations Act and give China the excuse to annex Taiwan with a military approach. It implies that China might break the blockade of the first island-chain set by the US and undermine US interests in the Western Pacific region.

In my opinion, Taiwan has very little leverage to negotiate a peace “accord” in favour of Taiwan under its current power gap with China. It is meaningless to discuss or even to sign the peace “accord” before China dispels its military threat to Taiwan and relinquishes its goal of annexing Taiwan. Besides, a peace accord is signed by the warring parties in a single country, while a peace treaty is signed by warring sovereign countries. If Ma really tries to protect Taiwan’s sovereignty, and if China and Taiwan indeed interact on the basis of “mutually non-denial” as claimed by Ma, he should propose a peace treaty rather than a peace accord. However, the validity ofa peace accord or peace treaty for a non-democratic regime is very doubtful, just as the result of the Munich Agreement and the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Soviet Union illustrates. The validity of Ma’s peace accord for non-democratic China might share a similar fate. Finally, after the authority handing-over process, China’s priority is to stabilize the economy and neighborhood situation. To sign a peace accord with Taiwan is not its priority. However, if some unforeseeable factors lead to domestic upheaval, China might shift from domestic conflict to threatening Taiwan. Policymakers in Taiwan should prepare for this scenario cautiously.

In sum, Ma’s Cross Strait peace accord proposal seemed like a failed campaign strategy, and led to an inconvenient spillover of negative repercussions from domestic to the international level.

Dr. Sheng-Chih Wang is a Research Assistant in the Department of Diplomacy at National Chengchi University, Taiwan.

What to make of James Soong? I don’t know, other analysts don’t know, so why not indulge in some idle speculation? Or like the Asia Times, which really let’s its imagination go wild with this one? Try and keep up now: Soong’s presidential campaign is a strategy to keep the PFP salient so that it can win enough seats (specifically Hualien, Kinmen and three aboriginal seats) to become pivotal (no less than a “kingmaker”) in the 8th Yuan, as a coalition partner to the DPP (which, even if it wins the presidency will inevitably be a minority in the legislature). Soong will simultaneously avenge age-old snubs by Ma (remember 2000?) and Lien Chan, by taking the latter’s beloved APEC job. In the event of Tsai winning, Soong will avert a reprisal of tensions with China because he is “trusted by Beijing” (probably not an endorsement you should put in your campaign ads, James) and an acceptable “shackle” to “DPP adventurism” (that’s what it says, don’t shoot the messenger, ok?).

This reminds me of a public speaking course I attended where we had to say words out loud, any words randomly ordered, for a minute in order to warm the voice box up. This particular collection of words looks to me suspiciously like the transcript of a James Soong daydream. However, the article does resist, heroically, the temptation (or is it an international diktat?) to write “pro-independence DPP”, instead going with the demure “anti-unification DPP candidate”.

As prescient as this Asia Times article may turn out to be, this UDN piece is more interesting on a number of levels. It opens with the line “loads of people are asking themselves, James, what the heck are you up to?” UDN can only think of four possibilities: he wants to be president, he wants to lead the PFP caucus in the Yuan, he wants to become head of the Executive Yuan or SEF (and thereby set himself up to influence cross-Strait relations), or finally he simply wants to pull Ma down and help Tsai get elected. Number one is out. Number two is scratched, because if his goal was that limited he could it achieve it in any number of less hassle-some ways. Paraphrasing, number 3 is a one in a million shot because whichever party wins, there’s no way they’d give such a shifty character as Soong an important position like that.

Which only leaves this: Soong wants to bring Ma down and allow Tsai to win. Remember that UDN is traditionally predisposed toward the KMT (that might be an understatement), and Soong should expect (I’m sure he does) a lot of attacks from this direction. The key point of the build up is this: 3-5% of the vote is all Soong needs to assure Tsai of victory. If I can interpret: “if you’re angry with Ma and considering voting for Soong, remember, it only takes a few people like you and the DPP will get in”. Of course we don’t know how many votes Soong might receive, and from whom he might take them. But this commentary (if I’m right to make this inference) is eerily reminiscent of blue media stories in 2000 and indeed a lot of KMT campaign advertising. Many materials have featured similarly precise quantifications of what is essentially the “DPP fear factor”, that long time staple of KMT campaigns: a vote for anyone but us will let the DPP in which in turn will lead to a) war with China, b) economic collapse or c) both.

The “quantification of danger” is something to watch out for once the Soong effect starts to show up in the polls, because if he starts showing anything like 10% levels of support, it will have a significant effect on the dynamics of the campaign. Remember that polling 10% support wouldn’t mean he would actually get 10% of votes, because as a third party spoiler his actual vote count will suffer attrition as those who tell pollsters they support Soong face up to the reality of wasting their vote in the booth. Another thing to look out for is how Tsai deals with the inevitable fear attacks if she takes the lead in the polls. Being the frontrunner in the polls is an unusual position for a DPP presidential candidate to be in. Indeed I think I’m right in saying that no DPP candidate has enjoyed that status, not even CSB when he stood for re-election. Being the frontrunner would render Tsai more vulnerable to fear attacks (as the possibility of her winning becomes more credible). It will be interesting to see whether her team will try to inoculate against such attacks if her numbers continue to improve.

Mail me at jonathan.sullivan@nottingham.ac.uk, follow me on Twitter @jonlsullivan, or access my papers at http://jonlsullivan.com

With southern Taiwan strongly pro-DPP and northern Taiwan strongly pro-KMT, both the local and international media as well as the two major parties in Taiwan have identified central Taiwan, especially the municipality of Taichung, as a major battleground in the ongoing election campaigns. In this piece I’ll summarize some of the issues that impact voters in the Taichung area.

The fundamental factor shaping voting patterns is the colonial pattern of resource flows erected by the KMT. Historically in Taiwan, resources flow out of peripheral rural areas and south and central Taiwan and to the north. In practice this has meant that the South is beggared to pay for Taipei’s extravagant lifestyle, and a disproportionate share of development funds have gone to the two municipalities of Taipei and (less so to) Kaoshiung. This colonial pattern of resource flows from south to north is a powerful driver of pro-DPP sentiment in the south and center, where Taiwan independence controversies mask a bitter struggle over the island’s resources between the center and periphery, between party elites in the KMT and southern KMT supporters, and between the two major parties.

As a result, in the last few years, the urban areas of Tainan, Kaohsiung, Taichung, and Taipei county have all upgraded themselves to municipalities in order to obtain a bigger slice of the government funding pie. Taichung annexed its entire county to form a new municipality in December of 2010, deeply impacting the local area’s politics.

Further, because of the central government’s lavish treatment of Taipei and other issues, local governments outside Taipei are deeply in debt, especially in the south and center. This means that the counties are dependent on central government funding flows, while voters experience a lack of the services and infrastructure they need. This makes them consider switching parties and politicians.

Taichung itself should never have been in play. A few years ago the friendly, outgoing Mayor of Taichung, Jason Hu, a KMT heavyweight and former former foreign minister, was highly popular with his constituents. He had crushed his DPP opponent in the previous election, and memories of his DPP predecessor, a local faction politician widely held to be corrupt, were not happy. Bit by bit, however, Taichung area residents have become increasingly dissatisfied with the mayor’s leadership.

One major factor has been the development of along the west side of the city, where giant new apartment buildings rise like a glass and steel henge around the city’s outskirts and thrust a long finger of new development toward the city center. In the best build-it-and-they-will-come style, these are aimed at presumed Chinese investors. This wave of development has also included both the new science park on the slopes of Tatu Shan, the 300 meter high hill that stands between the city and the ocean, and the residential and commercial areas that surround it. Unfortunately for the KMT, during the months prior to the Dec 2010 election many local factions on that side of the city, feeling shut out of the pie, dropped their longtime support of the KMT and switched to the DPP. Because these factions are frequently aligned with local temple associations that function as the nexus for powerful local clans, local organized crime, local businessmen, and other influential individuals, temples on that side of the city switched sides as well. Although control of temples is seldom mentioned in media analysis of Taiwan’s politics, they are a key element in local politics. So influential are they that politicians have been convicted of vote buying for donating to local temples in order to get them to influence their devotees.

Conversely, the new wave of luxury development has almost totally neglected the east side of the city and the hills beyond. Additionally, the city was supposed to have had a metro years ago. Construction has finally begun, but the interminable approval process, delays, and changes in the plan, along with the city’s uneven development that has enriched developers but few others, has left many voters disappointed in the administration of Mayor Hu.

A second factor in the changes in Taichung is the new municipality. While the city itself may be solidly pro-KMT, the rural areas are thought to lean DPP. After the upgrade the outgoing KMT chief of the county was said to have simply given up on his job, since he would no longer have it come Dec 25th when the new municipality was born and the county was swallowed. Moreover, Taichung mayor Jason Hu was widely perceived to have neglected the county in his campaigning.

In May of 2010 a spectacular gangland killing profoundly altered the political calculus. An assassin simply walked into the office of reputed gangster Weng Chi-nan and shot him. Four police officers were present playing Mahjong with the victim and did nothing; investigation later established that perhaps as many as ten policemen had been in and out of the dead man’s office that day. This highlighted Taichung’s dismal reputation for collusion between police and organized crime and its reputation as the island’s crime center under Jason Hu. The killing followed on the heels of a massive funeral in the city for a major organized crime figure, attended by 20,000, including prominent politicians and mayor himself. The public professed to be sick of the city’s lack of order, and the local media went baying after the issue in its finest Golden Retriever style.

Other issues came in a cascade. In March a fire killed nine people in an overcrowded bar; Mayor Hu responded by closing more than 300 drinking establishments because they were improperly registered. Not only did this cause outrage in the city over the loss of the city’s vibrant music scene, it also made public the fact that the process for overseeing the certification of restaurants under Jason Hu was corrupt and ineffective. Because Taichung is perhaps the center of the island’s live music scene, this caused little ripples of resentment all over the island. Moreover, critics claimed that large establishments owned by individuals close to the KMT had remained open. Hu also went even further to announce a ban an island tradition, outdoor tables at convenience stores, a favorite place for workers to gather for beer and snacks in the evening. Locals rolled their eyes and then laughed when it wasn’t enforced.

In 2010 Jason Hu did manage to win reelection in a tight election, probably due to an assassination attempt on a KMT politician by a local gangster in Taipei, which perversely generated sympathy for the KMT after KMT officials mendaciously claimed it was an example of “pan-Green violence.” Many voters felt cheated by this propaganda and there may be a small backlash of compensating votes for the DPP in the 2012 election. The current DPP vice presdential candidate, Su Chia-chuan, lost the 2010 mayoral election in Taichung to Jason Hu, but performed extremely well in Taichung, suggesting that he may have a positive influence on the DPP’s prospects.

Many other basic political factors remain unchanged. The KMT’s control over local neighborhood politicians and political networks, as well as the local government, temples, bureaucracy and police is more or less intact. The DPP’s local area networks remain underdeveloped and dependent for support on local clan and factional organizations that are likely to switch sides if a better deal is offered. The KMT controlled legislature passed a law to freeze its local politicians in place for another five years in the event of DPP victories in 2010, meaning that local government remains a KMT fief. In some ways, given the massive KMT advantage in funding, structure, and organization, it is a powerful testimony to the incompetence of that party’s leaders and to the skill of DPP Chair Tsai Ing-wen in reviving the DPP and fielding credible candidates, that central Taiwan has become a key to victory in the upcoming Presidential and legislative elections.

Michael Turton is a Taichung resident and blogs at the highly regarded, influential and recommended The View From Taiwan.

In the first half of the presidential campaign, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was bothered by one thing only: the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) seemed to be shadowing their every move.

The KMT sent King Pu-tsung, President Ma Ying-jeou’s campaign manager, on a US trip at almost the exact same time as DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen’s. King visited every city Tsai went to and delivered a speech at Harvard University, where Tsai also spoke, on the same day.

On the policy front, the DPP claimed that the KMT was being a “copycat” by plagiarizing Tsai’s platforms, including her policies on housing, tax reform, agricultural subsidies and labour.

The KMT denied the DPP’s claim.

The DPP went on to launch its slogan for the second part of the campaign – “Taiwan’s first female president,” a claim that the KMT can not duplicate for an obvious reason.

Her campaign adopted the slogan not because it is “trendy” or “fashionable,”, but because women are often more able to solve problems in a harmonious way through better communication than men, Tsai said, adding that women are usually more perseverant and persistent as well.

In constituencies of Hakka ethnicity, the DPP has been using “Hakka girl for president” as its main slogan to promote its candidate who shares the same characteristics – frugality and perseverance, among others – with Hakka women.

Tsai did try to run her campaign in a much “softer” way in comparison to previous DPP candidates. She made clear that she does not like “negative campaigning” nor fighting the rhetorical battle.

However, the slogan also has a strategic implication in securing more votes from women.

Seen as a progressive and confrontational party since its founding in the martial law era, the DPP has had a hard time to appeal to women voters, often trailing the KMT by more than 10 percentage points in elections.

Frank Hsieh’s loss to Ma, whose good-looking appearance is believed to be one of his advantages in vying for female voters, in the 2008 presidential election by more than two million votes marked the lowest point. An unofficial tally showed that more than 4.8 million of Ma’s 7.65 million votes, or 62.7 percent, came from women voters.

The party also cited various countries, including Iceland, Thailand and Germany, which are led by a female head of state, as examples, and said that it is time for Taiwan to have a female leader.

It would be crucial for Tsai to bridge the gap and vie for women’s support on the presumption of their preference for a female leader.

Results of various recent public opinion polls are mixed. A survey conducted by the Taiwan Brain Trust between Oct. 28 and 29 found that Tsai has cut her deficit in women’s support against Ma to 39.3%-35.7%, which the DPP said is the closest of any DPP presidential candidate, and has led Ma by 2.8 percent.

Another poll conducted by Taiwan Association of Pacific Ocean Development between Oct. 31 and Nov. 2 found that Tsai still trailed Ma 38.6%-30.3% in terms of women support and she is behind Ma by 7.3 percentage points overall.

The appeal seemed to be received well in DPP rallies and Tsai’s presidential campaign visits everywhere. However, do Taiwanese women voters prefer a female leader? Are they ready to do something the Americans did not do? It remains unknown until election day.

Chris Wang is a political analyst, writer and editor at the Taipei Times. He writes here in a personal capacity.

On April 27^th this year, party chairperson Tsai Ing-wen captured the 2012 presidential nomination for Taiwan’s main opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).  This made her the first female presidential candidate in ROC history. Meanwhile in South Korea, another woman—Park Geun-hye—is expected to be nominated by the Grand National Party (GNP) for the 2012 presidential election as polls consistently have her far ahead of other GNP hopefuls.

Political life in East Asia is often characterized as male dominated, especially compared to its Western counterpart. Yet, recent elections throughout the region suggest a small but growing trend of strong female candidates across the political spectrum. In the cases of Tsai and Park, both carry the heavy burden of resurrecting the hopes of their particular parties. For Tsai, whose party lost in both the presidential and legislative elections in 2008, the main aim is  to steer the party towards the middle on the issue of Taiwan’s future status while simultaneously developing an engagement policy regarding China distinct from that of the Kuomintang (KMT).

Tsai’s stronger than expected showing in the 2010 Xinbei mayoral election, a region historically more favorable to the KMT, showed her ability to appeal to both party loyalists and the ever desired median voter. For Park, presidential politics are nothing new. As the daughter of authoritarian era leader Park Chung-hee, she narrowly lost her own bid for the GNP nomination in 2007. Her widespread appeal is seen by GNP insiders as a counterbalance to the general decline in party support under President Lee Myung-bak, further weakened by the success of the Democratic Party (DP) in by-elections held on April 27th.

Admittedly Tsai and Park are not necessarily representative of their parties or female politicians in East Asia.  In both countries as well as in Japan, female legislators remain underrepresented and relegated primarily to party list seats and not the more numerous district seats. This is likely due either to the difficulty in recruiting quality female candidates or more probable still, the hesitance of parties to run such candidates out of concern of their limited electoral appeal.  Still, while traditional views of a woman’s role within society are slow to change, we appear to see a growing willingness among a diverse set of voters in East Asia to transcend such historical and cultural constraints.

Certainly predicting any election in advance is risky business. Even if neither Tsai nor Park become the first female head of state in what we might call Confucian East Asia, the importance of major parties nominating nationally competitive female candidates should encourage future challenges to the political glass ceiling.

Tim Rich is a PhD Candidate at Indiana University, working on Taiwan and South Korea.  

October 10th, 2011 marked the 100th anniversary of the Xinhai Revolution which led to the demise of China’s last dynasty and the subsequent birth of the Republic of China (ROC). Known as Double Ten Day, this date is celebrated as the National Day in Taiwan. However, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) does not recognise this date; rather, it celebrates its own National Day on 1 October.

The ROC’s centennial has given politicians in Taiwan and mainland China another chance to express their political stances on the sovereignty of Taiwan, and from these expressions, three broad voices representing the blue, red, and green camps can be discerned.

The blue camp’s voice was reflected in Taiwanese president Ma Ying-Jeou’s National Day speech, in which he asserted that mainland China needs to recognise the existence of the ROC. Ma is also the blue camp’s candidate for the 2012 presidential election.

Maintaining the red camp’s stance, during a talk on the 100th anniversary of the fall of China’s last dynasty, Hu Jintao downplayed the existence of the ROC. Twenty-three times in Hu’s speech, he noted “the revival of the great Chinese people” as a result of the Xinhai Revolution and that it should continuously be pursued in our time, but he did not mention the ROC even once.

Lastly, the green camp, headed by Taiwan’s candidate for the 2012 presidential election, Tsai Ing-Wen, noted that the ROC is Taiwan, and Taiwan is the ROC.

These assertions reaffirm the three parties’ old schism over the existence of the ROC.

As usual, the red completely ignores the existence of the ROC, and repeatedly stresses that Taiwan should be reunited with China in due course. For the blue camp, the Kuomintang’s defeat in the Chinese Civil War led the ROC to temporarily relocate and re-establish itself in Taiwan; thus, the ROC does exist. Ma has avoided using the term ‘unification’, which the red camp enjoys advocating, but has stressed the necessity to institutionalise a peaceful relationship with mainland China. Although the blue and red camps have tackled the existence of the ROC and the question of unification differently, they share a similar tendency to situate Taiwan in the broader Chinese historical context.

On the other hand, the green camp has been known for its staunch stance on Taiwan’s unique identity and statehood. It views Taiwan’s history as more nuanced, such that it also encompasses the history of various indigenous people residing on the island. The green opposes the sole narration of Taiwan’s history and existence as a part of the greater Chinese history. Tsai’s abovementioned statement indicates that it is Taiwan that allows the ROC to exist. Therefore, while Taiwan’s history might include part of the history of the ROC, one cannot equate Taiwan’s history with that of the ROC.

It is worth noting that Tsai actually stirred debates last year when she contended that the ROC is a government-in-exile. However, by stating this year that the ROC is Taiwan and Taiwan is the ROC, Tsai made her stance more moderate. One can inevitably relate this to her effort to appease more voters in the middle (i.e., not too green, not too blue) in the upcoming presidential election.

Julie Yu-Wen Chen is an Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica in Taiwan and an Honorary Research Fellow at the Institute of Human Security at La Trobe University in Australia.

Paul Katz posted here last week on the Piggy bank scandal. The ever observant Michael Turton at the View From Taiwan points out that pigs have a history of symbolism in Taiwan. He reminds us that “when the KMT first arrived the locals would call the KMT the “pigs”. Rituals in which pigs were sacrificed then took on a political double meaning, the more so because the KMT became increasingly bent on reshaping traditional religion as the Taiwanese practiced it, under the slogan of “Simplify Customs and Save Waste”, deep into the 1970s. Indeed, the Taiwanese used to cover the pigs with colorful Nationalist political symbols, ostensibly demonstrating their loyalty to the regime in carrying out traditional religion, but since the pig was killed, the double meaning should be obvious”. In the same post, Michael posts an image of a children’s textbook from the early 1980’s showing how children donated their piggybanks out of love for the state.

I noted in another recent post, that KMT spokeswomen have outdone themselves in terms of their sanctimonious hand wringing over the “politicization of children” in the piggybank drive. On Twitter, the ever-punctilious @TimMaddog from Taiwan Matters linked to several examples of the KMT using children in their ads.

Ben Goren at Letters from Taiwan has been busy. First, he suggests some suitably irreverent campaign slogans for the major parties. You are invited, esteemed reader, to add your own in the comments below. Ben also flipped me some anecdotes about Taiwan’s readiness for a woman president. He says “while it seems that more women will vote for Ma, many ‘because his is so handsome’, another load will not vote for Tsai out of a feeling that she reminds them of the elementary school ma’am that punished them for not finishing their homework.” Although the gender voting dynamics are far from clear cut, Ben avers that “Taiwanese are ready for a female President and I think Tsai’s gender, despite the DPP playing it as a positive meme, will not factor too greatly into the final results”.

Tsai targeted rural aboriginal communities in latest leg of her campaign on the east coast, where “she pledged to advance Aboriginal autonomy and laws related to Aboriginal lands and maritime space, some of which have been seized by governments for several decades, and establish a “new partnership” between the government and Aborigines to “correct the historical mistakes that have lasted for hundreds of years.” See Scott Simon’s post comparing candidates’ indigenous policy platforms.

James Soong is in the news, and he’s not having a good day. First, he’s fed up with his computers being hacked. And he wants y’all to know he’s absolutely, positively not going to pull out of the campaign after doing a deal for seats in the legislature. Nah-ah, ain’t happening people… The first link here has a great Soong quote. Observe during this campaign: for a Big Man politico, Soong plays the injured soul so often and so well. Apropos being hacked, he laments how “furthering oneself by killing a rival is the act of a despicable man”. Is that Bushido?

Mail me at jonathan.sullivan@nottingham.ac.uk, follow me on Twitter @jonlsullivan, or access my published and working papers at http://jonlsullivan.com

Facing the transformation of the international order and the increasing influence of China in East Asia, policymakers in Taiwan acknowledge the necessity of engaging with China in order to survive the international political transformation and cope with more globalized economic competition. As presidential candidates, both Ma and Tsai require concrete cross-Strait policy platforms to inform the electorate about their methods to make use of Taiwan’s strategic position in East Asia as well as in the triangle relationship between China, Taiwan, and the United States. Since the principles of Ma’s and Tsai’s Cross Strait policy are respectively represented in the KMT’s “Golden Decade” and the DPP’s “Ten Year Policy Guidelines”, I briefly analyze the merits and shortcomings of their policy principles by comparing the two documents along with the security and economic conditions in East Asia.

China’s governing class is undergoing an authority handing-over process. Its current priority is to maintain domestic stability and peace in its neighborhood. Therefore, China is reluctant to see increasing competition in the cross-Strait relationship, initiated by US arms sales to Taiwan. It always tries hard to shape the cross-Strait problem as a domestic issue in order to drive out foreign intervention. In responding to China’s preference, the security dimension of the KMT and DPP’s cross-Strait policies have great similarity. On the one hand, they agree on maintaining a stable and peaceful cross-Strait relationship, since it is the most desirable outcome for most Taiwanese. On the other hand, they agree on improving self-defense capabilities against China since China does not relinquish its right of solving cross-Strait problems with a military approach. The KMT inclines to achieve the goal by technological innovation and arms sales primarily from the US, while DPP does not propose a concrete method.

However, a stable and peaceful cross-Strait relationship and enhanced military power seem contradictory. Neither Ma nor Tsai clarify how the two goals can coexist. In addition, from the perspective of US self-interest, the US needs China to deal with important issues in international affairs such as counter-terrorism and the Six-Party Talks. Foreign policy is always “realistic” and China’s role may compromise US willingness, or the contents of, arms sales to Taiwan. Accordingly, high dependence on US arms sales does not seem a cost-effective strategy and entails certain risks in the long-term. Moreover, the defense budget cut in recent years has led to domestic suspicion about the government’s determination to improve self-defense capabilities. Taiwan does not need (and cannot afford) an arms race with China, nor should it cut defense budgets year by year to express its benign motives to China . According to my experience of serving in the Taiwanese Marine Corps, it is more cost-effective to invest in developing advanced defense systems and increase the maintenance budget for self-developed systems as well as those we bought from foreign countries. Only by possessing a high quality (not large quantity) defense power capable of ensuring our own security do we have the leverage to negotiate the terms of a stable and peaceful Cross Strait relationship. Otherwise, China will call all the shots.

In terms of the economic dimension, China has made use of its large-scale internal market to increase Taiwan’s economic dependence and has tried to cut the political and economic connection between Taiwan and other countries in order to isolate Taiwan. Japan and South Korea also need China’s internal market for certain products (particularly the automotive and electronics industries) to stimulate their economic growth. China’s strategic objective is to increase East Asian countries’ dependence and thereby reduce US influence in the region. Further, China has become the second largest creditor (the first is Japan) of the US by buying huge sums of US governmental bonds. This increases China’s influence on US policy and ability to resist US attempts to shape East Asia’s balance of power.

Ma and Tsai propose different strategies to respond to this situation. Ma prefers active openness for Taiwan-China mutual investment through which he expects to resuscitate Taiwan’s economy and to make commercial profits. While Ma argues that the signature of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with China (which provoked serious domestic debate) would facilitate free trade agreements (FTA) between Taiwan and other countries, the claimed effect has not been clearly discerned yet (though the Senate “suggests” US-Taiwan FTA). However, the US and South Korea signed an FTA recently. It increases the opportunity for mutual investment and intensifies US economic connections with East Asia. In addition, the technological level and investment environments in Taiwan and South Korea are quite similar. Under the US-Korean FTA, Taiwan must prudently deal with the substitution effects of investment caused by tariff variation.

Tsai possesses a more cautious attitude about the impact of openness for Chinese investment, and emphasizes governmental support for native industries and economic autonomy. She also argues that Taiwan should engage with China from a multilateral framework (e.g. WTO) rather than through bilateral interaction or reckless unilateral action. This seems a more secure strategy for a small country to interact with another country with a much larger economy. However, Tsai’s argument remains stuck at the conceptual level and we get no clue about any precise method to achieve this goal.

In my opinion, Tsai’s strategy is conceptually correct but very difficult to carry out due to China’s international influence. Ma’s strategy is relatively risky, but easier to implement because it is more consistent with China’s interests. In sum, every problem has a solution, and every solution is a problem. Taiwanese people have to make their choice on 14 January 2012.

Dr. Sheng-Chih Wang is a Research Assistant in the Department of Diplomacy at National Chengchi University, Taiwan.

Indigenous people, accounting for about 2% of Taiwan’s population, are unlikely to influence the 2012 presidential election outcomes. Nonetheless, the relative success of the candidates in indigenous communities may influence elections for the Legislative Yuan, which has a quota of six indigenous legislators. The way in which candidates position themselves on indigenous rights, moreover, may indicate how they understand such issues as popular sovereignty and social justice. The goal of this post is to analyze how they position themselves in relationship to “multiculturalism” and “indigenism”.

The evolving framework of indigenous rights, as expressed in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007), is concerned about colonial injustice, affirms that indigenous peoples are equal to other peoples, and recognizes their right to self-determination. Indigenism, emphasizing indigenous sovereignty (self-government and land rights), can be contrasted with multiculturalism, focused more on ethnic harmony and social welfare.

In Taiwan, Article 10 of the additional articles of the ROC Constitution stipulates, “[t]he State shall, in accordance with the will of the ethnic groups, safeguard the status and political participation of the aborigines.” The 2005 Basic Law on Indigenous Peoples further outlines state responsibilities and indigenous rights, requiring the creation of indigenous autonomous zones. Yet there is still room for interpretation as policies are formulated and implemented.

All three candidates include indigenous rights in their platforms. Although “autonomy” emerges as a common leitmotif, there are differences in how they contextualize indigenous issues. Ma Ying-jeou’s (Chinese Nationalist Party, KMT) “Golden Decade” platform embeds eight planks under four guarantees: 1) the independence and integrity of the ROC; 2) the security and prosperity of Taiwan; 3) ethnic harmony and cross-straits peace; and 4) sustainable environment and just society. As part of “just society,” Ma subordinates indigenous rights to “ethnic harmony.” He promises to create indigenous autonomous zones (already stipulated by law), and make further progress on culture, education, and economic development. Ma’s platform thus frames indigenous rights in terms of ROC nationalism and ethnic harmony, positioning him closer to multiculturalism than to indigenism.

Tsai Ing-wen’s (Democratic Progressive Party, DPP) platform for the next decade of “development” is remarkably similar. With general goals of “strengthening Taiwan, consolidating Taiwan,” and core values of “looking to the world, equal justice,” she also subordinates indigenous issues under other goals. In the environmental section, she promises space to “develop indigenous tribal economies” in mountainous regions. Her 16th section, on “ethnic groups,” includes recognition in social memory, language rights, economic development, and the creation of autonomous zones. On autonomy, she promises to set up “self-managing” zones with secure financial resources. Tsai’s stated policy is thus closer to multiculturalism and social welfare developmentalism than to indigenism. Both Ma and Tsai seem to view indigenous people as ethnic minorities, rather than as colonized peoples with special rights in international law. The main difference between Ma and Tsai is that one subordinates multiculturalism to ROC nationalism, and the other to Taiwanese nationalism. From an indigenist perspective, both nationalisms are different variants of Han hegemony.

Dark horse candidate James Soong (People First Party, PFP) makes indigenous policy part of a bricolage of promises for youth, municipal reform, agriculture, indigenous peoples, disaster prevention, and education. His goals for indigenous peoples are framed as autonomy, equality, and development. His platform, beginning with themes of cultural “respect” and autonomy, states that the main principle is “self-sufficient development” rather than “long-term financial assistance.” The relative prominence of autonomy reflects the close relationship he cultivated with indigenous leaders while serving as Taiwan provincial governor; and suggests awareness of indigenism. Everyone knows that Soong is a Chinese nationalist, but he is the only candidate who does not explicitly subordinate indigenous policy to broader political goals or “ethnic relations”. His platform can be characterized as an ad hoc blend of light indigenism and heavy developmentalism. It was probably drafted by Walis Belin. Walis has been a KMT lawmaker, chair of the Indigenous Peoples’ Council (IPC) under Chen Shui-bian’s DPP administration – and is the political maverick who actually succeeded in creating the IPC in the first place.

If re-elected, Ma can continue to build upon the progress made during his first term. Most of the work at the IPC, led by Dr. Sun Da-chuan, emphasized social welfare while strengthening cultural foundations for autonomy. Tsai would likely replace Sun with an indigenous leader from Presbyterian networks, bringing a stronger preference for legal autonomy and experience with international activism. Soong, who has the strongest base in grassroots base in indigenous communities, is likely to get the most indigenous votes. If so, his legislative candidates will have better chances of getting elected, and may make forceful advocates for indigenous rights as members of the opposition. Walis Belin, surely not by coincidence, is one of those candidates. In terms of indigenous politics, he may be the real victor.

Scott Simon is Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at the University of Ottawa. He recently published an article on elections in indigenous Taiwan and blogs at the Centre for International Policy Studies blog 

Sanctimonious quotes from KMT women regarding the “politicization of children” during the DPP’s piggybank campaign. To wit, Chao Li-yun delivers her anguished verdict that “labelling children with political labels [sic] and ‘contaminating’ their innocence with politics is heart-rending. Could this also be seen as a type of bullying?” Continuing on, probably dabbing her wet cheeks, she explained how “many parents were saddened to see children appear at DPP fundraisers as Tsai’s electioneering tools”.

It is similarly sad when elderly partisans throw down in fisticuffs, as in this report of ad-hoc hospital waiting room campaigning gone wrong. A fight resulted when one old geezer “declined [the other’s] request to support Tsai,” because he could not vote for “one who wears a skirt”. (I wonder if this reflects a demure euphemism on the part of the journalist.) Typically, the local KMT politico called on Tsai to make a public apology, the local DPP rep issued some platitude about keeping calm, and everyone went home for tea.

A reasonable KMT piece about Soong’s campaign strategy and his (surrogates’) attacks on both blue and green. This piece includes a brilliant line, which they should copyright now otherwise I’m going to steal it and work into every article I write from now on. Ready? “Being a palace kongfu master, Soong is an expert of intrigues and machinations”. I imagine it is 100% accurate but its also fantastic-can’t you just picture Soong dressed in all black, skulking clandestinely around palace courtyards with scheming eunuchs and poisonous concubines? You can’t? Does this help?

The best case scenario for Soong is that the DPP and KMT attack each other, while he attacks them both while not suffering any attacks in return. This is not as implausible as it sounds, given that close rivals fight more intensely and there is generally nothing to gain from attacking a no-hoper. The key development will be if Soong’s campaign gains traction to the extent that he shows 15% in the polls. Since there is some debate about from whom Soong will be taking votes, neither KMT nor DPP could risk Soong getting that many votes. In this scenario, it is likely that Soong would be fired on by both parties, as happened in 2000 (when he was the clubhouse leader). In 2000 his accumulated capital (financial and social) enabled him to withstand dual attacks and, importantly, people knew he was in with a chance of winning. On this occasion Soong has none of these advantages, but then again, his motivation is probably not to win outright, but to gain leverage with the KMT to use post- election.

Mail me at jonathan.sullivan@nottingham.ac.uk, follow me on Twitter @jonlsullivan, or access my published and working papers at http://jonlsullivan.com

Recent developments in North Africa have re-ignited public interest in the fate of dictators. Inspired by footage of Muammar Gaddafi’s death outside Sirte, BBC4’s ‘Archive on Four’, for example, recently examined the diverse ways in which modern dictators have faced demise, contrasting those who died in their beds to those who were executed, in the manner of Gaddafi, by their own people.

One dictator who tends not to have been included in such comparative discussions, however, is Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang was fortunate enough to die of natural causes in Taipei in 1975 (rather than in the throes of a violent uprising), and the rule of his son in subsequent years ensured that a state-sponsored cult of personality carried on well after his passing. Taipei’s Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall, ordered by Chiang Ching-kuo as an act of filial mourning, is probably the most tangible example of this.

It is in a post-Chiang Ching-kuo Taiwan, however, that the fate of Chiang Kai-shek becomes slightly more complex and unusual. The gradual transformation to democratic rule which occurred under Lee Teng-hui saw the official memory of Chiang Kai-shek either suppressed, or, in the words of Stéphane Corcuff, ‘ritualised’ in Taiwan. In the 1990s, groups such as the New Party certainly clung to the heritage of Sun Yat-sen, but few acting or former KMTstalwarts went out of their way to embrace the heritage of Chiang Kai-shek. Under Lee, the beginnings of a process which has since come to be referred to as ‘de Chiang Kai-shek-ification’ (quJianghua) began – at first gradually, but eventually, under the Taipei administration of Chen Shui-bian, in a far more systematic fashion.

Despite all this – or perhaps because of it – Chiang Kai-shek never really went away in Taiwan. Indeed, come the 2008 presidential elections, he was back as a major political issue, with DPP attempts to rename and reconfigure the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall setting off a major public debate about how Chiang deserved to be remembered in a Taiwan which Chiang himself would probably not have recognised. Ironically, the opening of Taiwan to large numbers of mainland tourists since 2008 has contributed to such debates, with many Chinese visitors expressing an interest in visiting sites associated with the Generalissimo, and in seeing Chiang’s body, which still lies in state (though concealed from direct view) in Taoyuan.

It is unlikely that the legacy of Chiang Kai-shek will arouse quite as much attention at the 2012 elections. The DPP under Tsai Ing-wen has not placed quite as much weight on KMT failures of past decades, preferring instead to focus on Ma Ying-jeou and the potential problems that a number of his policies may cause for Taiwan in the future.

Yet it is significant that even today, the memory of Chiang is still being called upon in Taiwanese political debate, either to defend Nationalist rule on the island or to illustrate KMT authoritarianism of an earlier era.

Only a few days ago, the one-time KMT premier Hau Pei-tsun used the anniversary of that long-forgotten ‘holiday’ – Chiang Kai-shek’s birthday – to defend Chiang’s reign, and argued that Taiwan would have no democracy today had it not been for the actions that Chiang carried out in the name of ‘anti-communism’ in the Cold War years.

Such comments do not represent mainstream public opinion inTaiwan. And despite leading to complaints from a number of groups, they have not yet resulted in the widespread and often divisive discussions about Chiang’s legacy that were witnessed in 2008. Nevertheless, it is indicative of the unresolved debates about the merits (or demerits) of Chiang’s rule on the island that his name continues to be invoked almost four decades since his death, and especially in the run up to elections. If nothing else, Hau’s comments – made only days after the new leaders of Libya informed the world that Gaddafi’s body has been laid to rest in an unmarked grave – suggest that Chiang’s legacy, like his as yet un-buried body awaiting interment in a hypothetically unified China, remains very much ‘up in the air’ in democratic Taiwan.

Jeremy E. Taylor is Lecturer in Chinese Studies at the University of Sheffield. He is the author of Rethinking Transnational Chinese Cinemas: The Amoy-dialect Film Industry in Cold War Asia (London: Routledge, 2011).

Next year’s Legislative Yuan election will be the second under a two-vote mixed member system, where legislators are elected in two tiers: 73 seats by single member districts (SMDs) alongside 34 seats delegated by proportional representation (PR). An additional six seats are delegated by two multiseat aboriginal lists. What should we expect this time around?

Although the 2008 election was a landslide victory for the KMT in terms of seats (72%, slightly more if coalitional partners are included), evidence both in Taiwan and in mixed systems elsewhere provide some insight into probable outcomes.

Since the two tiers are not linked (that is voting in one does not directly affect the other), the expectation is that over time support beyond the two strongest candidates or parties will diminish. District evidence in Taiwan already shows voters defecting towards stronger, usually DPP- or KMT-affiliated candidates, with less than five percent of the vote in SMD races for candidates beyond the top two in 2008. Evidence from mixed member elections since 1990 finds that across almost all see a similar reduction over time, with the East Asian cases (Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan) appearing particularly hostile to smaller parties in district races.  The five percent threshold for party list representation (a common threshold in mixed systems) further limits the chances of smaller parties, as evidenced by the both the New Party (NP) and Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) failing to garner a single seat.

The KMT success lies largely in factors beyond these institutional factors however. Scandals associated with the DPP drove swing voters towards the KMT.  A primary system further disadvantaged the DPP in areas that should have been highly competitive. While the KMT formula used public opinion polls and party member polling, the DPP only polled those self-identifying as “green”, and in doing so arguably nominated candidates more extreme than the median swing voter.

The question remains have parties learned? The KMT clearly do not expect a repeat of 2008. Smaller parties have little incentive to exhaust limited resources in most district races, but potentially can eke out party list seats. It also appears that the DPP has learned from 2008, opting towards candidates not as closely identified as deep green. Meanwhile if the DPP and TSU followed the suggestions of former president Chen Shui-bian and ran a unified party list similar to the coordination among the KMT and the People’s First Party (PFP), the pan-green coalition potentially would pick up an additional list seat.

Predicting any election months in advance is tricky business, but evidence of voter and party adaptation suggest that the electoral system itself does not prevent a greater balance in party representation.

Tim Rich is a PhD Candidate at Indiana University, working on Taiwan and South Korea.  He can be reached at tsrich@indiana.edu. 

Taiwanese businessmen (Taishang) have been investing in China for more than three decades. If you talk to any Taishang in China about their political identity (as I’ve been doing for the last 8 years of my research), most probably their response will be that “Business is business, politics is politics. We are businessmen and we don’t talk about politics”. However, can they really isolate themselves from politics?

Actually Taishang are one of the groups that will have a determining influence on the outcome of the presidential election. For the Taiwanese government’s concerns, Taishang and their families are a fundamental source of votes. Estimates vary wildly (from several hundred thousand to more than a million), but without doubt there are a substantial number of Taishang with families in China. Taishang supported the KMT policy from December 2008 to open the three direct links (trade, transport and postal service), which shortened the time of processing and saved some capital for production. Most importantly, the opening of transportation links cut down on the time it took Taishang to go home. However, with the global economic recession starting in 2009, most small and medium sized (SMEs) Taishang (which comprise the majority of Taishang in China) hoped the next government would establish a more solid economic agreement with China.

ECFA (Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement) obviously springs to mind when we talk about economic agreement. ECFA was signed in China in June 2010, and aimed to strengthen cross-Strait economic and industrial cooperation by waiving unnecessary custom fees and also many other detailed cooperation across the Strait, including agricultural production. Nevertheless, according to the Taishang I have interviewed, they don’t quite understand the meaning of ECFA and most importantly, when they are crying out for help to solve their tough situation in China, ECFA does not seem to do much for them.

Most Taishang expect the government to negotiate with the Chinese government a better deal for them in more practical terms. For instance, in acquiring loans from local Chinese banks. This kind of practical issue certainly was not included in the grand framework of ECFA, and yet it is greatly needed for most Taishang in China. For the presidential election in 2012, Taishang will vote not for the colour of a party, but for the party which can address their problems.

Chun-Yi Lee is a post-doctoral researcher at the University of Nottingham, where she works on Chinese labour issues and (separately) Taishang.